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CHAPTER 1
ON THE DESIRABILITY OF INSIDER TRADING
REGULATIONS IN FINANCIAL MARKETS: A
REVIEW ESSAY
First draft: June 1992,
Current version: January 1993.
ABSTRACT
The debate whether insider trading should be prohibited or not is the topic of this dissertation. This cMpter offers a
short review of the arguments for and against regIdation, su.rveys the empirical literatu.re, and discu.sses briefly the
regu.lation on SOfl'U! 11IIljorstock exchanges. Finally, an overview of the su.bsequ.entchapters is given.
3
1.1 INTRODUCTION
This dissertation analyzes, from an economic point of view, the desirability of insider trading reguJations in
fmancial markets. Its objective is to contribute to a better understanding of how fmancial markets work when
insider trading is allowed, relative to the case where the supply of corporate insiders is limited by a law
prohibiting insiders from trading on inside information. A better understanding could. for instance, be useful to
stock market regulators by improving the design and enforcement of the regulations, and thereby improve the
welfare of groups of individuals such as small, uninformed investors.
Insider trading is interpreted as being the security trades of corporate employees (and their tippees) based on
material non-public information obtained at work or in connection with work. Information is considered to be
non-public if it has not been disseminated in a manner making it available to investors in general. This
interpretation of insider trading is narrow in the sense that not all informed trading is considered to be insider
trading, and not all trades by employees need to be based on superior information. Non-public information
obtained by employees at work or in connection with their employment is referred to as inside information.
Individuals trading on such information are called corporate insiders or just insiders. Individuals trading on other
information or for other reasons are called outsiders. They are often subclassified according to their trading
motives as liquidity traders, hedgers, market professionals, market makers, broker - arbitrageurs, etc. Corporate
employees may trade as outsiders if they trade for other reasons than motivated by inside information, for
instance, because of liquidity needs or pure hedging. Finally, if the regulators so decide, insider trading may be
allowed or prohibited.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. Section two discusses the research methodology used to analyze
insider trading, sections three, four, and five review the arguments for and against a ban on insider trading,
section six looks at empirical studies related to insider trading, section seven discusses the regulation of insider
trading on major stock exchanges, section eight gives a short overview of the following chapters, and section
nine concludes.
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1.2 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
Insider trading is analyzed by developing theoretical models with many of the properties characterizing real
financial markets. The theory is therefore expected to shed light on effects caused by insider trading and its
regulation. Figure 1.1 illustrates the research approach by distinguishing it from pure empirical research.
-
FIGURE 1.1 Theory vs reality
/ Theoretical Real financial
- Connections
markets-model
Although the model is supposed to reflect reality, effects found in the model are not necessarily present or
important in real fmancial markets. A complete analysis of insider trading implies that the hypotheses deduced
from the theory should be studied empirically to check whether the effects which seem important also are
important in real world markets.
Despite, a theoretical model without a thorough empirical analysis is of interest in itself to gain better
understanding about the potential effects caused by insider trading regulations. It could, for instance, help us in
defining the I3Dge of behavior which we consider to be damaging, in identifying who the victims really are, and
in being aware of possible allocational and distributive consequences which might be the price to pay for a
prohibition of insider trading.
Financial market models with asymmetric information
Models for analyzing insider trading and its regulation are found in the extensive literature on securities markets
with heterogenous information, especially the area called the "microstructure of financial markets." Admati
(1989, 1991), Grossman (1989, chapter 1), and Kyle (1989) give excellent reviews.
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However, the more specific theoretical foundation is found in Kyle (1984, 1985), and the extensive
literature which uses Kyle's work as a basis for extensions and applications; see Admati (1991), pages 355 -
356. Glosten and Milgrom (1985) and Grinblatt and Ross (1985) have developed similar models which also
take into account strategic behavior among superiorly informed traders (see also Laffont and Maskin (1990».
This dissertation builds on this foundation.
Inthe one period model of Kyle (1985), there is a single informed trader who observes perfect information
about the future value of the firm. He trades, together with uninformed liquidity traders, by submitting orders to
the market makers. If necessary, they clear the batch on their own account, and set the price at which the
transactions are executed. The price is set by the support of information obtained from the net order flow, but
the marlcet makers cannot distinguish the informed from the uninformed. The market makers expect to earn zero
expected profit because of the assumed competitive environment in the dealership market On the other hand,
the informed trader is risk neutral, and acts strategically by restricting his trade. This implies that the informed
trader manipulates the information content of the transaction price to his advantage, and, accordingly, expects to
earn an abnormal return at the expense of the liquidity traders. But the transaction price reveals some of the
insider' s information because his trading makes the net order flow correlated with his information. This
revelation makes the expected profit on inside information less than in an otherwise identical market,
It is my view that a Kyle-type of security market model is a good starting point for the study of insider
trading, and in chapter 2 - 8, I extend it to a setting more appropriate for analyzing insider trading and its
regulation. In doing this, I have benefitted from many of the existing extensions, for instance, Admati and
Pfleiderer (1988), Subrahmanyam (1992), Spiegel and Subrahmanyam (1992), and, especially, Fishman and
Hagerty (1992). Their models are special cases of the models characterized by lemma 2.1,lemma 7.1, and
lemma 8.1 in subsequent chapters.
Financial market models focusing explicitly on insider trading regulations
In recent years, trading by corporate insiders and the regulation of such trades have been analyzed in models
specially designed for this purpose. Examples are found in Grinblatt (1986), Manove (1989), Dennert (1989),
Ausubel (1990), Fishman and Hagerty (1992), and Leland (1992). Here I concentrate on the last two.
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Fishman and Hagerty (1992) analyze insider trading in a Kyle-type of model with two types of informed
speculators, a single corporate insider and several market professionals. There are also liquidity traders who are
trading to satisfy their liquidity needs, and market makers whose duty it is to clear the auction by taking the net
opposite position. They find that insider trading may have two adverse effect on the competitiveness of the
financial market; it deters other traders from acquiring information, and thereby skews the distribution of
information held by traders towards one trader, which suggests that insider trading may lead to less efficient
stock prices. To outsiders, such as potential entrants into the industry, it means that the market price cannot be
trusted as much as basis for decisions whether to enter into the same line of business or not,
In Leland (1992), insider trading is analyzed within a rational expectations framework. The demand for
shares comes from a single insider who observes perfect information and recognizes his impact on the
transaction price, from outside arbitrageurs who trade on information generated by observing the market price,
and from liquidity traders who are trading randomly. The supply comes from the firm which issues shares to
maximize the expected profit of current shareholders. Leland shows that when insider trading is permitted, the
average stock price will be higher, the liquidity of the market will be less, the current price will be more
volatile, the future price volatility given the current price will be lower, and the current price will be more
highly correlated with the future price. He shows that there may be a net gain in welfare due to increased
internal efficiency of investments which offsets the cost to outside investors and liquidity traders. The opposite
is the case if the investments are inflexible.
These articles give no clear conclusion whether insider trading should be prohibited or not. It seems that
the net effect on social welfare is ambiguous because there are both positive and negative effects caused by
insider trading.
Methodological problems
One of the major problems with the literature focusing on heterogenous information in fmancial markets,
including the models presented in my dissertations, is the rather strong parametric assumptions relative to the
ones needed in the extensive literature on fmancial market with homogenous information (see, e.g., Duffie
(1992».
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It is usual to assume that the random variables are normally distributed, and that the preferences of the
agents are represented by linear or exponential utility functions (risk neutral or constant absolute risk aversion).
Moreover, many of the random variables, e.g., the risky assets, are often assumed to be mdependent, These
assumptions lead to a rather neat linear equilibrium (without any wealth effects) so they are also widely used
throughout my dissertation.
The attractiveness of model with heterogenous information is that they give insight into phenomena such
as the bid ask spread, the market liquidity, the volatility, and the informativeness of the transaction price which
are important to real fmancial markets. Nevertheless, these new market characteristics complicate the
equilibrium relative to the corresponding equilibrium with homogenous information, partly because we have to
keep an accurate account of the new concepts.
1.3 ARGUMENTS AGAINST INSIDER TRADING
There has been an academic controversy over insider trading at least since Henry G. Manne in 1966 publicized
his insightful book "Insider Trading and the Stock Market" (an earlier reference is Smith (1941». There he
challenges the at that time established view that insider trading is harmful by exhibiting many of the potential
positive effects of insider trading. In recent years, the so called insider trading scandals on Wall Street and
elsewhere have revitalized the interest of insider trading and its regulation. Dennert (1991) gives an excellent
overview of the current state (see also King and ROell (1988».
According to Scott (1980) and Haft (1982), there are four rationales or categories of arguments for
prohibiting insider ttading; the fair play, the business property, the informed market (or the external efficiency),
and the internal efficiency (see also Charlton and Fischel (1983) and Moore (1990) for discussions along these
lines). The arguments are connected, for instance, because the fair play rationale may depend on the property
rights of information.
The following presentation of arguments follows along the lines of the four rationales for prohibiting
insider trading. It is based on the current state of the insider debate, and includes therefore many arguments
which come from and therefore will be looked at more closely in this dissertation.
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i) Fair play
This was previously the most common argument in favor of insider trading regulations (see Macey (1984». It
holds that insider trading should be prohibited because it is unfair to take advantage of internal information,
knowing it is not available to those with whom the insider is trading. Moral or ethic behavior requires that
corporate insiders either abstain or disclose their information before trading in the securities market There are
two versions; one proclaiming that trading on differential information in itself is unfair, the other that trading is
unfair only when its sources are not available to all. Insider trading would be unfair according to both. The
trades of market professionals would be unfair according to the first, but not according to the second. Finally, a
related line of arguments speaks of the traders' confidence. The idea is that if the public believes that the
securities market is biased, they will choose not to participate, the market will suffer because of reduced
liquidity, and the efficient allocation of capital will be impeded.
ii) Business property
Insider trading should be prohibited because internal information is intended for corporate uses, and not for
anyone's personal benefit A ban on insider trading affords protection of the shareholders' property rights. This
suggests that corporate insiders are actually stealing or breaking their fiduciary relationship with their principals,
and should be treated accordingly. However, the property right theory implies that if the current shareholders
fmd it in their interests, they could allocate the property rights of inside information to their agents and thereby
legalize insider trading. This means that regulation becomes a matter of contract between the shareholders and
their employees (see Macey (1984». If the employment contract forbids an employee from using the company' s
information, insider trading would be unethical. Then the only reason for not permitting companies to allow
their employees to trade on internal information would be that it causes harm to investors outside the firm
(potential future owners) or to society at large. It therefore becomes important to identify who are actually
harmed by insider trading.
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iii) Informed market (or external efficiency)
Insider trading should be prohibited in order to let the stock market perform its functions of security evaluation
and capital allocation. For instance, if the corporate insiders have internal infonnation indicating that the
company is undervalued, they would be buyers of the company' s stock, and realize a profit when the infonnation
becomes public. The opposite side of the net order flow is taken by the intennediaries. They would be market
makers in a dealership market or broker - arbitrageurs in a market matched by matchmakers. The effect of
insiders buying is that the intermediaries' net position is more negative, and their profit is less than it otherwise
would be. This is because they have sold stocks to the corporate insiders or due to the insiders' influence on the
net order flow. However, the intermediaries are rational and insure their long term profit against losses to better
informed traders. They do this in advance by making the tenns of trading worse; the buy orders are executed to a
higher price, and the sell orders are executed to a lower price than otherwise. If the intermediaries are sufficiently
insured, they do not expect to lose at all. The result is that the expected losses are transferred from the
intermediaries to the outsiders who are traders like market professionals and liquidity traders. Consequently, the
expected trading cost is increased due to corporate insiders trading on superior information, The market
professionals also lose because of increased competition among speculators in exploiting. non-public
information.
Of course, a higher cost of trading reduces the outsiders' demand for shares, and thereby the liquidity of the
market (see Leland (1992), page 870). This means that the corporate insiders have an even greater effect on the
net order flow, forcing the intermediaries to worsen the terms of trade, increasing the trading cost even more.
The result is a self-feeding process, leading to a completely illiquid market This is the same as saying that
trading in the stock is stopped. If the securities market is illiquid, it does not perfonn its role of effectively
allocating risk. Consider a risk averse investor who has realized a large dividend, and wants to hedge his
portfolio. This can easily be done by taking an offsetting position in the securities market However, if insider
trading has transferred the uncertainty from the future to the current period due to infonnation signaled to the
market through the net order flow, the effectiveness of such a hedging strategy is reduced. In fact, if all
uncertainty is transferred to the current period, as would be the case if the market is perfectly illiquid, hedging is
not possible. This flight of liquidity which may lead to market breakdowns is the reason that stock market
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regulators have to prohibit the most highly informed trading, as it easily triggers the self-feeding process
towards a collapse. By prohibiting insider trading, the market more easily establishes a liquid and viable long-
tenn equilibrium.
i v) Internal efficiency
Insider trading should be prohibited because it enhances the decision-making precess. Insider trading allows
corporate insiders to profit on bad as well as good news, giving an incentive to choose risky projects and
surprise the market by delivering less effort than expected. Doing something unexpected generates inside
information exploitable for trading (see Leftwich and Verrecchia (1983». If,for instance, the corporate insiders
know in advance that the project is bad in the sense that its outcome is significantly lower than expected, they
would sell short and thereby generate a significant profit, The profit increases with the difference between the
outcome and its expectation. Consequently, the insiders will chose a risky project in advance because the
outcome probably will differ more from its expectation. Insider trading may therefore lead to perverse
incentives, and should therefore be prohibited.
1.4 ARGUMENTS FOR INSIDER TRADING
According to Charlton and Fischel (1983), pages 866 - 872, there are two sets of arguments for allocating the
property rights of inside information to the corporate insiders and thereby allowing insider trading (see Manne
(1966ab) and Shaw (1988».
i) External efficiency
Corporate insiders who are trading m superior internal infonnatim reveal infonnation through their influence on
the net order flow. If, for instance, the insiders obtain infonnation indicating that the security of the rum in
which they are employed is undervalued, they issue buy orders. This means that there is relatively more buy
orders, suggesting that, in order to clear the market, the matchmakers (or the market makers in a dealership
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market setting) have to increase the transaction price relatively to an otherwise identical market without insider
trading. In this way, some of the information originally possessed by the corporate insiders has been
transmitted into the market price, and thereby made public. Insider trading is of benefit to outsiders who are
trading for reasons other than information (e.g., raise cash, reinvest dividends, chasing trends, etc.), because it
reduces their expected trading cost, and therefore improves their welfare. The reason is that when insider trading
is allowed, the intermediaries are able to reduce the bid ask spread due to the additional information revealed by
increased competition among the superiorly informed traders. H the liquidity traders are risk averse, insider
trading also reduces their risk adjusted trading cost, because it brings the transaction price nearer to its underlying
fundamental. This reduces the risk of trading, and therefore increases the welfare of liquidity traders.
Prices that reveal information more accurately are beneficiary because they guide the capital investment of
the outsiders. H, for instance, potential entrants observe higher prices in an industry in which the market is
relatively efficient due to information revealed by insider trading, they infer that this industry is expected to give
a high return and enter. In this way, capital has been allocated to the industries which gives the highest returns
(see Fishman and Hagerty (1992), pages 113 - 118).
i i) Internal efficiency
The market prices are also signals which direct the choices of capital within the companies themselves.
Suppose the return of a company is high in a securities market where insider trading has contributed to a price
which is a relatively precise informational statistic, then the managers of that company may infer from the price
that the company is profitable. H the managers are differentially informed, the price as a source of information
for internal decisions is important, In this way, the managers would increase the investments if the price
signals high returns and liquidate unproductive lines of business when the price signals low returns. Hence,
insider trading improves this decision because it makers the price a better prediction of the underlying value (see
Fishman and Hagerty (1989) and Leland (1992».
The corporate insiders have of course incentives to acquire non-pubic information because it generates profit
by trading in the securities markeL One can generally obtain non-public information by a random event or as a
result of planned actions. The insiders generate information by supplying actions (productive effort or
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investment decisions) that surprise the market. If,for instance, the managers are investing in a project giving a
higher return than expected, they may buy stock in advance of disclosure and make a nice profit (see Easterbrook
(1985) and Dye (1984». They will not surprise the market negatively because it hurts their long term
reputation.
1.5 ARGUMENTS FOR VS ARGUMENTS AGAINST INSIDER TRADING
Proponents of allowing insider trading (among them Henry G. Manne) claim that it increases both the internal
and external efficiency and therefore social welfare. On the other hand, proponents of prohibiting insider trading
(including spokesmen of the regulatory agencies) claim that it decreases both the internal and external efficiency
and therefore social welfare. This dispute between the opposite directions is referred to as the insider trading
debate.
As reflected in the insider trading debate, conclusions based on equilibrium models with asymmetric
information show that there is a trade-off between both positive and negative effects, making it hard to conclude
whether insider trading should be prohibited or not 1be strength of the effect must be studied empirically, and
may in principle vary from exchange to exchange, and even from security to security and from time period to
time period.
My contribution to tbe insider trading debate
I think that my contribution to the ongoing insider trading debate is to clarify a few but important points.
Some of these may have been mentioned, but not to my knowledge formally emphasized in earlier research,
• I recognize competition among the corporate insiders by allowing, for instance, all member of the
board of directors to trade when insider trading is allowed, whereas the supply of corporate insiders is
only reduced and not necessarily eliminated when insider trading is banned and enforced by the stock
market regulators. Most previous research, including Fishman and Hagerty (1992) and LeJand (1992),
have focused on a situation where there is one insider when insider trading is allowed and zero when
insider trading is prohibited.
13
• I present one of the very few formal models focusing on insider trading as an incentive mechanism
(another model is Dye (1984), but his conclusions are affected by risk sharing whereas mine are based
solelyon effects caused by the incentive to maximize their own expected profit). Manne (l966ab)
claims that insider trading is the mechanism for rewarding managerial effort. whereas my results show
the opposite.
These are two of main points in my dissertation, the first may be used as an argument in favor and the second as
an argument against insider trading.
1.6 EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
In relation to the insider trading debate, the objective of empirical studies should be to help determining the
strength of the effects caused by insider trading and its regulation. However, very few of the empirical studies
have this as their primary objective. Most studies motivate the focus on insider trading in order to test strong-
form market efficiency. Today, the theoretical development in the area of equilibrium models with asymmetric
information has made it possible to form hypotheses which one should be able to test empirically, and we have
already observed the first such studies.
Many empirical studies of insider trading are confronted with the problem that information sets are not
observable by others than its owners. Analysts have either to use case studies, or they have to use an
approximation for the insiders' information sets.
Case studies
One way of analyzing insider trading is for the analyst to become a corporate insider and trade based on inside
information. The most famous of these "researchers" are Ivan F. Boesky and Michael R. Milken, who indeed,
have shown that it is possible to earn huge sums of money by trading on inside information. Nevertheless, in
these cases, the fines, imprisonment, and a destroyed reputation have to be taken into account, hopefully leaving
them with no abnormal returns. But it is unlikely that there is an ex post settling up in every case.
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Approximations
A different approach is to use an approximation for the insiders' information sets to find out how insider trading
affects fmancial markets. There have mainly been two types of empirical questions based on proxies that have
drawn much attention by researchers: What is the extent of insider trading in financial markets, and what is the
performance of the identified insiders?
i) Event studies
Presumably, a typical sequence of events is that before it becomes public, fum-specific information is revealed
to the corporate insiders. ff insiders or their tippees are trading on inside information, they would of course do
this before the information is formally disclosed. In this way, one could look at the abnormal return prior to the
announcements. and if the abnormal return starts to increase before a disclosure of good news, we could conclude
that informed traders were operating on non-public information. The abnormal return would rise because
information leaked out through their trades. Clearly, we should be careful when concluding, because a
significant part of the informed trading is performed by quasi-insiders such as securities analysts trading legally
on private information generated outside the fum from sources which in principle are available to all. To reduce
the problem with the quasi-insiders, event studies examining the extent of insider trading should try to identify
who is actually trading. One way of doing this is to control against the reported trades of corporate insiders
presumably trading for other reasons than inside information.
What events are most likely to tempt the corporate insiders and their tippees to trade illegally on internally
generated information? King and ROell (1988) claim. on the bases of the notorious cases of insider trading on
both sides of the Atlantic. that advance knowledge of take-over bids are the most important example of
unpublished price-sensitive information because the share price of the target tends to rise dramatically (see their
pages 179 - 181). One problem is that in this case a possible rise before announcement may also be caused by
the bidder's own purchases and has nothing to do with corporate insiders trading illegally. but a sharp price
movement is sufficient to generate suspicion. Keown and Pinkerton (1981) analyze the extent of insider trading
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before merger announcements. They conclude on page 863 that ..... this suggests substantial trading upon inside
information concerning the prospective merger, beginning approximately one month before the announcement
date with uncontrolled abuse of Rule 10b-5 occmring in the five to eleven trading days immediately prior to the
announcement date." But on the same page, they say that ..... the frantic trading that occurred prior to the
merger announcement was not caused by registered insiders for whom trades during this period would attract
unwanted attention. The absence of registered insider trading combined with the dramatic increase in volume
suggests that much insider trading is carried out through third parties so as to escape detection." Keown and
Pinkerton may be right, but I think they fail to recognize the role of market professionals who as part of their
work should look for signals revealing possible merger candidates. Mergers and insider trading has also been
studied by, e.g., Elliott, Morse, and Richardson (1984) and Givoly and Patmon (1985) who confirm that
registered insiders do not want to be incriminated by increasing their reported activity before mergers.
Among the other events tested are announcements of earnings (Elliott, Morse, and Richardson (1984) and
Givoly and Palmon (1985», forecast of earnings (penman (1982, 1985) and Givoly and Palmon (1985»,
dividends (Elliott, Morse, and Richardson (1984), Givoly and Palmon (1985), and John and Lang (1991», bond
ratings (Elliott, Morse, and Richardson (1984», new issues (Karpoff and Lee (1988», and bankruptcies (Elliott,
Morse, and Richardson (1984), Loderer and Sheehan (1989), and Gosnell, Keown, and Pinkerton (1992». Most
of these studies use reported insider transactions to control that the information leakages actually came from the
corporate insiders. Some find significant indications of insiders timing their trades relative to these events,
others find no or a very weak connection.
A related approach is to look for insider ttading before large changes in stock prices. Reinganum (1988) and
Seyhun (1990) find no insiders trading before such events using the reported insider transactions as a proxy for
insider trading (see also Netter and Mitchell (1989». Seyhun (1988) analyzes whether there is a relation between
market movements and aggregate insider trading, and concludes that insider trading sometimes is motivated by
economy-wide factors.
ii) Performance studies
As long as the ttades of corporate employees are based on other motives than inside information, they may trade
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perfectly legally in the securities of the company in which they are employed. However, on most stock market
exchanges these trades have be reported to the control authorities. These trades (e.g., in the USA reported in the
SEC' s Official Summary of Insider Trading) may be used 10 test whether insiders earn an abnormal return, and
they may be linked 10 events 10 find out whether the insiders trade illegally on inside information. The return in
such studies gives the lower limit of what insiders trading on inside information may expect 10 achieve.
Perfonnance studies find that insiders earn an average excess return of 5 - 10% over the year following the
transaction; see, e.g., Lorie and Niederhoffer (1968), Pratt and DeVere (1972), Jaffe (1974ab), Finnerty (1976ab),
Baesel and Stein (1979), Givoly and Pa1rnon (1985), Seyhun (1986), Heinkel and Kraus (1987), King and R6ell
(1988), Rozeff and Zaman (1988), Lin and Howe (1990), and Pope, Morris and Peel (1990). If transaction costs
are taken into account, the net returns become significantly lower. Outsiders obtain no abnormal return by
mimicking the insiders.
Some other relevant studies
Stoll (1989) fmds that the quoted bid ask spread contains a large and statistically significant adverse selection or
informational asymmetry component; see also Glosten and Harris (1988) and George, Kaul, and Nimalendran
(1991). This confums that there is trading based on non-public information. However, it is very difficult 10
measure how much of this should be attributed to corporate insiders. Masson and Madhavan (1991) examine
whether insider trading by a firm' s top executives raises or lowers fum value. They find support for the
hypothesis that active use of inside information lowers fum value. However, greater stock ownership by
executives raises firm value. Torabzadeh, Davidson, and Assar (1989) find that two of the insider trading
scandals on Wall Street (the Levine and Boesky cases) had a negative effect on risk adjusted stock returns of
eleven major publicly traded securities. Finally, Kabir and Vennaelen (1991) study the introduction of insider
trading restrictions on the Amsterdam Stock Exchange. They conclude that after the trading restrictions, stocks
became less liquid but the speed of the adjustments to new announcements was not altered.
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Summary
The empiricalliterature suggests that insider trading is a part of the trading activity in financial markets, and it
affects the properties of the securities market and thereby the welfare of all its participants. This means that it is
important to get a deeper understanding of how insider trading affects the market and thereby the welfare of all its
participants.
1.7 REGULATION
One of the major tasks of fmancial market regulators, whose duty it is to regulate trading on inside information,
should be to design an appropriate regulatory framework given the theoretical and empirical implications
outlined above. This section summarizes the basic premises for successful regulation and enforcement, and
gives a short overview over the existing legislation in Europe (especially United Kingdom and Norway), the
USA, and Japan.
Should insider trading be prohibited?
The problem faced by stock market regulators is whether insider trading should be prohibited or not, An
individual prefers a change in the securities market law if his or her expected welfare increases. H all the
individuals prefer the change, it is said to be Pareto-optimal. Usually, this is not possible when the legislation
changes from allowing to prohibiting insider trading because the corporate insiders who are forced out of the
market lose. A criterion that a regulatory change should be Pareto-optimal would not lead to any
implementation of a law prohibiting insider trading. This suggests, because we actually observe regulatory
changes, that stock market regulators use some welfare function to decide whether to implement and enforce a
law restricting the trades of corporate insiders. For a given set of welfare weights, the law should be
implemented if its benefits dominate its harmful effects.
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Optimal enforcement
If it is optimal to prohibit insider trading, the fmancial market regulators often establish an agency (like the
SEC in the USA) whose duty it is to enforce the ban by catching corporate insiders trading illegally. It may,
however, be very difficult to catch and punish the insiders or their tippees, because they may easily hide behind
the outsiders in the order flow. As a result, it is very costly to enforce the law which may suggest that a
significant number of corporate insiders is "allowed" to trade illegally. This means that the real choices of
regulators are to allow insider trading or ban it with an enforcement which does not always prevent all the
corporate insiders from trading.
Haddock and Macey (1987) analyze a model which suggests that regulatory actions, including the decision
of the enforcement agency, will divert wealth from relatively diffuse groups toward more coalesced groups whose
members have strong individual interests in the effects of regulations. They argue that active traders such as
market professionals form well defined organizations whereas inactive traders often are disorganized. The
regulators changing the law or its enforcement practice therefore face either strong opposition or strong support
from the organizations of the active traders, and less such activity from the less active traders. Figure 1.2 gives
anexample.
FIGURE 1.2: Support maximization
Support from marlcet
professionals
The area outlined shows the policy selection opportunity set of the regulatory agency defmed by the regulators
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and the courts. It can be of virtually any shape, but is here drawn so that the interests of the two groups are
negatively correlated. To maximize support, the regulatory agency will have to select the policy represented by
E. In optimum, the slope of the frontier of the opportunity set is minus forty-five degrees, reflecting that the
regulatory agency value support from market professionals as much as from ordinary shareholders. We see that
in this example, the enforcement agency faces support from the market professionals and opposition from the
ordinary shareholders.
In chapter 4, I show that the market professionals tend to prefer insider trading outlawed whereas the
liquidity traders tend to prefer it allowed. If the law prohibits insider trading, the regulators will be supported by
the professionals and not by the liquidity traders. The enforcement agency determine how many corporate
insiders that are "allowed" to trade illegally when it determines how much resources to spend on enforcement. If
the agency wants to implement restrictive and costly policies, it faces support from market professionals and
opposition from liquidity traders (see chapter 5).
Regulation on major stock exchanges
Insider trading is prohibited on most highly developed stock market exchanges. The short presentation given in
this subsection is based on Gaillard (1992) who gives a detailed overview of the insider trading laws in Europe,
the United States, and Japan.
i) USA
The law in the United States relating to insider trading has developed by statutory enactment, common law
interpretation, and regulatory promulgation. The legislation is primarily a matter of federal law where the
primary underlying prohibitions that are construed by the Congress to forbid insider trading are found in §§
1O(b) and 14(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and § 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933. Nevertheless,
none of these sections mention insider trading explicitly, but refer more generally to fraud. Their application to
trading on inside information is due to judicial interpretation and the regulations of the Securities and Exchange
Commission such as the SEC rules 10b-5 and 14e-3.
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The so called scandals on Wall Street during the 1980s lead to widespread calls for amendments to the
federal securities sanctions aimed at deterring insider trading offenses and to increase the enforcement powers of
the SEC. To satisfy the demand for more regulations, the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, the Insider
Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, and the Securities Law Enforcement and Penny Stock
Reform Act of 1990 were enacted. This means that the Jaw of the United States today includes a wide range of
civil, administrative and criminal sanctions applicable to violations of the insider trading Jaws and regulations,
and the SEC has enlarged its authority with investigative and enforcement powers to execute its regulatory
mandate.
The sanctions for insider trading fall into three categories: civil sanctions and administrative remedies
available in proceedings brought by the SEC, criminal sanctions avaiJable in prosecutions brought by the
Justice Department, and remedies available to private litigants in civil actions. According to section 32(a) in the
Exchange Act, the maximum jail sentence for violations of the federal securities law is ten years, and the
maximum fme is $1 million dollars for individuals and $2.5 million for institutions. In addition, the courts are
permitted according to § 21A of the Exchange Act to impose a civil penalty of up to three times the trading
gains made, or losses avoided. Several insiders have been prosecuted and convicted (see United States v. Boesky
(3 years imprisonment and $100 millions in fines), United States v. Levine ($11.5 millions in fines, and United
States v. Milken (10 years imprisonment and $600 millions in fines) for some cases from the period 1985 -
1990).
ii) Europe
Insider trading is prohibited on most exchanges in Western Europe. Insider trading is prohibited in France since
1970, United Kingdom 1980, Norway 1985, Sweden 1985, Denmark 1987, Greece 1988, Finland 1988,
Switzerland 1988, Austria 1989, Belgium 1989, Netherlands 1989, Liechtenstein 1989, Ireland 1990, Italy
1991, Luxembourg 1991, Portugal 1991, and in Spain since 1991. Only Germany has yet to enact a legally
binding regulatory regime to replace or supplement its existing voluntary Insider Trading Guidelines. In
addition to nationallegislation, insider trading is also regu1ated internationally. Directive 89/592 coordinates
EEC regulations in this field, and the Council of Europe in Strasbourg has opened for signature an international
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tteaty, called the Convention on Insider Trading. The fust country to sign was Norway followed by the United
Kingdom and Sweden.
The leading stock exchange in Europe is the London Stock Exchange. Consequently, I identify more
closely the insider trading regulation in the United Kingdom. The criminal prohibition of insider trading is
contained in the Company Securities (Insider Dealing) Act 1985, but see also the Financial Service Act 1986 for
implications for the control of insider trading. In addition to legislation, there are a number of Codes of
Conduct which have been promulgated by various self-regulatory bodies such as the Conduct of Business Rules
and Core Rules by the Securities and Investments Board, the City Code on Takeovers and Mergers, and the
Model Code for Securities Transactions by Directors of Listed Companies. A person accused of insider trading
may be tried by a Magistrates Court or upon indictment in the Crown Court. In the Magistrates, he may be
sentenced to up to 6 months in prison or to a fme not exceeding the statutory maximum or both. If convicted
upon indictment, he can be sentenced to imprisonment for up to 7 years or to an unlimited fme or both. Several
insiders are prosecuted and convicted (see, e.g., The Times, 1st May 1991, about the case R v. Goodman.
Goodman pleaded guilty and was sentenced to 18 months imprisonment, half of which was suspended).
In Norway, insider trading is prohibited according to the Securities Exchange Act of 1985 No. 61 section 6,
6a, and 6b. Section 62 contains penal sanctions such that corporate insiders and their tippees who are breaking
the law may be punished by fmes or imprisonment or both. For violating § 6, the maximum imprisonment is
6 years; there is no maximum fine, No case has as yet been brought to courts, but several cases have been
investigated. One case is expected to be tried for courts in 1993.
iii) Japan
From 1988, insider trading is regulated by the 1948 Securities Act where its Articles 58, 190-2, and 190-3
prohibit insider trading (see also articles 154, 188, and 189). A person who violates the provisions 190-2 and
190-3 is subject to imprisonment for up to six months and/or a fine of up to ¥500,OOO. Violations of the more
general article 58 are punishable by imprisonment for not more than three years and/or a fine of not more than
¥3 millions. It does not mention insider trading explicitly, but refer to fraud in general. There has been no
cases brought to court, but at least some cases have been investigated by the authorities.
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Summary
The regulation of insider trading is extensive. It is therefore important to understand how these regulations work
in financial markets by considering that the number of corporate insiders may be reduced, and not necessarily
eliminated by banning insider ttading.
1.8 AN OVERVIEW OF THE SUBSEQUENT CHAPTERS
This dissertation is organized in five parts. The first part gives an introduction to the insider trading debate, and
the second part develops the basic model and analyzes its properties. Parts three and four extend the basic model
by taking into account the production side of the economy and factors such as the market power in the broker -
dealership market and risk aversion. Finally, part five summarizes the dissertation, and gives some policy
recommendations based on the developed theory.
PART I INTRODUCTION
The dissertation starts with an introduction to the insider trading debate, raising theoretical, empirical, and
judicial issues.
Chapter 1 On the Desirability of Insider Trading Regulations in Financial Markets: A
Review Essay
The debate whether insider trading should be prohibited or not is the topic of this dissertation. This chapter
offers a short review of the arguments for and against regulation, surveys the empiricalliterature, and discusses
briefly the regulation on some major stock exchanges. Finally, an overview of the subsequent chapters is
given.
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PART II BASIC MODEL AND ITS PROPERTIES
A simple exchange economy with insider trading is developed and analyzed. The focus is on what happens to
the properties of the economy and the welfare of its participants when the supply of corporate insiders changes
exogenously due to a shift in the law governing insider trading or the enforcement intensity of the stock market
regulators.
Chapter 2 Models of Imperfectly Competitive Markets with Insider Trading
This chapter is technical and its major purpose is to derive a security market equilibrium which takes into
account presence and absence of corporate insiders. It is used in chapters 3 - 4 as a first approach to analyze the
effects of insider trading in fmancial markets. Later chapters extend the outlined framework to capture other
elements relevant for the insider trading debate.
Chapter 3 On the Properties of Financial Markets with a Changing Supply of
Corporate Insiders
Under certain condition, insider trading causes the trading intensities of all superiorly informed traders to decrease
and thereby reduces the equilibrium bid ask spread. On the other hand, it increases the market depth, the
expected trading volume, the volatility, and the informativeness of the transaction price. This is a flavor of the
numerous and rather complex effects which have to be taken into account when stock market regulators propose
changes in the law governing the trades by corporate insiders.
Chapter 4 Welfare Effects Caused by a Changing Supply of Corporate Insiders
Insider trading is shown to affect the expected profit of security traders such as market professionals and liquidity
traders. I identify two effects: one caused by competition and the other by adverse selection. First, if the trader
is motivated by liquidity events, the competition in exploiting superior information is zero. If, on the other
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hand, the trader is motivated by privately acquired information, the competition increases with the supply of
corporate insiders, leading to less expected profil Secondly, the adverse selection effect worlcs indirectly through
the problem of differentiating the informed from the uninformed, faced by the price setting market makers. If
one insider enters, the adverse selection problem is increased. The result is a negative effect on the expected
profit of both the liquidity traders and the market professionals. However, if the supply expands further, the
adverse selection decreases due to competition among the informed. The result is a positive effect on the
expected profits of all traders. In this way, the total effect is a trade-off between these effects. I conclude that
the market professionals tend to prefer insider trading prohibited, whereas the liquidity traders tend to prefer
insider trading allowed. Nevertheless, they tend to agree that the worst case is to have an insider trading law
which is not adequately enforced by the stock market regulators.
As we have seen, chapter two develops the exchange economy, chapter three analyzes its properties, and chapter
four analyzes welfare effects.
PART m PRODUCTION
I extend the exchange economy analyzed in part two to a corresponding economy where the corporate insiders are
considered to be corporate employees who supply an effort to the firms in which they are employed. This
means that insider trading in the fmancial market may influence production.
Chapter 5 On Production, Disclosure, and Insider Trading Regulations
A change in the supply of corporate insiders is shown to affect the expected welfare of current shareholders by
causing information, production, and enforcement cost effects. My analysis indicates that if the negative
production effect is very strong, it quickly tends to dominate the positive information and cost effects. Insuch a
market, I conclude that insider trading is not desirable as it gives corporate managers an incentive to act in their
own interests and not in the interest of their principals. They do this by shirking their duty as suppliers of
productive effort. Inthis way, insider trading is really an agency problem.
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Chapter 6 Insider Trading on Effort Generated Information
I examine insider trading as a mechanism promoting managerial effort. My findings show that trading on effort
generated infonnation promotes an equilibrium supply of effort that is either incentive compatible or destructive.
This is because corporate managers of higher than average quality are motivated to supply an effort higher than
expected, and, symmetrically, the managers of lower than average quality find it easier to surprise the market by
supplying an effort less than expected. In this way, effort is random which generates superior information
unavailable to outsiders. I compare the expected effort and its volatility when insider trading is the sole
incentive mechanism with a corresponding market where insider trading is prohibited. The managers are instead
motivated by a linear outcome-contingent incentive scheme. My results indicate that insider trading is not
desirable as an incentive mechanism because the linear outcome-contingent scheme produces a higher expected
effort and reduces the volatility of the effort choices.
Roughly speaking, the difference between these two chapters is that chapter five focuses on the effects
influencing the expected production whereas chapter six develops a theory which explores the effects on its
variance. Nevertheless, there is a close link between the two.
PART IV OTHER EXTENSIONS
This part extends the analyzes in part two to a corresponding economy where all the participants are risk averse
and where there ismarket power in the broker - dealership marlceL Incentive effects are ignored.
Chapter 7 Insider Trading in an Imperfectly Competitive Market with Risk Averse
Agents
A change in the security market law from allowing to banning insider trading is shown to affect the expected
profit and the risk exposure of all the traders. Take, for instance, the uninformed and semi-rationalliquidity
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traders whose welfare depends on their expected trading costs and the risk of trading at a price different from the
future value of the security. The expected trading cost is determined by the equilibrium bid ask spread and their
trading volume, where the spread depends on adverse selection and risk compensation. As in previous chapters,
the adverse selection component is caused by the price differentiation problem of market makers. It may either
increase or decrease with the supply of corporate insiders, depending on the change in the insiders' market power.
However, the risk compensation component is caused by the aversion of market makers towards variations in
the price deviation. It is shown to be reduced by insider trading. This is because corporate insiders improve the
informativeness of the pooled order flow, and thereby reduce the risk of taking the opposite position vis-a-vis
the traders. Insider trading has also a desirable effect on the liquidity traders' risk premium because corporate
insiders tend to bring the transaction price nearer to its underlying value based on privileged information. This
suggests that the welfare of liquidity traders are improved by intensive insider trading.
Chapter 8 Hedging, Arbitrage and Dealing in a Securities Market with Insider Trading
Regulations
This chapter focuses on the welfare effects of insider trading regulations in a simple exchange market where the
intermediaries recognize their market power. Take, for instance, the uninformed hedgers whose welfare is shown
to depend on their initial position and the net gain from hedging. The sign and the size of the gain depends on
the effectiveness of the hedging strategy and its implementation costs. Insider trading transfers resolution of
uncertainty from the future to the present period, and thereby reduces the effectiveness of hedging strategies via
the so called Hirshleifer effect This is because insider trading reveals information to the intermediaries. They
are then able to set the transaction price nearer its underlying fundamental, making it hard to hedge the future
value of the security by taking offsetting positions in the securities market On the cost side, there are two
effects. Insider trading widens the equilibrium bid ask spread because of increased adverse selection due to less
hedging. This erodes market liquidity. On the other hand, insider trading decreases the trading risk because it
brings the transaction price nearer to its underlying fundamental. The net effect depends on the trade-offbetween
the Hirshleifer effect, which reduces the effectiveness of hedging, and the two cost effects working opposite of
each other. I find that the Hirshleifer effect tends to dominate, and conclude that hedgers tend to prefer insider
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trading prohibited and enforced by. the stock market regulators.
The difference between these two chapters is that chapter eight extends the model developed in chapter seven to a
corresponding economy where there are rational hedgers replacing the semi-rationalliquidity traders. In addition,
imperfect competition in the dealership market is allowed.
PART V CONCLUSIONS
This part concludes the dissertation and draws attention to future research possibilities, both empirical and
theoretical ones.
Chapter 9 Summary of Major Conclusions
This chapter gives a short overview over the major conclusions in chapters 2 - 8. It is done by giving concrete
advice on how the stock market regulators, the various types of outsiders, and the corporate insiders should
adjust to insider trading or its regulation.
1.9 SUMMARY
The desirability of insider trading regulations in fmancial markets depends on a rather complex trade-off among
several effects working on the social welfare function. In my opinion, there is no obvious conclusion because
the net effect is ambiguous. Nevertheless, my personal view is that if insider trading is to be prohibited, which
often seems to be optimal, the prohibition should be enforced adequately by forcing the corporate insiders out of
the security market Insider ttading should be rather rare events which presumably is not the case today at
several exchanges.
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CHAPTER 2
MODELS OF IMPERFECTLY COMPETITIVE
MARKETS WITH INSIDER TRADING
First draft: October 1990,
Current revision: January 1993.
ABSTRACT
This chapter is technical and its major purpose is to derive a securities marlæt equilibrium which taw into account
both presence and absence of corporate insiders. It is used in chapters 3 - 4 as a first approach to analyze the effects of
insider trading in financial markets. Later chapters extend the outlined framework to capture other elements relevant
for the insider trading debate.
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2.1 INTRODUCTION
Asymmetric information in financial markets was first analyzed in simple exchange settings where risk averse
and privately informed speculators take the information content of asset prices as given. InGrossman (1976)
and similar models, the number of informed speculators is limited and the price system is fully revealing,
because there is no other noise than the uncertainty present in the information received by the speculators. If
additional noise is introduced, e.g., by making the supply of the risky assets stochastic as in Grossman and
Stiglitz (1980) or by introducing noise traders as in Pfleiderer (1984), the price would be partially revealing.
Nevertheless, if the number of informed speculators is infinitely large to justify the initial competitive
assumption, the price system would reveal all information even if additional noise is introduced (see Pfleiderer
(1984), pages 5 - 7). If the market price is a sufficient informational statistic, there are no incentives for
rational traders to acquire costly information because they infer all available information from the transaction
prices. This means that the fully revealing equilibrium is not viable (see Grossman and Stiglitz (1980», and
accordingly is unsuitable for analyzing insider uading as there is IlO difference in expected return between insiders
and outsiders.
The securities market could alternatively be modeled with competitive behavior among a limited number of
informed speculators in the sense that they consider the information content of prices as given (which might be
referred to as a type of Bertrand competition). It turns out that the resulting stock market equilibrium is viable
since it is panially revealing, and the price system therefore gives rational traders incentives to acquire and trade
on costly information. It is however important to notice that it is risk aversion which limits the informed
speculators' positions in the risky assets, and consequently prevents the price system from becoming a sufficient
informational statistic. On the other hand, if the informed speculators were risk neutral, the prices would
transmit all information even with a limited number of traders because they would trade very large quantities.
The problem is that competitive behavior in a finite market is "schizophrenic" as recognized by Hellwig (1980).
Despite this criticism, this approach could be chosen when analyzing insider trading since informed trading may
possibly influence the stock market equilibrium, which is hardly the case when the prices are fully revealing.
Admati (1989, 1991) and Grossman (1989, chapter 1) give excellent surveys of the competitive rational
expectations approach to financial markets. It has recently been criticized by Dubey, Geanakoplos, and Shubik
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(1989). Huang and Litzenberger (1988, chapter 9) give a good introduction to fmancial markets with
asymmetric information.
I chose to follow Albert Kyle (1984, 1985a), who uses an alternative and more realistic approach, where the
superiorly informed speculators act strategically by trying to influence the information content of the price
system to their advantage. It turns out that rational traders maximize expected utility by reducing their trades
and therefore the information content of the price system relative to the competitive case discussed above. In
addition to risk aversion, strategic behavior per se limits the positions of speculators in the risky assets. This
means that unlike in the competitive case, privately informed traders may be risk neutral without driving the
stock market equilibrium to its fully revealing limit Kyle (1989) gives an excellent survey of the imperfectly
competitive approach to financial markets (see also Admati (1991», and Glosten and Milgrom (1985) present an
approach similar to Kyle (1985a) where both informed and uninformed traders are restricted to trade one unit at
the time.
In the multi-period, multi-security market outlined in this chapter, I assume that risk neutral speculators use
privately acquired information to determine their trading strategies. They are simultaneously recognizing that
they influence the information content of the price system. The informed traders submit their orders, together
with the orders from the liquidity traders, to risk neutral market makers who set the equilibrium price according
to their price rule. The dealers or market makers cannot observe which type of traders that is trading, and for
this reason face a price discrimination problem, referred to as an adverse selection problem to the pricing of
securities. This is in short the major element in the securities market approach which I use in the two
following chapters to analyze insider ttading. Later chapters investigate other effects caused by legal and illegal
trading by corporate insiders.
As in Fishman and Hagerty (1992), I split the informed speculators into two sub-groups called market
professionals and corporate insiders:
• Market professionals (or smart money investors, for instance, security analysts) are rational outsiders
who acquire costly information not yet reflected in the price system. They use this information to
determine their allocation of resources among the speculative assets, and therefore expect to earn a
supernormal profit
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• Corporate insiders are usually employees (i.e., corporate managers and directors) who have access to
privileged information about the prospects of their firm, If insider trading is allowed, rational corporate
insiders and their tippees use inside information to determine their demands for the risky assets as they
expect to earn an abnormal return. This may, of course, also be the case if insider trading is prohibited,
especially in markets where the enforcement of the securities market law is inadequate, leading to
illegal trading.
The main difference between the two types of superiorly informed speculators is that the outside professionals
observe diverse private information and the corporate insiders observe common privileged information. That is,
the market professionals observe one signal each, whereas the corporate insiders share one signal. The precision
of inside information is always higher than the precision of privately acquired information. However, since the
market professionals observe diverse information, the precision of their total information increases with the
number of such smart money investors. Clearly, the insiders observe infonnation correlated with the security-
specific return component, and the professionals may either observe firm-speciåc information as in lemma 2.1,
or as is possible in lemma 2.2, infonnation correlated with a common factor influencing the returns of all the
assets listed on the exchange.
Inaddition to superiorly informed speculators such as corporate insiders and market professionals, there are
also noise or liquidity traders present in the market. These traders have no private information, and trade for
reasons given outside the model. They may, for instance, be trading to raise cash, reinvest dividends, or they
may just be chasing trends. As suggested by Admati and Pfleiderer (1988), there are two types of liquidity
tradels:
• Non-discretionary liquidity traders must trade a particular number of shares at a particular time
whatever the marlcet conditions are, and
• Discretiormy liquidity traders execute their trades to minimize their expected trading cost by choosing
strategically the assets and times to trade.
The liquidity traders may be viewed as an irrational element as they seem to be better off holding the riskless
asset. However, since their demand is given exogenously, they may have benefits not realized in our simple
market setting. Instead of liquidity traders, I could use a stochastic supply of securities to create the adverse
selection problem of pricing.
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The fmal group of individuals in the securities market represents the intermediacy and can be interpreted as
either dealers/market makers or arbitrageurs.
• Matket makers observe the net order flow, determine the equilibrium price, and clear the market by
taking the net opposite position vis-a-vis the traders. Thus, their major function is to provide
immediacy so that a trader is able to trade without having to search for another trader willing to take the
opposite position in that stock.
• Arbitrageurs are traders who tend to trade away the difference between the market price and its
"fundamental". They have rational expectations, and therefore use the information content in the
security prices when they are determining their trading strategies. The equilibrium prices are determined
by market clearing among the privately informed speculators, the liquidity traders, the arbitrageurs, and
the market makers.
I do not need to distinguish between the arbitrageurs and the market makers. The reason is that their presence
have exactly the same effect in the model; they both provide immediacy so that buyers or sellers do not have to
search for other traders to take the opposite position. I choose an approach with risk: neutral market makers, and
assume for simplicity that they expect to earn no economic rents because of price taking behavior in the
dealership market
Insider trading can be allowed or prohibited by a law (or a private contract) regulating what corporate
insiders are supposed to do in the securities market I compare the insider trading equilibrium with the
corresponding equilibrium without the corporate insiders. In this way, I am able to analyze the effects of insider
trading on the behavior and wealth of all individuals present in the market. Moreover, some of the corporate
insiders in the model may trade illegally, giving me an opportunity to study the effects of prohibited insider
uading.
The securities market equilibrium presented in lemma 2.1 differs significantly from previous models with
imperfect competition, but several of them (e.g., Kyle (1985a) and Admati and Pfleiderer (1988» are limits or
special cases. The closest model is that of Fishman and Hagerty (1992), which is a special case of my model
with only one corporate insider. My more general approach gives a competition effect which is important when
we are evaluating the desirability of insider trading regulations (see chapters 3 - 4). I also present a second
equilibrium characterized by lemma 2.2 which really is a special case of lemma 2.1. The model of
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Subrahmanyam (1991) is in many respects a special case of the second model. The differences are discussed in
more detail after I have presented each of my models. It is possible to generalize the model further, for instance,
by extending the number of types observing private information and by letting each signal be observed by any
number of speculators. This, however, is beyond the scope of this dissertation.
The balance of this chapter is organized as follows. The next section discusses the assumptions, and the
equilibrium is given in section three. Sections four and five discuss two important special cases. Then I
simplify and assume that the two types of informed speculators observe uncorrelated information. Section six
outlines the assumption and presents the resulting equilibrium. The following section shows that the same
equilibrium is possible to obtain in a setting where the market makers are replaced by broker - arbitrageurs. In
section eight two extensions are discussed. Section nine summarizes the research approach, and formal proofs
are found in the appendices.
2.2 ASSUMPTIONS
I draw as mentioned on the securities market approach originally proposed by Albert Kyle (1984, 1985a) and
outlines an imperfectly competitive securities market with some additional properties which include several
securities listed and traded sequentially by several types of traders. The model is used, according to the objective
of this dissertation, to describe and later, in chapters 3 - 5, to analyze security trading on superior internal
information.
Sequence of events
Figure 2.1 illustrates the time structure around the (call) auction at time te {O, 1, ..•, Tt-l} where LI means
just before time t, L2 means just before time LI, and so on.
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FIGURE 2.1 Sequence or events
Public Informed speculators Private
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security becomes
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observing the
net order flow
from informed and
uninformed traders.
At time l3, a public signal is revealed to all the individuals. Then at time t-2, the speculators determine their
trading strategies as functions of their forthcoming information. At time t.lo the superior information is
realized and the market orders from the informed traders are submitted. together with orders from the uninformed
traders, to the price setting market makers. Then at time t, the dealers or market makers observe the net order
flow, set the transaction price, and clear the market by taking the net opposite position. Finally, at time t+l,
the value of the security becomes public. In this way, the model is characterized by batch trading (see section
2.8 for comments on the extension to continuous trading).
Securities
I assume that at time t there are Kt + 1 securities listed on the stock market exchange; Kt risky securities and
one riskless bond. At time O, the value of the riskless bond is one. However, at time t, the bond value
increases from Rt-l = (1 + r)t-l to Rt = (1 + r)t where r ~ Ois the riskless rate of return from time t-t to time L
Cash is assumed to be in perfectly elastic supply. If there is no public signal realized at time l3, the public
pre-trade value of security k e {l, 2, ..., Kt} at time t is!
(2.1)
I
m" = mo + Ld ..,
..-1
where mo >Ois the face value of security k and I d't is the change in value from O to t (which equals the sum
of the value changes from period to period). The face value was paid to firm k at time O,and the total value
1 I drop the subscript k.t throughout this dissertation unless it is necessary to clarify.
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change equals the sum of the value changes in each period from ° to t. Some of the realized value could, of
course, be paid out to the shareholders as dividends without altering anything in the model but mx• As in
Admati and Pfleiderer (1988), private infonnation about the future value of the security is assumed to be short
lived which means that it is never optimal to store information to later periods as it becomes public after one
period (see section 2.8 for further comments). At time t+ 1, the value of security k equals
(2.2) i = m" + d,
where the innovation or the period's value change
(2.3) d - N(O, eS).
That is, the value change from t to t+ 1 is nonnally distributed with mean °and variance S, The dividend paid at
time t E {O, 1, •••Tk-1} is zero, and, at the horizon Tko firm k is liquidated and the liquidating dividend is
consumed by the shareholders.
Information structures
At time t-3, all the participants are assumed to observe a common infonnation signal correlated with the future
value of asset k. It may be interpreted as a preliminary income budget disclosed to the stock market prior to
trading. The budget is represented by a random variable
(2.4) y. = i + g,
where the noise tenn
(2.5) g - N(O, r).
This means that if 'Y -+ 00, the public signal is only noise (and therefore useless), but as long as 'Y < 00, y. is
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informative.2 In addition to the public signal, the distributive and structural assumptions are common
knowledge.
In the same way, private information observed by the informed speculators are represented by random
variables correlated with the future value of the risky assets. A realization of a signal tells the speculators who
observe it, that some states are more likely to happen than others. Informed traders update their probability
assessments of the payoff according to Bayes rule. As in Fishman and Hagerty (1992), there are two types of
privately informed speculators; market professionals (or smart money investors, e.g., securities analysts) and
corporate insiders.
At time Lt, the corporate insiders managing firm k are assumed to observe common private information
correlated with the value of security k at time t+l. Common information means that there is one signal shared
by all who observe il This implies that insider m E {I, 2, ... , M} observes a signal
(2.6) y=i+ii,
where
(2.7) ii - N(O, TI).
The inside information is about business fluctuations outside the direct control of the corporate insiders. This
implies that there is no information generated by the insiders' choice of effort, In this way, the corporate
insiders choose the action or effort expected by the market such that the value of the information generated by
their actions is zero. Inchapter 6, I extend this market to one where the corporate insiders randomize their effort
to generate inside information.
The market professionals analyzing security k observe diverse private information represented by a random
variable correlated with the future value at time t+l. Diverse information means that each individual who
observes such information observes one personal signal, but all the signals have the same precision. Thus,
professional n e {l,2, ... , N} observes a signal
2 I drop the tilde when referring to a stochastic 'variable in the text, but the distinction between a stochastic
variable and its realization is used in numbered mathematical expressions like (2.11) below.
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(2.8)
where the noise tenn
(2.9) en - N(O, e).
This implies that the precision or quality of the market professionals' common infonnation increases with their
number. However, I assume that
(2.10) r > e > " ~ O.
The public observe a noisier signal than the professionals, who again observe noisier information than the
insiders. The error terms are assumed to be uncorrelated. Alternatively, Krishnan and Caballe (1990) analyze a
multi-security market where the infonnation signals are correlated as in their setting, the risky assets are
correlated. Observing information about one asset gives infonnation about the other assets in the economy as
well.
Trading strategies
I have to limit the ttading intensities of competitive and risk neutral speculators. This is because unlimited
trading ends up in a price system which is fully revealing (i.e., strong-form market efficiency). Such an
equilibrium is undesirable since, according to Grossman and Stiglitz (1980), it is inconsistent with acquisition
of costly infonnation. I follow Kyle (1985a) and limit the speculators' net position in the risky assets by
assuming that they do not act as price and information takers. Instead they try to manipulate the infonnation
content of the equilibrium order flow by holding back their quantum relative to the competitive case such that
the transaction price reveals the amount of infonnation that suits them best in terms of expected profit ff the
speculators were risk averse as in chapter 7, they would limit their trading even more.
This implies that market professional n E (1, 2, ... , N) at time 1.2 wishes to choose a ttading strategy that
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maximize bis expected profit given available infonnation and price manipulative behavior. Thus, his portfolio
selection problem is to
(2.11)
where E[ I ] is the conditional expectation, 9n is the optimal trading strategy of the market professional, and S is
the equilibrium price of security k set by the market makers at time t,
Symmetrically, corporate insider m E {I, 2, ..., M} has a similar portfolio selection problem and therefore
wishes to maximize
(2.12)
where ~ is the optimal trading strategy based on infonnation available to the corporate insider prior to trading
at time t
Unlike in the rational expectations literature (see, e.g., Grossman and Stiglitz (1980», the informed
speculators do not condition on the transaction price because at the time when they determine their orders, they
cannot observe or foresee the price. I condition on y* although the signal is public and could therefore be
omitted along with other public information. This is because it is useful to explicitly remind the reader that
there is a public disclosure. As we shall see, the public disclosure is important when the market determines its
pre-trade estimates of the expectation and the variance of the future value of security k. Foster and Viswanathan
(1991) develop a Kyle-type of model where public information explicitly affects the trading volume and price
volatility.
In addition to the privately informed speculators, there are at time t uninformed noise or liquidity traders
present in the securities marlret These traders come to the market without any information, for reasons not part
of this model (e.g., hedging, raise cash, reinvest dividends, or they may just chase trends), and take whatever
prices the market hands them. Despite the fact that the trades of liquidity traders are not modeled explicitly, they
playa crucial role to fmancial markets; see, e.g., Black (1986), Shleifer and Summers (1990), and Bikhchandani,
Hirshleifer, and Welch (1992) for a general discussion around there issues.
45
I assume there exist two types of liquidity traders as in Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) and Subrahmanyam
(1991): The non-discretionary liquidity traders are constrained to trade a random number of shares in one or
several of the securities at one or several future auctions, whereas the discretionary liquidity traders are acting
strategically, and therefore compose a portfolio of trades to minimize expected trading costs over time. The total
liquidity trading in security k at time t is a random variable
(2.13) li - N(O, u).
where
(2.14)
This means that Cf is an endogenous variable depending on where the discretionary liquidity traders cluster. The
mean is normalized to zero withoutloss of generality. The first term is the trading by the ocean of non-
discretionary liquidity traders. and the last term measures the trading by the D discretionary liquidity traders who
at time t choose to trade in security k. Thus, this variance increases with the number of discretionary liquidity
traders who are finding it optimal to trade in this security.
Generally, there are at least three motives for trading; the motive for risk sharing. the information motive,
and finally the liquidity motive. The two last motives are present throughout the dissertation, and the first is
introduced in chapter 8 by replacing the liquidity traders by hedgers as in Spiegel and Subrahmanyam (1992).
Admati and Pfleiderer (1991) analyze the possibility that some liquidity traders preannounce the size of their
orders.
The uninformed liquidity traders submit their demand together with the demand from the informed
speculators to Q risk neutral and competitive market makers who are dealing in security k at time L The market
makers set the equilibrium price according to the price rule (this is the equilibrium condition in the dealership
market):
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(2.15)
where Zq = Z IQ is the part of the net order flow in security k at time t handled by market maker q E {l, 2, ... ,
Q}. The total order flow Z = L Zq. Since the market makers are competitive, they are forced to set the price so
as to make zero expected profit; see below for further comments.
I assume that the market makers do not have any special information. It is, of course, more realistic, as in
Gennotte and Leland (1990), Lindsey (1990), Foster and George (1992), and Leach and Madhavan (1992), to
assume that the intermediaries have (or may acquire) superior information about the condition of the market
(e.g., the amount of liquidity trading). Hughson and Bernhardt (1990) present a Kyle-type of model where the
incoming orders are cleared one-by-one; see also Glosten and Milgrom (1985), Glosten (1989), and Admati and
Pfleiderer (1989).
Regulation
I assume the presence of a regulatory agency (such as the Securities and Exchange Commission in the USA)
that enforces the securities market law; see chapter 5 for a discussion of these issues. The regulators can
prohibit insider trading or they can allow it, I define the regulatory scheme
(2.16)
if insider trading is allowed, and
if insider trading is prohibited.
If the law allows insider trading there are N market professionals and M corporate insiders trading on non-public
information in the securities market, On the other hand, if the law is changed so that it prohibits insider trading
there are still N market professionals, but the supply of corporate insiders decreases from M to J1 where M ~ J1
~ O. Figure 2.2 illustrates.
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MEnforcement
'FIGURE 2.2 Enforcement and the number
of insiders trading illegally
Insiders following
thelaw
Lawbreakers
E
The number of corporate insiders trading illegally depends on E the enforcement of the law by the enforcement
agency.
I assume that the trading behavior of insiders does not change when they are trading illegally. It may,
however, be more realistic to assume that the corporate insiders who trade illegally restrict their traded quanta for
the reason that they are doing something illegal. If the insiders are allowed to trade, this may also influence the
supply of market professionals, see section 3.6 or Fishman and Hagerty (1992). Thus, I allow illegal trading as
detecting illegally trading insiders may be a hard task. I extend in section 5.4 - 5.5 to a corresponding market
where the number of illegally trading insiders is determined as part of the equilibrium, until then J,1 is given
exogenously.
Market clearing
I have assumed that there exist Q dealers or market makers. Their duty is to clear and stabilize the securities
market and set the transaction price. All the market makers observe the arriving order flow, but they cannot
distinguish the orders coming from informed speculators from the orders coming from noise traders. This means
that the market makers face a price discrimination problem or what I choose to call an adverse selection problem
to the pricing of securities.
Ina market with perfect competition or alternatively Bertrand price competition among a limited number of
risk neutral market makers, the intermediaries, in this case the market makers, do not expect to earn any
economic rent (see (2.15». It is easy to show that this condition of semi-strong market efficiency leads to a
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price functional
(2.17)
or equivalently (see foomoæ 7)
(2.18) s = .!. [E[il y*=y*] + .t(f8n + ~lim + o)],
R n=l m-I
in which
(2.19) .t =
where cov( ,I) and var( I) are the conditional covariance and variance respectively. The fust tenn in (2.18) is
the price given publicly available infonnation before the orders are executed at time L I therefore call it the
market price before trading, Hence, if the market makers do not observe any orders from the traders, the price at
time t equals the present value of the liquidating dividend given public information. The second term is an
adjustment based on the information that market makers learn by observing the net order flow (or equivalently
the market price).
The price sensitivity reflects the change in the market price caused by a unit change in the order flow. If,
for instance, the market makers observe a positive net order flow, they adjust the price upwards. Figure 2.3
illustrates the process.
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FIGURE 2.3 Price rule as a function of
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The liquidity traders are selling the amount u of the speculative asset. and the speculators are buying l: en +
l:.dm where l: en + l:.dm > I u I. The positive net order flow indicates that the market price before trading is
too low. and at time t the market makers therefore raise the transaction price to S*.
2.3 EQUILIBRIUM
A perfect Bayesian stock market equilibrium is a set of trading strategies (eDkt. åmkt. UcJkt)and an equilibrium
price system Skt where (i) the informed speculators maximize expected profit. and (ii) the price is set to satisfy
semi-strong market efficiency.
Lemma 2.1: Suppose L = A. then there exists a unique, linear pooling of orders equilibrium [(Bdt, Limkt,
"dia); Skd for firm k E {l, 2•... , Kt} at time t E {O, 1, ...• Tk-1} where the trading strategy of market
professional n E {l, 2•... ,N} and corporate insider m E {l, 2, ...,M} are
(3.1)
(3.2)
Bn = P (Yn - E[i I Y* = y*]). and
Åm = B (Y - E[i I y*=y*]).
The trading intensities are
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(3.3)
(3.4) B = ap,
where
(3.5) r = ....E.L andB + r '
(3.6) r + 2ea = .r + (M + 1) T/
The equilibrium price determined partially by market maker q e (l. 2•...• Q) is
(3.7) S = .!.[E[x,y*=y*l + Å (fOn + rXm + 0)]'
R n-l m-I
where the price sensitivity is
(3.8) Å = r IN (r + e) + M (r + T/) a2
Nr + (M + 1)(r + T/) a V CT
fmgf: See appendix A (or let 1----+ 00 in lemma 6.1).
Lemma 2.1 extends the trading model developed by Kyle (1984, 1985a) to the case with different quality
information among privately informed speculators. FIShman and Hagerty (1992) were, as far as Iknow, the first
to do this extension of Kyle's model in a one period, two asset framework.3 I generalize Fishman and Hagerty' s
extension to the case with several insiders who are able to trade in a multi-period, multi-security market As we
shall see, my simple generalization has several interesting new features discussed in chapters 3 - 4, in which I
focus on the properties of the stock market equilibrium, the welfare effects of participants, and on the stock
3 See their lemma 1, page 108.
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market regulation.
Brief remarks on later extensions
In lemma 5.1, I extend lemma 2.1 to a market where the corporate insiders are supplying as part of the
equilibrium a positive expected effort. Lemma 5.4 extends lemma 5.1 to the corresponding quotation
equilibrium where the market makers are expected to earn a positive amount of money to cover the cost of
operating the market. In lemma 6.1, the equilibrium given by lemma 2.1 is extended further so that the
corporate insiders may randomize the total supply of effort to generate superior internal information; see also
lemma 2.2 below. Lemma 7.1 extends to the case where all the participants (including the market makers) are
risk averse, and in lemma 8.1, the semi-rationalliquidity traders are replaced by rational hedgers.
2.4 EQUILIBRIUM WHEN N = O
The market professionals are rational, and do not enter the securities market if the cost of acquiring private
information is higher than the expected profit from bading on this information. Expected profit of professionals
tends to fall if the number of corporate insiders increases due to increasing competition (see sections 3.6 and 4.2
- 4.3). This indicates that an increase in the number of corporate insiders may sometimes squeeze the market
professionals out of the market.
Corollary 2.1: Suppose L = A, then there exists a unique, linear stock market equilibrium [( S"kt, .dmkt>
Udla); Skt : k € {l, 2, ..., KJ, t e {O, l, ... , TrI}} where the market professionals are in zero supply. The
allocation functions are
(4.1) ~o BD = ~ fj(N) (YD - E(i I y* = y *]), and
(4.2) £1m = B (Y - E(i I y* = y *]),
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where the trading intensities of market prcfessional n e {Ø} and corporate insider m fE {l, 2, ...,M} are
(4.3) lim f:J(N) = _!_~ (1 andN ....O a M(r + 71)'
B = ~M (r(1+ 71)"(4.4)
The price functional
(4.5)
where the price sensitivity
(4.6) A.= r ~
M + 1V(r+1ifCi·
frw(: Set N = Oin lemma 2.1. Q.E.D.
If R = M = 1 and Tl = O, corollary 2.1 equals the trading model in Kyle (1985a), and if R = I, lemma 1 in
Admati and Pfleiderer (1988).4 These are all models where the privately informed traders observe common
information.
We observe that p(N = O) > p(N > O) because the equilibrium is continuous (and thus ignoring the integer
problem) which means that it is possible to increase the market power of market professionals by decreasing
their supply from let say one to zero (see section 3.2).
4 See Kyle (1985a). page 1319 andAdmati and Pfleiderer (1988), page 10; see also Caballe (1990), page 7.
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2.5 EQUILIBRIA WHERE INSIDER TRADING IS FORBIDDEN
If insider trading is prohibited, some of the corporate insiders may choose to break the securities market law.
This is because there may be significant costs of control, implying that the enforcement of the law is not
complete.
Corollary 2.2: I/ L = B. the equilibrium is given by lemma 2.1 where J.l replaces M.
This is because I have assumed that it is impossible to identify and punish the traders trading illegallyeven if
rational participants know they are present; see chapter 5 for further elaboration. Corollary 2.3 is a special case
of lemma 2.1, and gives the stock market equilibrium when insider trading is effectively forbidden. That is, Il =
o.
Corollary 2.3: Suppose L = Band J.l = O. then there exists a unique.linear securities market equilibrium
[(8n/a. Llmkt. Udkt): Skt : k E {I. 2•...• KJ. t E {O.l •...• TrI}} where insider trading is effectively forbidden
by a law governing the securities market. The allocation/unctions are
(5.1) 8n = P (Yn - E(i I Y* = y *]), and
(5.2) lim ~m(J.l) = lim P(J.l) (Y - E(i I y*=y*]),
1'-+0 1'-+0
where the trading intensities o/ the market professionals n E {I. 2 •...• N} and corporate insider m E {Ø} are
(5.3)
(5.4) limB() 1 ~
1'-+0 J.l = -;: ~N(f+£).
The price functional
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(5.5)
where the price sensitivity
(5.6) A. =
£[QQf: I use coroUary 2.2 and then set Jl = O in lemma 2.1. Notice that a.' = a.(Jl = O) > a.(Jl > O), but the
empty set of corporate insiders has no effect on the order flow and pricing. Q.E.D.
When R and r are normalized to unity, coroUary 2.2 equals the model with diverse information among the
informed speculators in Admati and Pfleiderer (1988), and when R = 1, the trading model with perfectly
competitive market makers in Kyle (1984).S
2.() TRADING ON UNCORRELATED INFORMATION
The corporate insiders are now assumed to observe information that is not correlated with the information
observed by the market professionals. This is easily done by splitting the future value of the securities in two
independent terms. Then I let each type of informed speculators observe a signal correlated with one of the
terms as in Subrahmanyam (1991).
New assumptions
If not expressed otherwise, I draw on the assumptions specified in section 2.2 (see also section 6.2). The value
of security k E (1, 2, ... , Ktl at time 1+1 E {O, 1, ... , Tk -l} is now assumed to have two independent
S See lemma 3, page 22 inAdmati and Pfleiderer's article and pages 56 - 60 inKyle's article; see also Caballe
(1990), page 6.
ss
components. One component is unique for security k and reflects security-specific events such as the effort and
the investment decisions of the corporate employees during the period from t to 1+1. The other component
depends, for instance, on a common term present in the value of all the securities. It thereby reflects general
economic events influencing all the securities listed on the stock market exchange. In this way, the future value
of security k is
(6.1) i + e,
where e is the security-specific or idiosyncratic component and x is the systematic component influencing
security k's value at time t+1. The random business fluctuations are given by (2.2), and the security-specific
component
(6.2)
In this section, the security-specific component is given exogenously, but in section 6.4, it is determined as part
of the equilibrium.
Prior to trading at time 1, there is a public signal (in addition to y*) correlated with the security-specific
component, That is,
(6.3) Y· = e + j,
where the noise term
(6.4) j - N(O, ,).
This signal is used to update the prior expectations given by (6.2). One effect of public information is that it
reduces the risk associated with net value of the security-specific events from cp to Cl» where Cl» is given by
(6.13).
In this section, the corporate insiders observe only common private information correlated with the change
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in the security-specific component from time t time t+ 1 (thus, 11~ 00, leaving signal y without information
content). This means that corporate insider m E (l, 2, ... , Ml instead of observing the signal y given by (2.6)
observes a signal
(6.S) y = e + i,
where
(6.6) I-N(O, r),
This signal is assumed to be less noisy than the signal Y· observed by all the participants in the securities
market All error terms are uncorrelated.
As outlined in section 2.2, the market professionals observe one signal each correlated with the net value of
the random business fluctuations. Their signal Yn is given by (2.8). Notice that the two types of informed
speculators observe uncorrelated information because
(6.7) cov(Y, Yn I y*=y*, Y·=Y·) = O.
This assumption separates the two types of information, and gives the corporate insiders a greater market power
than in lemma 2.1 as they have not to compete directly with the market professionals. However, the two types
of informed speculators compete indirectly because they both may increase the adverse selection problem faced
by the price setting market makers.
Equilibrium
This subsection presents a unique equilibrium in an exchange market with two independent sources of private
information as described above.
Lemma 2.2: Suppose L = A, then there exists a unique, linear pooling of orders equilibrium [(8""t, .1mkt,
S7
Ud/ct); Sk,] for firm k e (l, 2, ,.., Kt) at time t € (O, l, ... , Tk-l) where the trading strategy of market
professional n € (l, 2, ...,N) and corporate insider m € (l, 2, ...,M) are
(6.8) 8n = p (Yn - E[x I y*=y*]). and
(6.9)
respectively. The trading intensities are
(6.10) p = ~N(r + e) +aM (Cl»+ l)a2' and
(6.11) b = ap.
where
(6.12) a = [(N + 1) r + 2 e] Cl»=--_;_-_......:...-. and(M + 1)(Cl» + l) r
(6.13)
The market price of security k at time t
(6.14) s = ..!. [E[i + el y*=y*. y·=y·i + l (f8D + tÅ. + 0)].R ~ _
is partially set by the risk neutral and competitive market maker q € (l, 2, ..., Q) by quoting the price
sensitivity
(6.15) l = r IN (r + e) +aM (Cl»+ l) a2 •
(N + 1)r + 2 e V
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fm:Qf: See appendix B (or let Tl -+ 00 in lemma 6.1).
Lemma 2.2 extends the trading model of Subrahmanyam (1991) to a setting where the systematic factor
informed traders trade intertemporalily on diverse private information.6 In addition, this lemma also extends the
trading models of Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) to a world with several risky assets and trading on two
independent sources of information.
Extensions
In lemma 6.1, I extend lemma 2.2 to a corresponding securities market where the corporate insiders also trade on
information about random business fluctuations (thus, Tl< 00, making y valuable). This equilibrium is used to
analyze insider trading as an incentive mechanism by interpreting the term e in (6.1) as managerial effort which
in lemmas 6.2 - 6.4 is determined as part of the equilibrium.
Equilibria when N = O or L = B
IfN = Obecause the cost of acquiring private information is higher than the expected profit generated from this
information, lemma 2.2 is given by corollary 6.1 where Y replaces y, b replaces p, a replaces a, Cl> replaces T,
and 1. replaces Tl.
Corollary 2.4: If L = B. then Il replaces M in lemma 2.2.
If J1= O, then the equilibrium is given by corollary 6.3 where Y replaces y, b replaces p, and a replaces a. The
reason for this simple transformation is that I have assumed that the corporate insiders do not change behavior
when L shifts from A to B. This is because they are perfectly camouflaged by the liquidity traders and the
6 See his lemma 3 on page 28 for a one period model where both traders observe common private
information. Subrahmanyam also allows trading in a basket of securities. and uses the model to study trading in stock
index futures.
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always legally trading market professionals.
2.7 BROKER. AUCTION MARKET APPROACH
Equilibrium prices are usually determined by imposing strict (Walrasian) market clearing among the various
types of traders; see, e.g., Grossman (1989). This means that in most rmancial market models there is no need
to demonstrate explicitly how the prices are determined as part of the equilibrium (see also models with
homogeneous information like the one presented by Duffie (1992) where prices are determined by no arbitrage
opportunities). Consequently there are no dealers or market makers present in these models. This is in contrast
to what we observe in many real financial markets. Nonetheless, in most financial market models there are
usually broker- arbitrageurs who provide immediacy (that is the ability to trade now rather than wait for a trader
to take the opposite position as is the case in search markets) and tend to trade away profit based on public
information.
In the real world, there exist two types of securities markets called broker and dealership markets where the
differences are as follows; see Schwartz (1988), especially, pages 18·19, Pagano and Roell (1992), and Yavas
(1992):
• A broker> auction (or agency) market is a trading system where public orders go to the exchange
which matches them with other public orders. The traders trade with a broker (who is the trader's
agent) who trades with a brokers' broker or a matchmaker. Finally, the brokers' broker matches the
orders at the exchange. An example of a pure broker market is the Tokyo Stock Exchange where the
order clerks (called Saitori) are not allowed to participate in the trade by holding large position on their
own accounts. They only maintain the limit order book and monitor trading.
• A (pure) dealership market is a trading system where public traders do not trade directly with each
other, but trade with a dealer or a market maker who serves as intermediary. An example of a
dealership market is the over-the-counter market in the United States. The traders trade through a
broker, who buys or sells to a dealer.
Most exchanges in Europe are broker markets, and most of the dealership markets are not pure dealership
markets. In the normal course of business the orders in a dealership market are matched between the various
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types of traders. But if there are order imbalances, the dealers take the opposite position. Most of the stock
exchanges in the United States are what we might call dealer/broker markets. London Stock Exchange is the
leading dealer/broker market in Europe; see, for instance, Pagano and ROell (1990) for a discussion on the
trading systems in Europe. The trend on several exchanges, for example at Oslo Stock Exchange, is to allow
market making.
At the New York Stock Exchange there are specialists, who have functions both as market makers and
brokers, and member firms (brokerage houses) which compete with the specialists. The specialist operates as a
dealer when he buys or sells from his own inventory of stocks, and as a broker when he handles the limit order
book. The limit order book competes directly with the quotes of the specialist. For example, a limit order to
buy specifies a particular quantity to be bought at a predetermined price or lower. A market order to buy, on the
other hand, specifies that the trader is willing to buy a particular quantity of shares at the best price in the
market. This indicates that the quoted prices (bids or asks) can be the specialist's own and not the quotes of
other traders as is always the case in a broker market The specialists as market makers also have an obligation
to maintain a fair and orderly market Lindseyand Schaede (1992) make an interesting comparison of the trading
systems at the world' s two largest stock markets, the TSE and the NYSE.
I will show that our securities market model can be interpreted both as a broker market and as a dealership
market That is, the price setting market makers in a dealership market can also be interpreted as arbitrageurs in
a broker market, assuring that trading on public information yields zero profit. This does not mean, of course,
that dealership markets are identical to broker markets with respect to the pricing of securities in general. The
difference between broker - auction markets and dealership markets appears if there for some reason are too few
arbitrageurs. In this way, the dealer can be seen as a provider of insurance against execution risk. That is the
risk of finding few or no counterparts to trade, see, e.g., Pagano and ROell (1990) for a discussion of these
matters.
Assumptions
I assume there exist A risk neutral arbitrageurs who have rational expectations. Rational expectations means
that the arbitrageurs use the equilibrium price as a source of knowledge when determining their optimal trading
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strategies. The portfolio selection problem of arbitrageur a E {l. 2 •...• A}. trading in security k E {l. 2•...•
Kt} at time t E {O. l. ...• T k-1 }. is to maximize expected profit given the price information and strategic
behavior.
(7.1)
where Aa is the trading strategy. Now I make an important assumption that the arbitrageur follows a linear
(negative) feedback strategy
(7.2) A. = - '1'. (RS - E[xl y*=y*1).
where Va is the trading intensity on public price infonnation. Hence. the arbitrageurs buy when the price falls
unexpectedly. and sell when the market price rises unexpectedly. This is often referred to as market timing. If
there are no arbitrageurs in the auction market. it becomes almost a search market characterized by a low supply
ofimmediacy (see Yavas (1m). pages 3S- 38). That is a securities market where a buyer nonnally has to wait
for a seller to arrive before he can transact
Market clearing
Since I assume a broker market, the equilibrium price is produced by strict "market clearing" among the traders
at the auction at time C
(7.3)
The first term is the demand from the arbitrageurs. the second and third are the demands from the privately
informed speculators. and the last term is the demand from the liquidity traders. The volume of the arbitrageurs
(or market makers). for instance. can also be interpreted as the supply of the risky asset In a market where the
informed speculators learn information from equilibrium prices. they will have a stabilizing effect much alike
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the one performed by the arbitrageurs.
Equilibrium
It is straightforward to show that the equilibrium price of security k at time t must be linear in the net order
flow from the two last types oftraders (see Kyle (1984»:
(7.4) s = 1. [E[XI y*=y*] + ~ (f8n + l:Xm + 0)].
R L"'. n-1 m-1.-1
Define
(7.5) .Å: æ 1-A--'
L"' •
•-1
where this parameter is interpreted as the sensitivity of the market price to changes in the order flow from the
privately informed speculators and the noise traders. The price sensitivity is a regression coefficient and must
therefore satisfy (3.8) above, at least when A approaches infInity.
Broker vs dealership markets
I summarize the difference between broker and dealership market assuming that the supply of immediacy is
identical in the two markets:
Proposition 2.1: A broker market with a limited number of risk neutral and competitive arbitrageurs,
whose trading strategies are given by (7.2), produces the S(JI'M transaction price as a corresponding dealership
market where the price is set by competitive and risk neutral market makers.
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fmQf: If (7.5) equals (2.19), the proposition holds because the price function given by (7.4) is identical to
(3.7). One way of proving this under the specified conditions is by first assuming that the broker - arbitrageurs
act strategically. Kyle (1984) has shown (see his equations (21) and (22) on page 58) that the price sensitivity
in such a market is
(7.6) Å"=
1
AV'
A-2
= --A-
A-l '
see also the proof of lemma 8.1 where this price sensitivity appears as a special case. It follows that A.·(A-+ 00)
= A.where A. is given by (2.19) or (3.8). Finally, if a limited number of risk neutral arbitrageurs act
competitively, they act as if they were infInitely many, and the component reflecting market power (i.e., (A - 2)
I (A - 1» will be one for all A. Q.E.D.
When I later refer to market makers in a dealership market setting, I could alternatively refer to arbitrageurs in a
broker market setting.
2.8 SOME EXTENSIONS
This section discusses some important extensions which are considered to be beyond the scope of this
dissertations. Chapters 5 - 8 extend the lemmas derived in this chapter to take into account, for instance,
production, disclosure, risk averse traders, risk averse pricing, hedging, and market power in the arbitrage -
dealership market, but non of these chapters take into account long-lived information or continuous trading.
Long-lived information
In lemma 2.1 there are Tk discrete times where the secmities in finn k are traded sequentially. But information
observed prior to trading at time t is only useful at the next auction and not at any later auctions. This is
because the innovation d and thereby the value of the security become public information at time t+ 1 (see
(2.2». Prior to time t+ 1 there is a new signal and so on. The approach with short-lived information goes back
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to Admati and Pfleiderer (1988). Alternatively, the informed speculators could observe private information
before time Oand then trade sequentially at the auctions from O to Tk-l. New information which arrives before
time 1 could be used at the auctions from 1 to Tk-l, and so on. Then if the value of the firm becomes public
knowledge at the horizon, the problem of informed speculators must include considerations about whether to
trade now or wait, Thus, it may be optimal to trade less now and store information for later periods. Kyle
(1985a), Foster and Viswanathan (1990), and Holden and Subiahmanyam (1992) analyze the effect of long-lived
information. Kyle's insider observe only one signal and may trade sequentially on his superior information (see
his section 3). He flnds that information is incorporated gradually into the price because the insider trades in a
smooth manner and therefore holds a smooth stock of inside information. Holden and Subrahmanyam allow
multiple privately informed agents who all observe information of the same quality. They show that
competition forces their common private information to be revealed very rapidly (see also Dutta and Madhavan
(1991». Finally, Foster and Viswanathan combine discrete and continuous trading and thereby taking into
account that the exchange is closed over night. During the day, trading happens continuously. For instance,
they show that when private information is to be revealed at a later date, the informed individual must transact
more intensely, causing the private information to be released more quickly.
Continuous trading
I have assumed that trading takes place sequentially at the call auctions from O to T k-l which means that lemma
2.1 is characterized by batch trading. In the most important financial markets, though, trading happens
continuously from the exchange opens until it closes. Kyle (1985ab) analyzes continuous insider trading (see
also Back (1992». He ftnds that the insider trades gradually over time and increases his expected protit relative
to the discrete case with sequential auctions. The transaction price becomes more and more informative and
converges towards the liquidating value at the horizon. The incentives to acquire private information do not at
any time disappear.
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2.9 SHORT SUMMARY OF THE RESEARCH APPROACH
I have presented a simple securities market model suitable for analyzing various effects of insider trading
regulations in financial markets. This is because it takes into account may elements observed on the world's
largest stock exchanges which are the NYSE, the TSE, and the LSE. Chapters 3 - 4 use lemma 2.1 to analyze
the many effects of insider trading and insider trading regulations in fmancial marlcets. Later chapters extend the
outlined framework to capture other elements relevant for the insider trading debate.
APPENDICES
This section contains the formal proofs of lemmas 2.1 - 2.2.
Appendix A Proof of lemma 2.1
The decision problem of insider m E (1, 2, ... Ml is to choose the trading strategy .1m which maximizes his
expected profit given the information generated by observing the signal y. This problem is given by (2.12) or
equivalently
(Al)
where.1m is the insider's trading strategy and therefore his decision variable. I insert the price function given by
(2.18) and get
(A2) Max Am {E[il 9, 9*=y*1- E[E[iI9*=y*1 + A(fOn+ I,Am+ ii)19,9*=y*]},
~ ~ ~
or (after using that E[u I y, y*=Y*l= O)
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_ { (_ [ N _ M·I_ ])}(A3) Max ~m E[i 1 y, y*=y*]- E[i 1y*=y*] - A. ~m + E LOn + L~m 1 y, y*=y* .
A. n-l mal
The insider takes the price sensitivity and the trading strategies of other insiders and the market professionals as
given. This suggests a Nash-type of equilibrium (see Fudenberg and Tirole (1991), pages 11 - 44). The first
order condition is
wlrze
(AS)
The second order condition is - 2 A < O which is satisfied if A> o. I insert (AS) into (A4) and solve for ~m.
The result is
(A6) ~m = 1 (E[il y, y*=y*]_ E[il y*=y*]) _ 1 E[fOn 1 y, y*=y*],
(M + 1)A. M + 1 n-l
(A7)
vei -I -*- *)
E[i I y, y* = y *] = E[i 1 y* = y *] + co (~~ _! - ~) (y - E[y I y* = y *]), and
varyy=y
7 Generally, if x and y are normally distributed variables, then (see, e.g., Goldberger (1991), chapter 7
especially page 75)
cov(i y) cov2(i, y)
E[i I y] = E[i] + :) (y - E[y]), and var(i I y) = var(i) -~~ ~m .
67
(
N _ )COy l:8n, YI y* = y *
(AS) E[iSn I y, y*=y*] = E[iSn I y*=y*] + n-1(_1_* *) (Y - E[y I y*=y*]).
nc1 nc1 var Y y =y
-o
I insert (A7) and (AS) into (A6) and get
(A9)
cov(i, yl y*=y*) - A.Cov(iSn, yl y*=y*)
fj. n-1 (- _ E[- I -* - *])
m = (M + 1) var(y I y* = Y *) A. Y Y Y - Y .
Note that E[y I y*=y*l = E[x I y*=y*l because E[h I y*=y*l = Owhich means that the trading strategy equals
(3.2) where
(Al O)
cov(i, YIy*=y*) - A.COv(iSn, y Iy*=y*)
B = n-1
(M + 1)var(y I y*= y*) A.
in which
(All) cov(i, Y I y*=y*) = cov(i, i + hl y*=y*) = var(i I y*=y*) = T, and
(A12) var(yl y*=y*) = var(i + hl y*=y*) = r + 11.
A rational insider anticipates the sttuctural fonn of the trading strategy of the market professionals. I use (3.1)
andobtain
(A13) cov(iSn, yl y*=y*) = cov(Np (Yn - E[il y*=y*]), yl y*=y*) =
n-1
NP COV(YD'yl y*=y*) = NP r.
Iinsert (All), (A12), and (A13) into (AlO) and get
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(A14) B = [1 - N,BA.]r
(M + 1) (r + TI) A..
As indicated by (2.11). the problem of market professional n E (1. 2•...• N) is to choose the trading strategy
which maximizes his expected profit given the information generated by observing the signal YD. That is.
(AlS)
I insert the price function given by (2.18) and obtain after some straightforward simplifications
The first order condition is
(A18)
If A. > O. the second order condition - 2 A. < Ois satisfied. I use the rule for condition expectation (see footnote
above) and get
(A19) E[-I - -* *] E[-I -* *] cov(i. YnI Y*=Y*) (- E[- 1-* *])x Yn' Y = Y = x Y = Y + (_ I -* *) Y« - Y« Y = Y •cov Yn Y = Y
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(
N-l_ )
V ~O - 1-*- *N-l s-i CO s: n'Yn Y =s
(A20)E[LBn lYn' Y*=Y*]=E[LBn I y*=y*]+ n-(_ _*_ *) (Yn -E[Yn I Y*=Y*]), andn-l n=l COVYn I y - y
=0
COV(~.6.m' Yn I y* = y *)
(A21)E[~AmIY-n,Y-.=Y*]=E[~.6.mIY-*=Y*] + m-l (Y- E[y- Iy-*-y*])
~u ~ (_ I -* *) n - n - -m-l m-l COVYn Y = Y
-o
I insert (AI9), (A20), and (A21) into (AI8)_ The result is
(A22) Bn =
(
N-l_ M _ )
cov( i, Yn I y. = y *) - A.cov LOn + Låm' Yn I y* = y *
n-l m-l (- _ E[- I -* = *])
2 (- I -* *) 1 s; Yn Y Y -cov Y« Y =Y ""
Notice that E[Yn IY*=Y*l = E[x I y*=y*l because E[en I y*=y*l = O. This means that the trading strategy is
given by (3.1) where
(A23)
(
N-l_ M _ )
cov(i, Yn I Y*=Y*) - A.COV LOn + Låm' Yn I y*=y*
R n-l m-l
p= ------------~--~--~~------~
2 cov(Yn I Y*=Y*) A.
I find that
(A24) cov(i, Yn I Y*=Y*) = cov(i, i + en I Y*=Y*) = var(il y*=y*) = r,
(A2S) var(Yn I y* = y *) = var(i + en I y* = y *) = r + E,
(A26) COV(%Bn, Yn I y* = y *) = cov({N - 1) P (Y. - E(i I y* = y *]), s, I y* = y *) =
(N - I)P cov(i + e., i + en I y*=y*) = {N - I)P r, and
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(A27) cov(f~m'Yn'Y*=Y*) = cov(MB (y - E[iIY*=Y*]),Yn1y*=y*) =
m-I
MB cov(i + ii, i + en I y*=Y*) = MBr.
The market professionals are assumed to observe diverse information which means that cov(en, en Iy*=y*) = O
when n -:F- n. The next step is to insert (A24) - (A27) into (A23). The result is
(A28)
[1 - Å [(N - 1)P + M B]] r
p = 2 (r + e) Å '
(A29)
[1 - MBÅ]r
p = [(N + l)r + 2e]Å·
I insert (A14) and obtain
(A30) p = [N r + (M + 1) (r + 71)al Å '
r
where a is given by (3.6). The next step is to substitute this back into (A14) which gives the relationship
between B and P given by (3.4). Then Iuse the trading strategies ofmarket professionals and corporate insiders
given by (3.1) and (3.2) to split the order flow up into its basic elements:
(A31) Z = P [(N + Ma)i + pfeD + Maii] + jj - P (N + Ma)E[il y*=Y*],
Dal
which means that
(A32) cov(i, z I y* =Y*) = P (N + M a) r, and
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(A33) var(ily*=y*) = p2[(N + Ma)2r + Ne + M2a277] + (T.
I insert (A32) and (A33) into (2.19) and get
(A34) A. = P (N + Ma) r
p2 [(N + M a)2 r + N e + M2 a2 77] + (T
I substitute (A30) into (A34) and solve for A.. The result is given by (3.8). I then substitute (3.8) into (A30)
and get (3.3). Finally, notice that (see footnote 7)
(A35)
cov2(i, Y *)r = var(i I y* = Y*) = var(i) - =
var(y *)
ar--,a+r
which equals (3.5). This completes the proof of lemma 2.1.
Appendix B Proof of lemma 2.2
This proof is a special case of the proof of lemma 6.1 given in appendix 6.A. It is very close to the proof given
in the previous appendix. Market professional n e (1, 2, ..., N) wants to find a trading sttategy which is a
solution to the portfolio selection problem:
(Bl)
where I is an information structure reflecting publicly available information (thus, I = (y*=y*, y--y., ...D. The
proof mimics the solution procedure given by (Al6) - (A30) excepts for the fact that y now is non-informative
(because '1\ ~ 00 by assumption). In this way, the trading sttategy of the market professionals is given by (6.8)
where the trading intensity
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(B2)
r
f3 = [(N + l) r + 2 ep."
Note that (B2) is a special case of (A30) in which TI ~ 00. This is because the corporate insiders observe
security-specific information which is not correlated with the systematic factor information observed by the
outside professionals. In the same way, corporate insider m E {I, 2,..., Ml wants 10 find a trading strategy
which solves his portfolio selection problem
(B3)
The procedure of finding Am mimics the one given by (A2) - (AI4) except for the fact that Y = e + i replaces y
= x + h. In this way, the trading strategy of insiders is given by equation (6.9) where the trading intensity
(B4)
(J)
b = (M + 1)«(J) + l) Å '
in which
(B5)
cov2(e, y.) ø rp
(J) = var(el y.=y.) = var(e) - var(y.) = ø + rp
This is a version of (AI4) where the symbols are changed due to the new assumptions (thus, b replaces p, Cl»
replaces T, and l replaces TI)and the term N p A. is zero as the two types of speculators now observe uncorrelated
information. Notice also that (B5) equals (6.13). It follows from (B2) and (B3) that the relationship between b
and p is given by (6.11) where a is given by (6.12). The next step is to use (6.8) and (6.9) to find that the net
orderflow
(B6) Z = f3 [Mae + Ni + fen + Mal] + ii - f3 [MaE[el y.=y.] - NE[il y*=y*1].
D-I
Then I use this 10 derive the price sensitivity
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(B7) Å = cov{i, z I I) =var(z II)
J3 (Nr + Maw)
Isubstitute (B2) into (B7) and solve for A.. The result is given by (6.15). Ithe substitute (6.15) back ioto (B2)
and obtain (6.10). The price function must, as io the previous appendix, be linear in the order flow and is
therefore given by (6.14). This completes the proof of lemma 2.2.
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CHAPTER 3
ON THE PROPERTIES OF FINANCIAL MARKETS
WITH A CHANGING SUPPLY OF CORPORATE
INSIDERS
First draft: October 1990.
Current revision: November 1992.
ABSTRACT
Under certain conditions, insider trading caJUes the trading intensities of all sllpUiorly informed traders to decrease,
and thereby reduces the equilibrium bid ask spread. On the other hand, it increases the 11IIJrketdepth, the expected
trading volume, the volatility, and the informativeness of the transaction price. This is a flavor of the numerous and
rather complex effects which have to be taken into account when stock market regulators propose changes in the law
governing the trades by corporate insiders.
TI
3.1 INTRODUCTION
I use the securities market equilibrium characterized by lemma 2.1, and analyze the changes in some of its basic
properties when the law regulating insider trading is changed from allowing to prohibiting such trades. Some of
the corporate insiders (or their tippees) may find it optimal to trade illegally. This is because there are assumed
to be significant costs of control as a result of the camouflage provided by the outsiders, suggesting that it is
not optimal for the regulatory agency to enforce the ban such that all the insiders are kept out of the market (see
sections 5.4 - 5.5).
The focus is on the effects of this regulatory change on market characteristics such as the trading intensities
of the superiorly informed speculators, the price sensitivity and the equilibrium bid ask spread set by the market
makers, the market liquidity measured by the expected trading volume and the depth, and the market efficiency
measured by the volatility and the informativeness of the transaction price. The effects caused by insider trading
on the expected welfare of the future shareholders (i.e., the various types of traders) are left for chapter 4, and
chapter 5 analyzes the effects on the expected welfare of the current shareholders. Later chapters extend the
discussion by taking into account other effects relevant for the insider trading debate.
In many respects, this chapter is close to Leland (1992) who analyzes insider trading within a rational
expectations framework. The demand for shares comes from a single insider who observes perfect information
and recognizes his impact on the transaction price, from outside arbitrageurs who trade on information generated
by observing the market price, and from liquidity traders who are trading randomly. Shares are supplied by a
firm which issues shares to maximize the expected profit of current shareholders. Leland shows that when
insider trading is permitted, the average stock price will be higher, the liquidity of the market will be less, the
current price will be more volatile, the future price volatility given the current price will be lower, and the
current price will be more highly correlated with the future price. To some extent, these important findings are
confirmed in my analysis. Nonetheless, additional insight is offered, for instance, by recognizing competition
among the corporate insiders.
I start by assuming a fmancial marlcet design where the supply of market professionals is fixed and given outside
the model. Inthis setting, several interesting properties relevant for evaluating the effects of insider trading are
identified:
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If insider trading is prohibited, the market professionals tend to intensify their trading. This is because a
reduction in the supply of corporate insiders reduces the competition among the superiorly informed, allowing
the outside professionals to increase their trading without revealing too much information to the price setting
market makers. But if some of the insiders are trading illegally, the opposite might happen because few
speculators have more market power than many. Accordingly, the corporate insider trade harder when it is
illegal than when it is legal. The reason is that less competition, together with no fear of detection because of
the perfect camouflage provided by the professionals and the liquidity traders, allows the corporate insiders to
increase their trades without revealing too much information to the price setting market makers or being caught
by the stock market regulators.
If insider trading is prohibited, the price sensitivity and thereby the equilibrium bid ask spread may easily
increase. This happens if the reduction in the supply of corporate insiders leads to less competition and thereby
to less information in the equilibrium order flow. Then the price setting market makers face an increased adverse
selection problem, and, consequently, they have to increase the bid ask spread. This is inconsistent with King
and Roell (1988) who on page 168 claim that "market makers, of course, recognize the danger presented by the
better informed traders or competitors and respond by widening their bid-ask spread." Nevertheless, if there
initially is just one insider trading in each security, effectively prohibiting insider trading indeed decreases the bid
askspread.
I measure the market liquidity by the expected trading volume and the market depth, and show that a
reduction in the supply of COIpOCateinsiders may reduce both measures. The expected trading volume is reduced
because insider trading increases stock trading measured by the variability of the order flow, and the market depth
is reduced because the intermediaries represented by the market makers face an increased adverse selection
problem to the pricing of securities. Insider trading may promote the liquidity of the securities market.
Nevertheless, if the fmns are small with only a few employees, the market depth may actually increase because
in this case the adverse selection problem of the price setting intermediaries is reduced. The same may happen if
the supply of outsiders is elastic in the supply of corporate insiders. Finally, insider trading is shown to
accelerate the resolution of uncertainty from the future to the present period. This means that the volatility of
the current tmnsaction price increases with insider trading, but the uncertainty of the future value given the
current price is reduced by insider trading. Thus, insider trading improves the informativeness, but increases
volatility of the transaction price.
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In the second part of this chapter, I analyze the financial market described by lemma 2.1 in which the supply
of market professionals is detennined as part of the equilibrium. This is easily done by letting the outside
professionals enter into the market as long as their expected trading profit exceeds the cost of acquiring private
information.
If I assume a very elastic supply of market professionals, the following effects are identified: Allowing
corporate insider to trade on superior infonnation causes some of the professionals to leave because they are not
able to cover their infannational investments due to intensified competition. This. on the other hand, reduces
the competition and allows harder trading by the remaining speculators. It is shown that insider trading
decreases the price sensitivity and thereby the equilibrium bid ask spread. The reason is that the exit of market
professionals reduces the adverse selection problem faced by the price setting market makers, and therefore they
may reduce the bid ask spread and simultaneously decrease the market depth. As in the special case analyzed by
Fishman and Hagerty (1992), insider trading may reduce the ability of the price system to transmit information
because privately informed outsiders are kept out of the securities market by the insiders. The amount of inside
infonnation reflected in the price increases, but it is dominated by the reduction in the amount of privately
acquired information. This indicates that the effects of insider tIading on a stock market exchange with an elastic
supply of market professionals are even less clear cut than in the case with fixed supply discussed above. Notice
that in a market with elastic supply, we obtain the same effects as in the fixed supply market by reducing the
supplyelasticity.
This remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. Section two draws attention to the trading intensities of
both corporate insiders and market professionals, focusing on the difference between the two and on the changes
in their trading intensities caused by an exogenous shift in the insider trading regulations. Then, in section
three. I analyze the price sensitivity and the bid ask spread which both are determined in equilibrium by the price
setting market makers. Sections four and five analyze what happens to the market depth, the expected trading
volume, the infonnativeness. and volatility of the transaction price. In section six, I analyze the trading
intensities of infonned speculators, the price sensitivity, and the market efficiency in a corresponding securities
market with an elastic supply of market professionals. Section seven concludes the chapter. Some formal
proofs are found in the appendices together with a numerical example used throughout the chapter to illustrate
the properties of the stock market equilibrium.
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3.2 TRADING INTENSITIES
This section compares the trading intensities within and across equilibria. The flrst comparison means that I
contrast the trading intensity based on information from external sources with the trading intensity based on
information from internal sources. Then I compare the trading intensities when insider trading is allowed with
the corresponding trading intensities when insider trading is prohibited by the stock market regulators.
2.1 Comparison or the two types or inrormed speculators
The trading intensity on private information and the trading intensity on inside information are given in lemma
2.1 where, according to corollary 2.2, Il replaces M when L = B.
Proposition 3.1: Jf L = A, the trading intensities o/ superiorly informed speculators fJ and B on the stock
market exchange [(ONa, Limk" Udkt), Skl,' k: E {l, 2, ..., K}, t E {O, 1, ..., TIc-1}} are given by (23.3) and
(23.4) in lemma 2.1. They are related since
(2.1)
dB
dfJ
= a,
where a> O is given by (2.3.6).
IEm: This follows by differentiating (2.3.4) with respect to the trading intensity of market professionals.
Q.E.D.
According to (2.3.4), the trading intensity of corporate insiders equals the trading intensity of market
professionals multiplied with a factor a, depending on the number of corporate insiders, the potential amount of
private infonnation, and the precision of inside and privately acquired information.
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Proposition 3.2: If
(2.2) 2 e - TIIl < • then B > p.
TI
On the contrary. if
(2.3) 2 e - TIIl ~ • then B S p.
TI
IfTl = O.B > pfor all Il < oo(ifTl = O and Il-+ 00. B = P = O).
fmQf: If a > 1, then B > P (see (2.3.4». I use corollary 2.2 and equation (2.3.6), and find (2.2) by solving
a(Jl.) > 1 with respect to u, The inequality given by (2.3) follows analogously. Finally, the last sentence in
the proposition follows directly from (2.2), and the parenthesis follows from the fact that a(ll -+ 00) = O,
suggesting that B = O, and if 'Il = Oand Jl.-+ 00, p = O(see (2.3.3». Q.E.D.
This is consistent with Fishman and Hagerty (1992) who on page 108 observe that a single insider trades harder
than any of the market professionals. Their observation can be proven by observing that Il = I < (2 e - 'Il) / Tl
because e > 'Il (see (2.2.10». In my model, the opposite may happen if there are several corporate insiders.
Figure 3.1 illustrates the trading intensities as functions of J.1, using the numerical values given in table 3.3 (sec
appendix D).
2. 8. 1 .
The nmnber of illegally
trading insiders
Trading
intensity 0.36
FIGURE 3.1 Trading intensities of privately
informed speculators
~) M
0.3
0.26
0.16
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We observe that as long as ~ < 3, the corporate insiders trade harder or more intensively than the two market
professionals. Notice also that p.~ = 3) = 0.243 :s; P(J.L) for all u, implying that, in this example, the trading
intensity of the professionals reaches its minimum when there are only three corporate insiders in the securities
market.
2.2 Comparison across equilibria
I compare the trading intensities of market professionals and corporate insiders when insider trading is allowed
with their trading intensities in a corresponding market where insider trading is outlawed by the stock market
regulators.
Market proressionals
According to (2.3.3), the trading intensity of market professionals depends on the number of traders with inside
information.
Proposition 3.3: If the supply of corporate insiders changes, the direction of the effect on the trading
intensity of market professionals is determined by
(2.4)
IfTl> O, fJ(/.l = O)= fJ(/.l-+ 00) > O. However, ifTl = O, fJ(/.l = O)> fJ(/.l-+ 00) = O.
fmQf: The sign indicated by (2.4) follows straightforwardly by differentiating p with respect to ~ where p is
given by (2.3.3). The value p(J.L = O) is given by (2.5.3), and we observe directly from (2.3.3) that as long as 11
> O, P(J.L -+ 00) = P(J.L = O) because
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(2.5)
If 1\ = O, pijl ~ 00) = Obecause a is independent of J.L. Q.E.D.
If there are infinitely many corporate insiders observing perfect infonnation (i.e., J1 ~ 00 and 1\ = O), the
equilibrium price converges towards its fully revealing limit The market professionals have not any incentive
to trade because they do not possess any private infonnation. On the other hand, if 1\ > O and J1 ~ 00, the
transaction price reveals y, bul il is not a sufficient infonnational statistic, implying that the market
professionals have an incentive to trade, because some of their information is still intacl and therefore useful for
trading.
An infinite number of corporate insiders do not have any superior information and consequently do not
contribute to the adverse selection problem to the pricing of the securities faced by the intermediaries, The
adverse selection problem is caused by the market professionals as is the case when there are no corporate
insiders in the securities market This implies that as long as 1\ > O, the trading intensities of market
professionals are identical when J1 = Oand J1 ~ 00. The limits are confirmed in figure 3.1 where Pijl = O)= pijJ.
~ 00) = 0.354.
If the supply of corporate insiders changes exogenously, the effect on the trading intensity of market
professionals may be splil into two parts:
(2.6) d Competition Depth C . . d Depth+ ompeanon ,
d~ d~
because (see (2.A30»
(2.7) p = r 1lONr + (~ + l)(r + 11)a
The first factor may be interpreted to represents the direct competition among the infonned traders, and the
second factor is the market depth which reflects the indirect competition through the adverse selection problem
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faced by the intermediaries (see section 3.4 for a formal definition of the depth). Table 3.1 summarizes the
effects on p caused by an exogenous change in J.I..
+ +
TABLE 3.1:
~
J.lE [O,J.l~
J.l e (J.i.N J.1p]
J.l E Q.1ø.-)
Effects on p caused by å Jl
+
First, if Jl increases from O to JlA. (which equals approximately I), then the effect via the depth and the direct
effect on competition are both negative. This implies that market professionals act strategically and reduce their
trading intensity to prevent too much information to be revealed by the net order flow. Secondly, if Jl expands
from JlA.to Jlp (= (F + 11)/11), the direct competition effect is as always negative, but the adverse selecLion
problem is reduced and thereby allows a greater market depth. The reason is increased competition among the
corporate insiders. The effect caused by direct competition dominates and the professionals still find it optimal
to reduce P(Jl) further. Finally, for expansions beyond Jlp, the reduction in adverse selection dominates the
increased competition between the market professionals and the illegally trading insiders. This means that for Jl
> JlP, the trading intensity P(Jl) increases with u, If 11= O, the competition effect between the two types of
informed traders dominates the depth effect, and p{J.1) falls for all J.I..
Corollary 3.}: Suppose L changes from A to B in a small company (meaning that 1 SMS Mp = er+ 71)
171),then
(2.8) {J(p.} ~ {J(M).
If the company is large (that is, M > Mp), the opposite might happen if the enforcement of the law is
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inodeqUlJle.
f[QQf: This result follows sttaightforwardly from (2.4) since Jl S M. Q.E.D.
If insider trading is prohibited in a small company. reduced competition from corporate insiders allows the
market professionals to use their information more aggressively. This is not always the case in large
companies.
Corporate insiders
According to (2.3.4). the trading intensity of corporate insiders depends. among other things. on their own
supply.
Propositio" 3.4: If the "umber of trading insiders changes exogenously, the effect on their trading intensity
is negative. Thus,
(2.9) dB < o.
d/.l
The limit B(/.l = O)> B(/.l ~ 00) = o.
Proof: It is sttaightforward by the use of (2.3.4) to show that the derivative of B is negative. If insider trading
is effectively prohibited, B(Jl = O) is given by (2.5.4) where a' = (I' + 2 e) I (F +TI). We see directly that B(Jl
= O) > O. Finally. I use (2.3.4) and find that B(J1 ~ 00) = Obecause
(2.10) lim a(/.l) = O.
Jl-+-
Q.E.D.
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If J.l-+ 00, Y is revealed by S. This means that the corporate insiders have not any privileged information and
they therefore have no incentive to trade. If, on the other hand, J.l = O, the trading intensity reaches its
maximum due to maximum market power (ignoring the integer problem). This is confrrmed in figure 3.1
where B(J.l= O)= 0.707 > B(J.l-+ 00) = O.
Nevertheless, the total trade of corporate insiders does not converge toward zero when their number grows to
infmity. This is because
(2.11) r + 2elim J.L a =
implying that
(2.12) lim B r+ 2e ~ O
p.-+oo J.L = 11 ~N(r+E) > .
This means that the insiders indeed influence the net order flow at the limit when they are infinitely many, and
thereby reveal the information content of their common signal to outsiders inferring information from the net
orderflow.
Individual trading on inside information decreases with the number of illegally trading insiders because
competition among the insiders in exploiting their common signal increases as their number increases. In this
way, the competition effect dominates the adverse selection effect for all u. I may claim that insiders act
strategically and reduce their trades in order not to reveal too much information.
Corollary 3.2: Suppose L changes from A to B, then
(2.13) B(J.L) ~ B(M).
IEQf: This follows from (2.9) since J.l SM. Q.E.D.
Corporate insiders who are trading illegallyon privileged information trade more aggressively than when such
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trading is allowed.
3.3 BID ASK SPREAD
From a security trader's perspective, the bid ask spread is the difference between the ask and bid prices. A trader
who buys at market pays the ask price, and a trader who sells at market receives the bid price. Hence, the bid
ask spread is the cost of a round-trip; buying and then selling a given number of shares. Figure 3.2 illustrates
how the bid ask spread depends on the order size.
Zs
Orderflow
FIGURE 3.2 Relationship between the bid ask
spread and the price sensitivity
_ l
S = - {E[il y.=y.] + A.z}
R
Ask
Bid ask spread
Bid
If the traders first buy Zb and then sell z s where Izb I= I z s I, they expect to loose the difference between the ask
and bid price. The spread, now from a market maker' s perspective, is
(3.1) s = ! (Zb - z.).
R
In this way, the bid ask spread is increasing with the price sensitivity and the net order size. This suggests that
when the market makers act as dealers, their revenue comes from the bid ask spread, and when they act as
brokers, their revenue comes from the commissions on each transaction. The commissions are normalized to
zero without changing any results. I unify the round-trip volume and the spread becomes a deterministic
parameter:
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(3.2) s = !.t.
R
Generally, the spread is lowered if the uninformed trading activity is increased, the informed trading activity is
reduced, the market makers' risk of holding an unwanted position is reduced, and the competition among the
market makers is intensified. As a result, there are three components in the bid ask spread; a component
reflecting adverse selection, a component reflecting risk aversion of the intennediaries, and, finally, a component
reflecting the competition in the broker - dealership market The two last components are not present in this
model, but are taken into account in chapters 7 - 8; see also chapter 5 for an extension taking explicitly into
account the costs of market making.
Proposition 3.5: The market makers set the equilibrium price sensitivity depending on the supply nf
corporate insiders:
(3.3) (dÅ) [2r a(r+(I-/J)7J) ]Sgn - = -Sgn -dJ,l Nr + (/J + l)(r + 7J) a N(r + E) + /J(r + 7J) a2 •
We observe that when /J ~ /JÅ (where /JÅ be determined by d Å(/J~ I d /J = O), d .tI d /J < O. If 7J > O, Å(J.l = O)
> Å(/J ~ 00) > O. However, if7J = O, Å(/J ~ 00) = O.
1EQf: I differentiate (2.3.8) to get (3.3). We see directly that the sign is negative for large u, If Tl = O, then
J.li..is easy to fmd. However, if Tl > 0, the solution is complex but easy to fmd numerically. I usc (2.5),
(2.11), and (2.3.8) to show that
Nr +
r ~N (r + E)
(r + 2 e) (r + 7J) u'
7J
(3.4) .t(/J ~ 00) =
This limit is smaller than A(J.L= O) given by (2.5.6). Finally, when Tl = 0, we observe that A(J.l~ 00) = O.
Q.E.D.
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If the supply of corporate insiders observing perfect information approaches infinity. the underlying value of the
firm is completely revealed through the net order flow. There is no price differentiation problem. and the market
makers are able to set the equilibrium bid ask spread to zero. However. if they observe noisy information. the
price sensitivity does not converge towards zero as the supply grows to infinity. because the corporate insiders
are assumed to share one common signal. This suggests that if all inside information is ttansmitted into the net
order flow. there is still private information held by the market professionals who obtain information from
external sources.
Informational asymmetry leads to a price sensitivity greater than zero and thereby to a positive bid ask
spread. The reason that ).,(J.1 = O) > ).,(J.1-+ 00) is that corporate insides reveal information and. since y is
correlated with lYn; n = 1. 2•...• N}. they also reveal some of the information acquired by the market
professionals. This means that the market makers are able to set a lower price sensitivity when there is a
continuum of insiders.
It is possible by the use of (2.2.19) to identify two effects caused by an exogenous change in the supply of
corporate insiders:
(3.5) (
dA) (dCOV(i.ZIY*=y*) dvar(ZIY*=y*))Sgn - = Sgn - l •
~ d~ d~
The first term represents the information effect It tends to be positive because insider trading transmits
information into the order flow. leading to a situation in which the market makers are observing better or more
precise information. The second term represents the informed volume effect It tends to be negative. The
reason is that with insider trading orders from informed increases relative to orders from uninformed. Table 3.2
summarizes the effects.
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TABLE 3.2:
~
Il E [O. 1lA.1
Effects on Å. caused by 4 J.1
Il E (J.LA,,00) +
lo - IaImmoIiaøolloct, Ve - Val1llllll olIoct, md Ill.ja.-.
As confirmed by figure 3.3. the positive infonnation effect dominates for small J.1 and the negative volume effect
dominates for larger J.1.
Corollary 3.3: Suppose L changes from A to B in the securities market characterized by lemma 2.1 in
which M> Mo > O(where Mo> Ois determined by ).(Mo) = A(Jl =O)),then
(3.6) l(Jl) ~ l(M).
frQQf: This follows from (3.3) since J.1 S; M. Q.E.D.
If insider trading were allowed in companies with a large number of insiders. the bid ask spread would be lowered
even if the enforcement is complete. This is consistent with Leland (1992). page 877 who observes that the
average price will be higher when a single insider is trading. but contradicts the claim in King and ROell (1988)
that insider trading increases the bid ask spread; see also Glosten and Milgrom (1985). These authors do not
recognize the competition effect caused by several corporate insiders. Figure 3.3 gives an example.
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2. 4. 6.
The number of illegally
trading insiders
Price 0.6
sensitivity
0.65
FIGURE 3.3 Price sensitivity as a function of
the number of lawbreakers
0.46
In this example, the price sensitivity (and thereby the bid ask spread) increases if the supply of corporate insiders
increases from zero to one (A.(JJ. = O)= A.(M0 = 1.641) = 0.566 < A.(JJ. = 1) = 0.591), and is reduced if the supply
expands further. Note that, A.(JJ.,., = 0.512) = 0.601 ~ A.(JJ.) for all J.1. The spread is positive even when there are
no insiders. This holds as long as the market professionals are trading on privately acquired information and
thereby creating an adverse selection problem to the pricing of securities. Finally, note that A.(JJ. ~ 00) = 0.257
which is less than A(J.1 =O)= 0.566.
The results in this section depends critically on the assumption that the two types of informed speculators
observe correlated information which means that the corporate insiders reveal information hold by the market
professionals and the other way around. Figure 4.5 illustrates the price sensitivity when the two types of
informed speculators observe uncorrelated information. In this case, ).(J.1) is always minimized if J.1 = O,
maximized if J.1 is approximately I, and A.(JJ. ~ 00) = A.(JJ. = O).
3.4 LIQUIDITY
The concept "market liquidity" is closely tied to the trading volume, but it encompasses a number of
transactional properties. Following Black (1971), the liquidity of the market is generally measured by the depth,
the tightness. and the resiliency:
• The depth is defined as the lack of change in the market price caused by a unit change in the order flow.
In other words, the market depth is the size of an order flow innovation required to change the price a
given amount,
• The tightness is defined as the lack of costs when a trader is turning around a position in the securities
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market over a short period of time. Thus. the tightness is closely related to the depth. and a low bid ask
spread is consistent with a tight market.
• The resiliency is dermed as the speed with which prices recover from a random. uninformative shock.
suggesting that a resilient market is characterized by no systematic price bubbles which means that prices
are near the "true" underlying values.
Roughly speaking. a liquid market is one which is infinitely deep and tight and is so resilient that the price
reflects the underlying value (see Kyle (1985). pages 1316 - 1317). Another concept relevant for evaluating the
liquidity of a market is. again according to Black (1971). the immediacy. That is. the markers ability to
execute orders when they arrive. 10 this model. the market is immediate and in this respect liquid. This is
because I have assumed a dealership market approach where the price setting market makers always stand ready
to take the opposite position vis-a-vis the security traders. Hence. no orders have to wait for a trader to appear
and take the other side of the market as might be the case in some broker auction markets (then called search
markets).
In the rest of this section. I measure the liquidity of the securities market by the depth and by the expected
trading volume.
4.1 Depth
I follow the approach in Kyle (1985) and measure the market depth by the inverse of the price sensitivity. This
isbecause
(4.1)
The depth (and thereby the liquidity) increases when the slope of the market clearing line A. decreases. This
suggests that the market makers react to the information content of the order flow through the liquidity of the
market. The process works so that if the adverse selection problem faced by the market makers is becoming too
severe to handle. they react by making the stock market exchange less liquid simply by making the market
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clearing line in figure 3.2 steeper.
Corollary 3.4: Suppose L changes from A to Bin afirm with M> M· corporate managers (where M· > O
is defined by the equation A/.M·) = A/.Jl = O), then
(4.2) 1 1Å(Jl) S Å(M)·
IE2f: This follows from (3.3) since J.1S M. Q.E.D.
If insider trading is prohibited in a firm with many employees, the liquidity of the market is reduced (given an
inelastic supply of market professionals and liquidity traders). This may also happen in small firms provided
incomplete enforcement of the law. Leland (1992), who analyzes a framework with only one insider, claims on
page 870 that the liquidity of the market is reduced by insider trading which is consistent with my findings when
J.1=OandM= 1.
4.2 Expected trading volume
An alternative measure of market liquidity is the expected trading volume. It is dermed as in Admati and
Pfleiderer (1988) as the sum of the expected trading volume from the speculators, the liquidity traders, and the
market makers where the expected volume from, e.g., the market professionals is measured by the variance of
their net orders.
Lemma 3.2: The expected volume of trade on the stock exchange [( 8"kI, .1mkt, lldkl), Ski,· k e {l, 2, ..., K},
t tE (O, 1, ... , T/("l)J given by lemma 2.1 equals
[_ _ ] c[ ~N(Nr +e) +Ma~(r + f1)+~(N + Ma)[Nr+(M + 1Xr + f1)a1](4.3)E VI y*=y* = -sa 1+ ~ .
N (r + e) + M(r + f1)al
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If insider trading is prohibited, then p.replaces M.
£roof: See appendix A.
The first term is the expected volume from the liquidity traders (if there are both discretionary and non-
discretionary liquidity traders, 0'01/2 + l: O'd1/2 rep1aces 0'112), the second term is the expected volume from the
market professionals, the third term is the expected volume from the corporate insiders, and the last term is the
expected volume caused by the price setting market makers taking the net opposite position vis-a-vis the other
traders.
Proposition 3.6: If p.> Mp, the expected trading volume in the security market characterized by lemma 2.1
/QJdJ. to increase with the supply of corporate insiders:
(4.4)
d E[ V I y* = Y *]
> O.
dp.
If 11> O, then E[V(p. = O) / Y*=Y*J < E[V(p. -+ 00) / y*=y*J < 00. On the other hand, if 11= O, E[V(p. -+ 00) /
Y*=Y*J -+ 00.
Proof: I find that Sgn(d E[l:V n I y*=y*] / d u) = - Sgn(r - (Jl- 1) 11), d E[l:V m I y*=y*] / d Jl > O, and d
E[LV q Iy*=y*] / d Jl > Owhere Vn' Vm. and Vq are the volume from professional n E {l, 2, ... , N}, insider m
E {l, 2, ... , M}, and market maker q E {l, 2 •... , Q}. The last derivative implies that the total volume ~ to
increase with u, hence d E[V I y*=y*] / d Jl > O. However, if Jl < Mp = (F + 11) /11. the increase in the volume
from corporate insiders may be dominated by the decrease in the volume from market professionals. The limits
are
[ _ ] [..JN r + e + '(N + 1)r + 2 £](4.5) E V(p. = O) I y*=y* = {U 1 + ff+-e .and
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,.t ( ) r+2£ er:': ( r+2£)[ (r+2£)(r+'1)Jl"VNNr+£+--Vr+l1+ N+-- Nr+-'---";""';_-"'-
(4.6)E[V(Jl--+oo)IY*=y*]= 1+ 11 ,JN(r+£)l1 11.
We see that (4.6) is limited (if'll > O) and greater than (4.5). Q.E.D.
The expected trading volume tends to increase if the supply of corporate insiders increase. The reason is
increased variability in the order flow. This tends to hold even for small J.1 as the increase in the expected
volume from the corporate insiders usually dominates the decrease in the expected volume from the market
professionals.
Corollary 3.5: Suppose the L changes from A to B. then
(4.7) E[V(M) I y* = y *] ~ E[V(Jl) I y* = y *].
frQQ!: This follows from (4.4) since J.1 SM. Q.E.D.
If insider trading is prohibited by law (or contract), the expected trading volume decreases because some of the
corporate insiders choose to leave the securities market to avoid the risk of being punished. Figure 3.4
illustrates using the data in table 3.3.
Trading 7.
volume 6.5
6.
5.5
5.
4.6
The number of illegally
trading insiders
FIGURE 3.4 Expected trading volume
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We see that the expected trading volume increases monotonically from 3.806 when Il = O to 10.589 when Il ~
00.
3.5 VOLATILITY AND PRICE EFFICIENCY
Privately informed speculators reveal infonnation when they submit orders to the intennediaries here represented
by the market makers. The intermediaries set the transaction price and clear the market based on already
disclosed information and new information revealed through the net flow of orders. In this way, the quoted bids
and asks reveal information, Potential speculators, however, have no incentives to infer information generated
as part of the equilibrium because it is not possible to make a profit on public knowledge. But, of course, the
informed speculators know the price structure, and use it, before they execute their orders, to influence the
information content to their advantage by holding some of it back. The speculators' strategic adjustments
suggest that the informational role of prices is of interest because their expected profits depend on how much
information that is revealed to the price setting market makers. Traders need an inefficiency in the price
mechanism to generate trading profits. This raises at least two important questions: What determines the
volatility of prices, and how much information is reflected in the price system?
5.1 Volatility
The volatility of the market prices is often used to describe financial markets; see, e.g., Miller (1991) or Shiller
(1989). I analyze the volatility by analyzing the variance of the change in market value over the auction from
time L l to time L
LeI'tU1Ul 3.3: Suppose L = A, the variance of the predicting error
(5.1) var(i - RS I y*=y*) = r - R2var(S I y*=y*),
where the volatility of the maræt price
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(5.2) var(s, -*_ *) _ (£)2 N + May - y - R Nr + (M + 1)(r + 71) a'
The volatility is limited by the variance bound
(5.3) var(s IY'=Y')s var(sol j*=y') = (~r(~+ N) ((~ + N) r + .)
(Nr + (r + 71) ~ r
where var(So I r=ri is the volatility of the corresponding sufficient informational statistic. If L = B, then Il
replaces M,
1EQf: See appendix B.
The variance of the predicting error is a measure of the uncertainty faced by uninformed ttaders planning to trade
in security k at the batch auction at time t. It equals the total uncertainty minus the uncertainty revealed by the
market price, or equivalently
(5.4) var(x-RS' y*=y*) = r-R2var(So, y*=y*) + R2 (var(So, y*=y*)-var(S' y*=y*)).
Uncertainty foced b)' tndeø with
acc:as ml)' 10public infarmatioo
Uncertainty faced b)' full)' Ackti1ioaal UIlCCIlUintyfaced b)' uaden
with IlOacc:as 10non-public infarmatioo
The uncertainty faced by uninformed traders decreases if the superiorly informed speculators hold back more
information by trading less aggressively. Observe from (5.2) that the uncertainty is not influenced by so called
"popular models" (see Shiller (1989), page 3) because the variance of the predicting error is independent of G.
This implies that the informed and risk neutral speculators scale up their trades proportionally if investors with
sentiment strategies are expected to increase their trades, and they thereby neutralize the effect. The first tenn in
(5.4) may be interpreted as the difference between perfect information and available information whereas the final
tenn may by be interpreted as follows:
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(5.5) var(S· I y* = y *) - var(S I y* = y *) = var(S· I y* = y *) - var(S I y* = Y*).
IDformoticmhcld bod< hm
dIII_byillCarmod~
KIlDa -sk:olly
Consequently, the variance of the market price measures the amount of information that is revealed about
security k at time t (see Foster and Viswanathan (1990), pages 602 - 605), and it is easy to show that the
volatility is proportional to the informativeness of the price as measured by (5.10).
Proposition 3.7: The volatility of the market price increases with the number of corporate insiders trading
in the securities market:
(5.6) dvar(Sly*=y*) = (Rr)2 (r+ TI)a
2 > O.
dJ.l [Nr + (J.l + l)(r + TI) aY
IfTl > O, var(S(J.l = O) I y*=y*) < var(S(J.l ~ 00) I y*=y*) < TI R2. However, if TI = O, var(S(J.l ~ 00) / y*=y*)
= TI R2.
frQQf: I use (5.2) and the derivative follows without any difficulties. It is possible to show that d2 var(S I
y*=y*) / d J,L2< O, meaning that var(S(J,L) Iy*=y*) is increasing and strictly concave. The next step is to find
the limits when the number of corporate insiders approaches zero or infinity:
(5.7) - (r)2 Nvar(S(J.l = O)ly*=y*) = - ,and
R (N + 1)r + 2 e
(5.8)
N + r + 2£_ (r)2.
var( S(J.l ~ 00) I y* = Y*) = R -N-r-+----:'(r-+-2-~~)....,.(r-+-Tl...,...r
TI
By comparing the two limits, we observe that (5.7) is smaller than (5.8). Finally, if Tl = O, var(S(J.L~ 00) I
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y*=y*) = r t R2. Q.E.D.
The volatility of the market price increases with the supply of corporate insiders. This is because more (or
better) information is communicated via trading into the net order flow and thereby into the transaction price.
New information changes the expectations of the intermediaries which again creates variability in the price
system.
Corollary 3.6: Suppose L changes from A to B. then
(5.9) var(S(,u) I y*=y*) ~ var(S(M) I y*=y*).
fmQf: This follows from (5.6) since J1 sM. Q.E.D.
The market prices are more volatile if insider trading is permitted. Such a conclusion is consistent with the
results in Leland (1992), page 871. Figure 3.5 illustrates.
8.
The number of illegally
1.0. trading insiders
M
FIGURE 3.5 Market volatility
1..1.
Price
variability 1.. 3
1..2
0.9
0.8
This example indicates that if J1 ~ 00, var(S I y*=y*) = 1.455 < var(S' I y*=y*) = 1.600 < r = 2.000. On the
contrary, if J1 = O, var(S I y*=y*) = 0.800. This means that if insider trading is prohibited and effectively
enforced, the informed traders hold back 50% of the total information whereas they hold back 14% when insider
trading is allowed.
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5.2 Market efficiency
Assuming price taking behavior among a limited number of risk neutral market makers leads to no expected
profits by dealing on public information in the dealership market This suggests that the price system is at least
semi-strong efficient In addition to public information, the price system will reflect some of the information
acquired by the superiorly informed speculators. This is because the speculators affect the net order flow through
their buy and sell orders.
Lemma 3.4: Suppose L = A, then a measure of the amount of private information reflected in the
equilibrium price of security k at time t is
(5.10)
l l N
'P= =-+---
var( x I S, y. = y.) r r + 2 e
M
+ r + (M + l) 71'
where
(S.ll)
If, on the other hand. L = B. then JJ replacesM.
lEm: See appendix C.
The first term in (5.10) is the precision of the future value of the security given public information, and if there
are no informed traders, the market price reflects only public information. The second term reflects the private
information transmitted into the price by the trades of smart money investors, and the final term reflects the
privileged information communicated into the price by the trades of corporate managers. If 'P='P.,the price
system is a sufficient informational statistic.
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Proposition 3.8: The informativeness of the price system increases with the number of insiders trading
illegally:
(5.12)
d'l'
dJl
r+lI= -----'=----;;-2 > o.
[r + (Jl + 1) 11]
If 11> 0, 'P(Jl = O)< 'l'(Jl ~ 00) < 00. However, if 11= 0, 'P(Jl ~ 00) ~ 00.
fmQf: I use (5.10) where J.1 replaces M and (5.12) is its derivative with respect to J.1. Note that d2 'I' Id J.12 <
O,implying that 'I'(J.1) is increasing and strictly concave. The limits are
(5.13) 'I'(Jl = O) = rI + N , andr + 2 E
(5.14)
1+-
11
Clearly, the market efficiency is higher when there are infinitely many insider than when there are none. If TI=
O,then, according to (5.14), 'I'(J.1 ~ 00) -'-+ 00. Q.E.D.
The price informativeness increases with the number of corporate insiders as the order flow becomes more
informative due to less coordination among the informed speculators when trying to limit their trading
intensities.
Corollary 3.7: Suppose L changes from A to B, then
(5.15) 'I'(M) ~ 'I'(Jl).
fmQ{: This follows from (5.12) since J.1 S; M. Q.E.D.
This proposition suggests that if the supply of smart money investors is fixed, the price efficiency is higher if
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the corporate insiders are allowed to trade. Insider trading reduces the uncertainty about the liquidity value of the
speculative asset by a premature resolution of uncertainty at the time of trade; see, e.g., Leland (1992), page 871
for a similar result Figure 3.6 illustrates.
The number of illegally~~----------------------------~10 . trading insiders
M
2. 4. 6. 8.
FIGURE 3.6 Information content in the market price
Price 1.6
informativeness
1.4
1.2
In this example, 'P(JJ. = O) = 0.833 and 'P(JJ. -+ 00) = 1.833 < 'P. = 2.500. This suggests that the price is
partially revealing for all J.L
3.6 ENDOGENOUS SUPPLY OF MARKET PROFESSIONALS
In this section, the supply of market professionals is determined as part of the equilibrium. This is done simply
by imposing a competition constraint on their expected profit, making N an endogenous variable. I concentrate
on what happens 10 the trading intensities of the superiorly informed traders, the price sensitivity set by the
market makers, and the informativeness of the transaction price when the supply of corporate insiders changes
due 10 an exogenous change in the insider trading law. The welfare effects are analyzed in section 4.5, and the
case where the liquidity traders are in elastic supply is analyzed in sections 4.6 - 4.7.
Lemma 3.5: If the supply of market professionals is elastic, the equilibrium supply. denoted N*. is
determined by the competition constraint
(6.1) E[ ~ I y.=y.] - C = O,
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where C ~ O is the individual cost of acquiring a private signal y". The expected revenue generated by using the
signal is
(6.2) E(i-: I y* = y*] = (r + e) r I (1
N* r + (M + l)(r + 71)aVN* (r + e) + M(r + 71)az·
If insider trading is prohibited. then fJ.replaces M.
fmgf: The assumed equilibrium condition (6.1) leads to zero expected profit in the secmities industry. and (6.2)
is derived in chapter 4 (see (4.2.3». Q.E.D.
This means that market professional n E {l. 2, ...• N} enters into the secmities industry if his or her expected
profit from ttading on the signal yn exceeds the cost of acquiring the private signal. This way of endogenously
determining the information acquisition is also chosen by, for instance. Admati and Pfleiderer (1988). pages 14
-21.
It turns out that it is possible but not very convenient to obtain a closed form solution for the optimal
supply (as N* is characterized by a third order equation). but it is straightforward to find it numerically. This is
done in figure 3.7 below.
Proposition 3.9: The equilibrium supply of professionals N* depends on the exogenously determined
supply of corporate insiders:
(6.3) (d N *) [r a (r + (1 - fJ.) 71) lS -- = -Sgn +gn dfJ. N * r + (fJ. + l)(r + 71)a N * (r + e) + fJ.(r + 71)aZ •
If71 = O. then the effect is negative for all u:
fr2Qf: I use the implicit-function rule (see. e.g .• Chiang (1984), page 208): d N* Id J.L= - (d [E[xNn Iy*=y*l -
Cl I d J.L) I (d [E[7tNn I y*=Y*l - Cl I d N*). Then I use (6.2) and find that d [E[xNn I y*=y*l - Cl Id J.L has the
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sign determined by the right hand side of (6.3). Clearly, d [E[nNn IY*=Y*l - Cl Id N* < O. This means that
Sgn(d N* Id J.I.) = - Sgn(d [E[nNn Iy*=y*l - Cl Id J.I.) I (d [E[nNn Iy*=Y*l - Cl Id N*) = Sgn(d [E[nNn Iy*=y*l
- Cl I d J.I.) which equals the right hand side of (6.3). If TI= O, then a is independent of J.I. and d [E[nNn Iy*=Y*l
- Cl Id J.I. < O. This implies that d N* I d J.I. is negative for all J.I.. Q.E.D.
This indicates that if the supply of corporate insiders increases (to J.I. < J.I.p), the number of market professionals
is reduced. Thus, the insiders may squeeze the professionals out of the market which may end up in the
equilibrium given by corollary 2.1 ifthe individual cost of acquiring information is high. Figure 3.7 illustrates
using the numerical values given in table 3.3.
2. 4. B. 1.0.
The number of market
professionals
N
Tradingprofit 0.2S
and acquisition
cost 0.2
FIGURE 3.7 Equilibrium supply or market
professionals
JL=O
0.1.
O.1.S
O.OS
The cost of acquiring information is independent of J.I., and, according to (6.2), d E[nNn (N) I y*=y*l I d N < O.
In this example, if J.I. = O, the equilibrium supply equals 5.516 (ignoring the integer problem). Because of
increased competition from corporate insiders, it becomes less profitable for the professionals to trade, and the
expected revenue shifts downward. This leads to fewer smart money investors in the market (if, e.g., J.I. = lO,
N* = 2.394). Note, however, that the revenue function shifts outward if J.I. increases from, e.g., 10 to 100 (and
N* shifts from 2.394 to 2.737).
Corollary 3.8: If L changes from A to B in a security where M is small, the securities industry expands.
Thus.
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(6.4) åN* = N*(.u} - N*{M) > O.
If M is large, the effect on the size of the securities industry depends on the enforcement of the insider trading
regulations.
fmQf: This follows from (6.3) and the assumption that J1 S M. Q.E.D.
This suggests that if L changes from A to B, the equilibrium supply of market professionals tends to increase
because of less competition among the informed speculators. ff corporate insiders are trading, we might say that
the professionals "lose confidence" in the securities market and therefore leave. In reality they are forced out
because of greater competition from other informed speculators, and it has nothing to do with psychology.
6.1 Intensity or trade
I defme the number of market professionals needed to keep their trading intensity unchanged from L = A to L =
B or vice versa:
(6.5)
where åN~ is the needed entries of smart money investors to keep p(M) = P(J.L). The next proposition gives
its closed form.
Lemma 3.6: The needed entries of market professionals to keep their trading intensity unchanged when L
shifts from A to B is
(6.6)
fm2!: I use (2.3.3) and set it equal to (2.3.3) where J1 replaces M, and solve for åN. The needed inflow
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follows straight away. Q.E.D.
The needed entries of market professionals depends on the change in the number of corporate insiders and on the
change in the insiders' trading response relative to the ttading response of market professionals.
Corollary 3.9: Suppose MV .1fJ=O < /lN*. then
(6.7) P(p.) < P(M).
Otherwise the opposite happens.
ftQQf: This follows by definition. Q.ED.
On a stock market exchange where privately infonned outsiders are very sensitive towards the rule governing
insider trading, their intensity of trade decreases if insider trading is prohibited by the stock market regulators.
This is because the existing smart money investors face harder competition from entering traders than from the
full supply of corporate insiders. Figure 3.8 illustrates (note that the trading intensities are measured
negatively).
2. 4. 6. 8. 10.
Number of market
professionals
Expected
revenue
FIGURE 3.8 Optimal trading intensity
JI.=O
0.4
B Cost0.2
Trading intensity of -o. 4
professionals
JI.=O
If insider trading is prohibited (meaning that the equilibrium shifts from A to B in the figure), the expected
revenue as a function of the equilibrium number of smart money investors shifts outward, and the professionals'
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trading intensity shifts downward in the figure. We observe that AN* = 3.121 > ANAP=<>= 1.524 which gives
13(JJ.) = 0.213 < 13(M) = 0.323 as proposed above. For instance, if M = I, the opposite happens. In this case
13(J,l) = 0.213> 13(M) = 0.211 since AN* = 1.581 < ANåP::O = 1.687.
6.2 Price sensitivity
I define the number of market professionals needed to keep the price sensitivity unchanged by the regulatory
shift from L = A to L = B:
(6.8) N,u_o = N*(M) + AN,u_o,
where åNM::o is the needed entries of informed smart money investors to keep A.(M) = A(JJ.). There is no closed
form.
Corollary 3.10: If tiN .41::0 > tiN*. then
(6.9) Å(Jl) > Å(M).
Otherwise the opposite hoppens.
fmQf: This follows by definition. Q.E.D.
Figure 3.9 illustrates using the numerical values given in table 3.3 (note that the price sensitivity is measured
negatively).
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FIGURE 3.9 Price sensitivity
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The price sensitivity is a unimodal function of the number of market professionals, increasing for small N and
decreasing for large. As the number of market professionals grows toward infinity, the price sensitivity
converges towards zero. This is because the professionals observe diverse private information, implying that the
equilibrium order flow reveals approximately all privately acquired information for very large N. There are no
adverse selection problems in fully revealing equilibria, allowing the market makers to hold a very liquid
market.
We see that ~M=O = 16.221 > ~. = 3.121 and I..(M) = 0.392 < 1..(J.t) = 0.552. This is consistent with
(6.9) above. The opposite happens, e.g., if M = 1. In this case, I..(M) = 0.562 > 1..(J.t) = 0.552 because ~* =
1.581 > ~å~=O = 0.827.
6.3 Market efficiency
Idefine the number of market professionals needed to keep the price efficiency unchanged over the regulatory
shift from L = A toL = B:
(6.10) Nå'l'_O = N'" (M) + ~å'l'-O'
where the last term is the entries of market professionals needed to keep the efficiency unchanged. Its closed
form follows.
Lemma 3.7: The needed entries of privately informed market professionals to keep the price informativeness
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unchanged is
(6.11) AN .1'1'-0 = M a(M) - IJ a(IJ).
Proof: I use (5.7) and set 'I'(M) = 'I'(Jl) and obtain the difference between Nå,!,=o - N*(M) given by (6.11).
Q.E.D.
In this way. the needed inflow of market professionals depends on the change in the number of corporate insiders
and on the change in the corporate insiders' trading response relative to the trading response of smart money
investors.
Corollary 3.12: If tlN.Ii 'l'=0 > &V*, then
(6.12) 'I'(M) > 'I'(IJ).
Otherwise the opposite happens.
J?mQf: This follows by definition. Q.E.D.
This is consistent with Fishman and Hagerty (1992) who observe that market efficiency decreases if insider
trading is prohibited in a securities market where the supply of market professionals is very elastic; see their
proposition l on page Ill. Figure 3.10 illustrates the opposite case (note that the price efficiency is measured
negatively) as is always the case in a market with fixed supply.
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The price informativeness is a linear function in N. HL changes from A to B, then AN* = 3.121 < ANL1'l'=O
= 4.615 and 'P(M) = 1.668 > 'P(JJ.) = 1.419. HM = I,the opposite happens. In this case, 'P(M) = 1.406 <
'P(JJ.)= 1.419 because AN* = 1.581 > AN~'I'::() = 1.500 (see also figure 1 on page 113 in Fishman and Hagerty
(1992».
3.7 SHORT SUMMARY OF MAJOR CONCLUSIONS
Ihave shown that insider trading may affect the properties of the equilibrium characterized by lemma 2.1 where
the properties are the trading intensities of rational speculators, the price sensitivity, the equilibrium bid ask
spread, the market depth, the expected trading volume, the market volatility, and the informativeness of the
transaction price.
• H the enforcement of the law prohibiting insider trading is inadequate, the most aggressive trader need
not to be a corporate insider, but can equally well be an outsider trading legallyon privately acquired
information. Nonetheless, if insider trading is prohibited, both the market professionals and the insiders
tempted to trade illegally tend to trade harder than in an otherwise identical market where insider trading is
allowed.
• Insider trading tends to reduce the price sensitivity and thereby the equilibrium bid ask spread. This
happens even if the number of corporate insiders is large and the insider trading law is effectively enforced
by the stock market regulators. However, the opposite tends to happen if the supply of corporate insiders
is reduced from approximately one to zero.
• H insider trading is allowed, the liquidity of the market, measured by both its depth and its expected
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trading volume, tends to be higher. This may happen even if the control authorities are very effective
catching corporate insiders who are trading illegally. However, the depth tends to be lower if there is a
monopolistic insider.
• The volatility of the transaction price and the market efficiency are higher when the corporate insiders
are free to trade than in a regulated market where insider trading is prohibited by the stock market
regulators.
The next chapter analyzes the effects of insider trading on the welfare of all participants, again using the stock
market equilibrium characterized by lemma 2.1. Inchapter 7 - 8, the properties of the equilibrium are analyzed
under slightly different market conditions by taking into account risk aversion, hedging demand, and market
power in the broker - dealership market
APPENDICES
I derive measures of the expected trading volume, the volatility of the transaction price, and the price
informativeness. All proofs are based on lemma 2.1. The last appendix presents the numerical values used in
the example.
Appendix A Proof of lemma 3.2
This appendix draws on Admati and Pfleiderer (1988), pages 13 - 16. They measure the total expected trading
volume as the sum of the expected trading volume from the informed speculators, the liquidity traders, and the
market makers:
(Al)
+ ~var(u I y* = y *) + ~var(z I y* = y *).
Then I insert the trading straægies given by (2.3.1) and (2.3.2) and the netorder flow given (2.A31). The result
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is
[ - ] [(N + M a)l r + l(A2) E V I y* = Y* = f3 ...jN(N r + E) + M a f3 ...jr + 11 + .Ja + 132 + a,
NE + Ml al 11
The final step is to insert the trading intensity of market professionals given by (2.3.3). Iyield (4.3) after some
straightforward calculations. This completes the proof of lemma 3.2.
Appendix B Proof of lemma 3.3
The volatility measures the variability of the transaction price from time LI (i.e., just before time t) to time t.
The transaction price is given by (2.3.7) and its variance equals
(Bl) var(S I y*=y*) = (~rvar(z I y*=y*).
Iuse the order flow given by (2.A31) and get
The next step is to insert the trading intensity of market professionals given by (2.3.3) and the price sensitivity
given by (2.3.8), and the result of this operation is given by (5.2) and it follows without any difficulties. If the
equilibrium is fully revealing, the price would equal the price in a market where the market makers observe all
available information. Thus,
(B3) S· = l E[- I - - - -* *]R x y, Yl' •••, YN' Y = Y ,
or (by the rule of conditional expectation)
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Notice that
(BS) lim S'(N)
N...-
1 _
= -x.
R
If there are infinitely many traders observing diverse infonnation, the price equals the present value of the
underlying fundamental. This is not the case if there instead are infinitely many traders observing common
information, The variance of the sufficient statistic follows directly from (B4) and is given in (5.3). This
completes the proof of lemma 3.3.
Appendix C Proor or lemma 3.4
The efficiency of the market is measured by 'I' = 1/ var(x IS, y*=y*) where the conditional variance reflects the
uncertainty after observing the current transaction price. If the price reveals information about the future value,
the conditional variance is reduced (from var(x I y*=y*) to var(x IS, y*=y*), and consequently the efficiency
increases. This is the case because
(Cl) var(iIS,y*=y*) = r - A, cov(i,ily*=y*) = r(l - jJA,(N + Ma»).
Iinsert (2.3.3) and (2.3.8) and yield
(C2) ( - ) r (r + 2 E)var i I S, y* = y * = ....-~~-~~ :--
Nr + (M + l)(r + 71)a'
The inverse is given by (5.10) and measures the informativeness of the market price. If the price is fully
revealing, we could condition directly on the signals:
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(C3) (- I - - - -* *)varx Yl" .. 'Y2'y,y =y = re eNr + (r + 71) -
71
The inverse is given by (5.11). This completes the proof of lemma 3.4.
Appendix D Example
Table 3.3 gives the numerical values used in the figures to illustrate the properties of the securities market
equilibrium.
IåBLE J.J: Numerical values
r = 2, Cf = 1, N = 2,
11 = 1, R = 1, M = 10,
e = 2, C = 0.1, J.1 e {O, 1, •.., lO},
Q e {l, 2, ...}.
I have assumed that there are only two market professionals present in the securities market, because if, e.g., N
= 200 some of the endogenously determined parameters become relatively small without, of course, altering any
of the conclusions.
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CHAPTER 4
WELFARE EFFECTS CAUSED BY A CHANGING
SUPPLY OF CORPORATE INSIDERS
First draft: October 1990,
Current revision: November 1992.
ABSTRACT
Insider trading is shown to affect tlu! expected profit of secwity traders such as fNlrket professionals and liquidity
traders. I identify two effects; one caused by competition and tlu! other by adverse selection. First, if the trader is
motivated by liquidity events, the competition in exploiting superior information is zero. If, on the other hand. the
trader is motivated by privately acquired information, the competition increases with the supply of corporate inside's.
leading to less expected profit. Secondly, the adverse selection effect works indirectly through the problem of
differentiating tlu! informed from the uninformed, faced by the price seuing marke: makers. If one insider enters, the
adverse selection problem is increased. TIu! result is a negative effect on the expected prof" of both the liquidity
traders and tbe marke: professionals. However, if tlu! supply expands fwtlu!r, the adverse selection decreases due lo
competition among tlu! informed. TIu! result is a positive effect on tlu! expected profits of all traders. In this way, the
total effect is a trade-off between these effects. I conclude that tlu! 1NlTket professionals tend to prefer insider trading
prohibited, whereas the liquidity traders tend to prefer insider trading allowed. Nevertlu!less, they tend to agree that the
worst case is to have an insider trading law which is not adequately enforced by the stock marka regulators.
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4.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter analyzes the welfare effects caused by insider trading and its regulation on the stylized stock market
exchange characterized by lemma 2.1. On that exchange, I have assumed that all participants are risk neutral. It
means that the welfare effects caused by insider ttading are completely measured by its effects on expected profit.
Myanalysis shows that insider trading affects the expected profit of all participants. However, it turns out that
the welfare effects may not be as unique as many have thought. For instance, the fmancial market design turns
out to be critical for the conclusion.
Welfare of liquidity traders
I take the previous literature on financial markets with asymmetric information as a starting point for further
research on insider trading. Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) observe that
"...as long as there is at least one informed trader, the introduction of more informed traders generally
intensifies the forces leading to the concentration of trading by discretionary liquidity traders. This is
because informed traders compete with each other, and this typically improves the welfare of liquidity
traders," l
Their findings might be interpreted to suggest that if insider trading is prohibited and effectively enforced, the
trading cost of noise or liquidity traders is minimized. But as long as there is at least one corporate insider, the
trading cost decreases with further supply. Consequently, if the welfare of liquidity traders is a primary concern
of stock market regulators, it is optimal to prohibit insider trading and enforce the law so that there are no
illegally trading insiders. If, on the other hand, it is costly to enforce the law leading to illegal trading, the
liquidity traders may somewhat surprisingly prefer to trade in periods, securities, and markets which allow
intensive insider trading, This is because liquidity traders are hetter off if they trade together with legally
trading, rather than together with illegally trading insiders. The reason is that the former have less market
power.
l See page 5 in their article.
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I find that the tendency towards concentration is even stronger than previously suggested. As long as there
is at least one outsider trading on privately acquired infonnation, the liquidity traders tend to concentrate their
trades in markets, securities, and periods with intensive insider trading. The reason is that there always are other
informed traders such as security analysts who are impossible to get rid of by regulations. As the basis for their
trades such professionals use privately acquired information from outside sources, and increase thereby the
adverse selection problem faced by the intermediaries. This means that insider trading on correlated information
may reduce the overall adverse selection problem, because an additional supply of informed traders intensifies
competition, leading to more information being revealed through the influence of corporate insiders on the
equilibrium order flow.
Welfare of market professionals
My model has an additional advantage relative to most previous models (including Admati and Pfleiderer
(1988». It is possible to analyze the effects of insider trading regulations on the welfare of other privately
informed speculators. Another model with this feamre is Fishman and Hagerty (1992), who divide the informed
speculators into one corporate insider and several market professionals. Notice that the competitive outsiders in,
e.g., Leland (1992) are not speculators but arbitrageurs because they trade on public information generated by
observing the equilibrium price (see chapter 8 for further comments on the distinction between speculators and
arbitrageurs).
I use the securities market model characterized by lemma 2.1 where there is a limited number of market
professionals competing with a limited number of corporate insiders. Unlike in Fishman and Hagerty (1992),
my framework allows competition among the corporate insiders, leading to new and interesting results relevant
for the insider trading debate. If the corporate insiders are allowed to trade on inside information, the market
professionals face harder competition. This means that they prefer to trade alone, without the company of other
informed traders, but of course together with as many liquidity traders as possible. The reason is that less
competition gives the market professionals a higher price manipulative power, and therefore higher expected
profits. Nevertheless, I can identify two situations where the market professionals may actually prefer lo trade
together with the corporate insiders:
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• If the cost of enforcing the law is high, there would be corporate insiders trading illegally (see
sections 5.4 - 5.5). The illegal trading insiders have a larger market power than would be the case in an
unregulated market This again may lead to harder competition and less expected profits to the market
professionals.
• Suppose the supply of market professionals is very elastic towards the rule governing insider trading,
then if insider trading is prohibited, the influx of new professionals may be so large that the market
power of existing market professionals actually decreases. This makes the existing professionals worse
off. This argument is not valid unless there is an inefficiency, causing fewer than optimal to enter into
the security industry in markets allowing insider trading. If there are no such inefficiency, the market
professionals expect to earn zero profit in both cases, and are therefore really indifferent towards the rule
governing insider trading.
I conclude that the outside professionals may both vote against and in favor of a public law prohibiting insider
trading. The conclusion depends, among other things, on the expected effectiveness of the enforcement supplied
by the regulatory agency.
I ignore three important effects that we have to take into account if we are going to evaluate the desirability of
insider trading in real financial markets: First, because I assume risk neutrality, I ignore changes in the
possibilities of risk sharing (see chapter 7 - 8). Secondly, the market is assumed to be semi-strong efficient,
suggesting that it is not possible to earn money on trading strategies based on public information. I am
therefore really ignoring effects on the welfare of broker - arbitrageurs, simply by keeping them out of the
securities market (see chapter 8). Finally, the economy has no production so possible incentive effects caused
by insider trading are ignored (see chapters 5 - 6). Otherwise, it would make sense to evaluate the effects caused
by insider trading on the welfare of current shareholders. These effects are one by one taken into account in
chapters 5 - 8.
This chapter is structured as follows. The next section is technical and presents the expected profit of all
individuals. Section three analyzes the effects of insider trading on the expected profit of both types of
superiorly informed speculators, whereas section four analyzes the effects on the expected trading cost of
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publicly informed liquidity traders. I extend in section five to a corresponding securities market in which the
supply of market professionals is elastic, and analyze what happens to the trading cost of the liquidity traders.
Section six focuses on the optimal behavior of discretionary liquidity traders, and section seven analyzes the case
where the liquidity traders for some reason "lose confidence" in a market in which the supply of corporate
insiders increases. In section eight, I show that there might be a conflict of interest between informed and
uninformed outsiders. Section nine gives a short summary of major conclusions. Formal proofs are given in
the appendices.
4.2 EXPECTED PROFIT
This section gives the expected welfare of all participants by drawing on the securities market equilibrium
characterized by lemma 2.1. In that market, the superiorly informed speculators trade because they have a desire,
represented by a linear utility function, to make a profit as a higher realized profit allows a greater consumption.
Perhaps the noise or liquidity traders have the same objective, but they possess no superior information when
they determine their trading strategies. Maybe they are chasing trends? On the other side of the market, the
market makers observe the net order flow, and use it trying to make a supernormal return. Table 4.1 presents
the major components in the expected profits of these traders (see lemmas 4.1 - 4.2 and the appendices for
further details).
= Sum expected profit o
TABLE4.1:
Jfi~Iy*=y*]Ld-o
Expected profit
- Å var(ii I y*=y*)
+ ErIn: + ~~ I Y*=y*]
L;=l m-I
+"Cr ~;r~ I y*=y *]1q-1 (
N_ M_ )
Åvar(zl y*=y*) - cov l, LOn + Låm Iy*=y*
n-l m-I
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This table shows that the Q market makers who are dealing in security k E {l. 2••.•• Kl at time t E {O.l •...•
Tk-1lexpect to earn a positive revenue which depends on the equilibrium bid ask spread and the trading volume
(i.e .• ERQ = A var(z I y*=y*». But they have to pay a cost due to adverse selection which is caused by the fact
that informed speculators submit orders correlated with the future value of the security (i.e .• ECQ = covtx, z I
y*=y*». On the demand side of the market, the M+N informed speculators expect to earn a positive revenue
since their trading strategies are correlated with the future value of the security (ERM+N = cov(x. z Iy*=y*». but
they have to pay a trading cost depending on the equilibrium bid ask spread and their volume (i.e .• ECM+N = A
var(Lan + LAm I y*=y*». The D + 1 uninformed liquidity traders have no expected revenue from trading
because their trading strategies are not correlated with the future value of the security. Nonetheless. they have to
pay a trading cost which as usual depends on the equilibrium bid ask spread and their volume of trade (that is.
ECD+l = A covtu, z I y*=y*».
The securities market is a zero-sum game because the sum of the payoffs of all the participants is zero
whatever strategies they choose (see. e.g .• Fudenberg and Tirole (1991). page 4). It may seem strange to pay
attention to the expected welfare in a zero-sum game because the expected trading profits are just transfers
between traders which give no social surplus. However. there is. as shown in table 4.2. expected to be
productive effort, but it is not affected by security trading.
= Social surplus
TABLE 4.2:
Net profit from trading in security k at time t
+ Expected production in fmn k from time t to t + 1
Expected profit
O
E[8Iy*=y*]
This social surplus is received by current shareholders who are assumed to follow a buy-and-hold strategy (i.e .•
they do not trade at all in the period). In chapters 5 - 6. I extend to a corresponding production and exchange
economy where the corporate insiders may affect the social surplus and thereby the welfare of the current
shareholders. Until then E[~ I y*=y*] is given exogenously. and is not taken into consideration. This limits
the analysis to the welfare of future shareholders holding either long or short positions in security k from time t
to time t+1.
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4.2.1 Expected profit to market makers
I have assumed that there are a limited number of market makers. Nonetheless, they act competitively when
they detennine how sensitive the transaction price should be to changes in the net order flow. This implies that
competition forces market maker q E {I, 2, ..., Q} to set the price sensitivity to make zero expected profit (see
(2.2.15».
(2.1) E[Zq (RS - i) I y*=y*] æ 0,
where Zq = Z / Q is the position of the market maker. This is the equilibrium condition in the dealership
market, and it gives the equilibrium price, the price sensitivity, and the equilibrium bid ask spread (see (2.3.7),
(2.3.8), and (3.32».
In chapter 5, I extend to a production and exchange economy where the market makers expect to eam a
positive profit (to compensate for the cost of enforcing the law prohibiting insider trading; see lemma 5.4), and,
in chapter 8, to an exchange economy where the risk averse market makers have market power and may therefore
set the equilibrium bid ask spread above the spread detennined by (2.1); see lemma 8.1. In this way, they expect
to earn a positive risk adjusted profit
4.2.2 Expected profit to informed speculators
The superiorly informed speculators expect to earn a positive revenue on privately acquired information. This is
as mentioned because their trading strategies are correlated with the end-of-perlod value of the risky asset. They
have, nonetheless, to pay a trading cost which depends on the equilibrium bid ask spread and their trading
volume.
Lemma 4.1: Suppose L = A and the stock market equilibrium [(8I1kt, Limkt, "db), Skt,' k E {l, 2, ..., Kl. t
E (O, 1, ..., T r1)] is given by lemma 2.1, then corporate insider m E {l, 2, ...,M} and market professional n
123
E (l, 2, ... , N} expect to earn
(2.2) E[-MI-*- *] _ a
2
(r + l1)r ~ u nd
lrm Y -y - Nr+(M + l)(r + l1)a N(r + e) + M(r + 11)aZ' a
(2.3) = (r + e) r I u
Nr + (M + 1)(r + l1)aVN(r + e) + M(r + l1)az·
If L = B, then JL replaces M.
~: See appendix A.
Of course, privately informed speculators have incentives to take short or long positions in the risky assets if
they expect on the basis of privately acquired information to make a larger profit than investing in the riskless
asset (which gives zero profit). Thus,
(2.4) E[ily*=y*] > O,orE[ily*=y*] > r ~ O.
where r is the return from investing in security k from time t to time t+1 and r is the riskless rate of return. In
chapter 7, I extend to a corresponding stock market where the informed speculators are risk averse; see lemmas
7.5 - 7.6 for the risk adjusted values of inside and privately acquired information.
Expected profit when N = O
Figure 4.1 below indicates that the expected profit of market professionals decreases for small supply of
corporate insiders (that is when Il < J.In where Iln is a constant). This suggests that, for an appropriate number
of corporate insiders, the professionals may be squeezed out of the market by better informed traders since they
are not able to cover their informational investments. Corollary 4.1 gives the equilibrium in a market where N
=0.
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Corollary 4.1: Suppose the market professionals are in zero supply, then
(2.5) lim E[~(N) I -* = *]N-+O D y Y = (r + e) r I (j nd(M + 1)(r + 11)al V M (r + 11)' a
(2.6) E[ir!! I y* = Y*] = r I (j
M + 1 V M (r + 11)"
IfL = B, then p. replaces M.
frQQ.{: Set N = O in lemma 4.1. Q.E.D.
If the smart money investors for some reason are in zero supply. they do not make any trading profits because N
E[nNn(N) I y*=y*] = O. The trading profits of corporate insiders are expected to increase due to less competition
from the market professionals. This is confirmed by (2.2) because E[nMm(N -+ O) I y*=y*] > E[nMm (N > O) I
y*=y"'].
Expected profit when I.L or M = O
Now assume that L changes from A to B. then the stock market equilibrium is given by corollary 2.2. The
special case where I.L = O (or M = O) is given by corollary 2.3. What are the effects on the expected profits
earned by the informed traders?
Corollary 4.2: Suppose insider trading is effectively forbidden. then
(2.7) E[rr: I Si'" = Y*] = r t(r + e) (j and
(N + 1)r + 2 E V N '
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(2.8)
= (r « 2e)2r ~
]f.To E[i!(.u) I y*=y*] (r + 71)[(N + 1) r + 2 e] V~·
Proof: Set Il = O in lemma 4.1. Q.E.D.
Corporate insiders who follow L = B expect no trading profits because Il E[nMm(J.1) I y*=y*] = O. Naturally, the
market professionals expect to earn a positive profit by exploiting the uninformed noise or liquidity traders
alone. In fact, E[nNn(J.1 ~ O) I y*=y*] > E[nNn(J.1 > O) I y*=y*].
Common vs. diverse information
Icompare the value of a signal shared by several individuals with the value of a corresponding signal observed
by one individual alone given that the signals are of the same quality but not perfectly correlated.
Corollary 4.3: Diverse information represented by the signal y" is worth more than corresponding common
information represented by the signal y.
~: If e = 1\ and N = M, then (2.6) is less than (2.7). Q.E.D.
This result is intuitive as observing a personal signal must be worth more than observing an otherwise identical
signal which is shared by several others because of less competition. Nevertheless, I have assumed that the
precision of the signals observed by the market professionals are noisier than the signal shared by the corporate
insiders (see (2.2.10». This means that y may be worth more than Yn.
4.2.3 Cost of liquidity trading
According to table 4.1, the liquidity traders have to pay a premium for the ''privilege" to place or withdraw their
liquidity surplus in the stock market The premium equals the price sensitivity multiplied with their trading
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volume.
Lemma 4.2: Suppose L = A and the stock market equilibrium {(8dt, Limkt, Udit), Skt: k E {l, 2, ..., Kl, I
E (O, 1, ..., TK"l)] is given by lemma 2.1, then lhe expected profil of liquidity traders is
(2.9) E[ f~I y* = Y*] = - (r )( )~ [N (r + E) + M (r + 1]) a2] a.
d-O Nr + M + 1 r + 1] a
If L = B, then Il replaces M.
fmQf: See appendix B.
We observe that the trading cost of liquidity ttaders is minimized if O' = O. But uninformed traders who usually
follow a buy-and-hold strategy must trade as noise traders when liquidity events occur exogenously. This does
not imply that the liquidity traders are irrational, but it is easy to viewed them as irrational because
(2.10) E[f~ Iy*=y*] < o.
d-O
They are better off placing their surplus liquidity in cash because r 2: O. On the other hand, the liquidity traders
may have gains from trading which are not specified in this model, for example, the excitement of trading or the
liquidity traders might be endowed with stocks so that at least their net profit is positive. In this way, the noise
or liquidity traders are referred to as semi-rational. In chapter 7, I extend to the securities market where the
liquidity traders are risk averse; see lemma 7.4 for the risk adjusted value of random liquidity trading.
Trading cost when N = O
ff there are no market professionals, the tradingcost of noise traders occurs because of the adverse selection
problem caused by corporaæ insiders.
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Corollary 4.4: Suppose the market professionals are completely crowded out of the securities market by
other inf017l'U!d traders, then
(2.11) E[~ -n I -* *] r ~(1",",1rd Y = Y = - --o
d=O M + 1 r + fl
If L = B, then Il replaces M.
fmQf: Set N = O in (2.9). Q.E.D.
ff no smart money investors are entering the stock market, the liquidity traders are only exploited by the
corporate insiders.
Trading cost wben Il or M = O
ff there are no corporate insiders, the trading cost of liquidity traders depends only on the adverse selection
problem caused by the market professionals.
Corollary 4.5: Suppose insider trading isforbidden and effectively enforced by the stock market regulators,
then
(2.12) E[f~ IY*=y*] = - ( r ~N(r+ £)(1.
d-O N + 1 r + 2 e
fm2f: Set Il = O in (2.9). Q.E.D.
In this case, the liquidity traders have only to pay a premium to the market professionals through the adverse
selection component in the equilibrium bid ask spread.
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4.3 EFFECTS ON THE WELFARE OF INFORMED SPECULATORS
Before I analyze how the expected profit of superiorly informed traders depends on the supply of corporate
insiders, I compare the expected profit of the corporate insiders with the expected profit of the market
professionals.
3. 1 Comparisons of the two types of informed speculators
Is it really true that corporate insiders earn a higher expected profit than other informed speculators trading on
private information? This section gives some answers.
Proposition 4.1: The expected profits of informed speculators are related in the following way
(3.1)
where
(3.2)
d E[ n~ I y* = y *]
a= =
d E[ ~ I s- = y *]
r+l1 2 O--a> .
r+E
fmQf: This follows directly from (2.2) and (2.3). Q.E.D.
If there is one insider as in Fishman and Hagerty (1992), the insider expects to earn more than any of the
professionals. This is because private information is by assumption noisier than inside information (see
(2.2.10». If there are several insiders and provided that the quality of the information is not too different, a
professional might expect to earn more than a insider. For instance, if e increases, the corporate insiders expects
to earn more relative to the market professionals because d a I d e > O.
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Proposition 4.2: Suppose
(3.3)
r v z e (F+71
J.L < J.L' = --1'/-- V r-:;:-; -
then insider m € {l, 2, ..., J.L} expects to earn more than professional n e fl, 2, ...,N}. Otherwise professional
n expects to earn at least as much as insider m. If 1'/= O, a corporate insider always expects to earn more than
any of the market professional.
fmQf: According to (3.1), a> 1 ifE[n:J.Lm I y*=y*] > E[nNn I y*=y*]. I solve the inequality a = 1 with
respect to JL and JL" follows, suggesting that a> 1 if JL < Jl". We see directly that if 11= O, E[nl1m I y*=y*1 >
E[nNn I y*=y*] for all JL < 00 because JL < Jl" ~ 00. Finally, notice that if Jl ~ 00 and 11= O, then E[ 1tI1m I
y*=y*] = E[nNn Iy*=y*1 = Obecause the equilibrium is fully revealing. Q.E.D.
Figure 4.1 illustrates the expected profit of the corporate insiders and the market professionals as functions of
the number of corporate insiders breaking the law. I have used the numerical values given in table 3.3; see
appendix 3.0.
M
Expected 0.3
profit 0.26
0.2
0.1.6
0.1.
0.06
FIGURE 4.1 Expected profit to informed
speculators
E[n:(P) I y*=y*]
5. 1.0. 1.5. 20.
The number of illegally
25. trading insiders
In this example, I have increased M from 10 to 25. We observe that if JL < JL" = 2.196, then each corporate
insider might expect a higher trading profit than each of the outside professionals. Otherwise, a market
professional expects to earn more.
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3.2 Comparisons across equilibria
I compare the expected profit when insider trading is allowed with the expected profit when insider trading is
prohibited.
Corporate insiders
The expected profit to corporate insiders depends on their supply, and, of course, whether a particular insider is
able to trade or not,
Proposition 4.3: If the supply of corporate insiders changes exogenously, the effect on their expected profit
is
(3.4)
d E[ i!I y* = y *]
< o.
dJ,l
The limit is EltrJlm(J,l-+ 00) I Y*=Y*J = O. Finally, UmJl~ J,lEltrJl,,/J,l) IY*=Y*J = O.
ftQQf: I use (2.2) and differentiate with respect to the number of illegally trading insiders. The limits follow
from (2.2) without any difficulties. Q.E.D.
In other words, if the supply of corporate insiders increases exogenously, the expected profit of corporate
insiders, who are able to trade illegally because of camouflage provided by other traders, decreases due to higher
competition in exploiting their common signal y. This is confirmed in figure 4.1. But what is happening to
the total expected profit? Figure 4.2 illustrates.
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2. 4. 6. 8.
The number of illegally
10. trading insiders
Total expected
profit 0.26
0.2
0.16
0.1
0.06
FIGURE 4.2 Total expected profit to corporate
insiders
Il E [;r:(}L) I y* =s *]
We observe that if J.I. > 1.761, the total expected profit decreases. This is because when there are several
corporate insiders, there is competition which dominates the effect caused by a greater number of insiders and the
total expected profit falls. At the limit when J.I. ~ 00, then the total expected profit converges toward zero
because the insiders' common information signal y is completely transmitted into the equilibrium order flow and
thereby into the transaction price.
Corollary 4.6: Suppose L changes from A to B. then
(3.5)
fmQf: This follows from (3.4) since J.I. ~ M. Q.E.D.
If some of the corporate insiders trade illegally, they meet reduced competition and therefore expect to earn a
higher profil This means that a corporate insider may favor L = B if he expects to trade illegally without being
discovered which might be possible because of the camouflage provided by the outsiders.
Market professionals
I am now turning to the welfare of the outsiders who are choosing to acquire private information at a cost C ~
o. It is, however, sufficient to analyze the gross trading profit since C is assumed to be independent of the
supply of corporate insiders.
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Proposition 4.4: If the supply of corporate insiders changes. the direction of the effect on the expected profit
of market professionals is determined by
(
dE[~IY*=Y*]) (r a(r+(I-Jl)lI) )
(3.6) S = - Sgn + .
gn åu Nr + (Jl + l)(r + lI)a N(r + e) + Jl(r + 1I)a2
If." = O. then d E[teN" / Y*=Y*J Id Jl < Ofor all J.L On the other hand. if." > O.E[1fI'I ,,(Jl = O) / y*=y*] I d Il <
OandE[1fI'I,,(Jl> Jl,,) / y*=y*] I d Jl > Owhere Jl" is determined by E[teN" (Jl,,) / Y*=Y*J Id u = O. Finally.
notice the relation E[1fI'I,,(Jl= O)/ y*=y*J > E[1fI'I,,(Jl ~ 00) / Y*=Y*J ~O where the limit E[1fI'I,,(Jl ~ 00) / y*=y*]
£mm: I differentiate (2.3) with respect to J.I., and obtain straightforwardly the sign detennined by (3.6). If 'Il =
O, the sign is negative, and if 11> O, the derivative must change sign. The expected profit when J.I. = O is given
by (2.7), and the limit when the number of insiders grows to infmity is
(3.7) E[ ~ (Jl ~ 00) I Y*= Y*] = r /(r + t:) eT
Nr + (r + 2t:) (r + 11) V N
11
We observe that (3.7) is less than (2.7). If 11> O, E[1tNn(J.L ~ 00) IY*=Y*l > O and if 11= O, E[1tNn(J.L ~ 00) I
Y*=Y*l = o. Q.ED.
Figure 4.1 shows that if J.I. < J.I.n = 9.291 where J.In is determined by d E[1tNn(J.ln) I Y*=Y*l / d J.I. = O, E[1tNn(J.L) I
y*=y*l decreases from 0.283 when J.I. = O to 0.110 when J.I. = J.l.n. Otherwise, the expected profit increases and
converges toward 0.129 as J.I. converges toward infmity.
Roughly speaking, if the supply of corporate insiders changes as a result of tightened insider trading
regulations, it is a trade-off between two effects which detennine the change in the expected profit of legally
trading market professionals:
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• If the supply of corporate insiders decreases, the market professionals face less competition in
exploiting superior information which in turn increases their expected profiL
• If the supply of corporate insiders decreases, the market makers face a change in their adverse
selection or price differentiation problem. (i) If the supply decreases from M to J.!. > J.!.Å, the price
differentiation problem increases, leading to a higher bid ask: spread and thereby to a higher trading cost
for all traders because the market power of the remaining corporate insiders increases. (ii) However, if
the supply decreases from M to J.!. < J.!.Å, the price differentiation problem may be reduced due to no or a
very moderate "presence-of-insider" effect, This reduction of this effect decreases the spread and thereby
the trading cost, Thus, this adverse selection effect might be positive or negative for the market
professionals, depending on from and to where the supply of corporate insiders changes.
This means that the total effect depends on the direct competition and the adverse selection. Table 4.3
summarizes the effects.
Il E Uta,oo) + +
TABLE 4.3: Welfare effects caused by AJ.!.
~ Al
Il E [O, ilA]
+
According to the example, if J.!. E [O, J.!.i.. = 0.512), the direct competition and the adverse selection effect are
negative where J.!.Å is the maximum illustrated in figure 3.3. If J.!. E [J.1Å = 0.512, J1n = 9.291), the direct
competition effect is negative and the adverse selection effect is positive. The expected profit to market
professionals falls since the direct competition effect dominates the adverse selection effect, Nevertheless, when
J.!. ;;:: J.!.n = 9.291, the positive adverse selection effect dominates the negative direct competition effect. This
means that the expected profit of market professionals increases.
134
Corollary 4.7: Suppose L changes from A to B when M < Mn (where Mn is the solution to the equation d
E[1I'In(M,,) / Y*=Y*1 I dM = O). then
(3.8)
If TI < O. the opposite might happen if the firm is large (that is when M > M,,) and the regulators' enforcement
is not very effective.
~: IfM <Mu, (3.8) follows from (3.6) since Il S M. Q.E.D.
Market professionals prefer insider trading prohibited on every exchange where corporate insiders observe perfect
information. However, it may not be the case on other exchanges where the corporate insiders are "allowed" to
trade illegally on noisy information.
4.4 EFFECTS ON THE WELFARE OF UNINFORMED LIQUIDITY TRADERS
According to table 4.1. the expected trading cost of liquidity traders equals the price sensitivity multiplied with
their expected trading volume.
Proposition 4.5: Suppose the supply of corporate insiders changes exogenously. then the direction of the
effect on the expected profit of liquidity traders is determined by
[
[DJ]dEL ~ I j* = y * r 1(4 1)S d-O _ S 2 r _ a ( + ( - Jl) TI)
. go d)l - go(Nr + (It + !)(r + qla N(r + el + )l(r + qla').
If Jl:?!Jl). (where dE[J)iJd(Jl).} / Y*=Y*1 I d Jl = O). then d E[J)iJ dfJl) / y*=y*1 Id Jl > O. If TI> O.E['L7U)d(Jl=
0)/Y*=Y*1 <E[J)iJd(Jl-+ 00) / Y*=Y*1 < O. However, ifTl = o. E[brf)d(Jl-+oo) / Y*=Y*1 = o.
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lEm: I differentiate (2.9) with respect to u, and obtain (4.1) straightforwardly. We observe directly that the
sign is positive for Jl > Jl~ and negative for Jl < Jl~. If Tl= O, then Jl~ is easy to find, but if Tl> O, the solution
is complex, but easy to find numerically. If Jl = O, the expected profit is given by (2.12). I use (2.9) to show
that
(4.2) E[t 1i!'(Jl -+ 00) I y*= Y*] =
d-O
(r +r2 e)(r + 11) ~N (r + e) 0'.
Nr +
This limit is negative and larger than E[InDd(J.L = O) Iy*=y*]. We observe when Tl= O that E[l:1tDd(J.L -+ 00) I
y*=y*] = O. Q.E.D.
The trading cost of liquidity traders depends on the price differentiation problem faced by the price setting market
makers. There are two effects:
(i) If the number of illegally trading insiders increases from Jl = O to Jl < Jl~, there is what we might
call a "presence-of-insider" effect. It increases the adverse selection component in the bid ask spread,
and thereby increases the trading cost of traders who are trading, for instance, to raise cash by selling
out shares from their inventory.
(ii) If the number of illegally insiders increases further (that is beyond JlA), there is a "lack-of-
coordination" effect which reduces the market power of the corporate insiders. This lessens the adverse
selection component in the equilibrium bid ask spread which is advantageous for uninformed traders
because it reduces their trading cost.
Strictly speaking, the two effects are the same effect which we might call the adverse selection effect. This
effect is negative if the supply shifts from zero to approximately one, and positive if the supply of corporate
insiders shifts from one to several.
Corollary 4.8: Suppose L changes from A to B andM>M· (whereM· > OisdeterminedbyEIInPd(M·)/
y*=y*) =EIItPd(Jl =O)/y*=y*), then
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(4.3) E[ f~(Jl) I y* = y *] :S;E[ fir(M) I y* = y *].
d~ d~
IfM SM·, the opposite happens.
fmQf: This follows from (4.1) since 1l:S;M. Q.E.D.
Figure 4.3 illustrates the expected profit of following a trading strategy Ud of buying and selling shares
randomly.
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We observe that the expected profit is U-fonned, and the trading cost is maximized if JlA. = 0.512, giving a total
cost 0.601. If the supply changes from one to zero, the trading cost falls from 0.601 to 0.566, or to 0.395 if
insider trading is allowed. This indicates that uninformed traders prefer insider trading outlawed in small
companies where M <M· = 1.641. But ifM >M·, the liquidity traders prefer insider trading allowed because of
the additional competition.
4.5 TRADING COST WHEN THE SUPPLY OF MARKET PROFESSIONALS IS
ELASTIC
I have so far assumed that the supply of market professionals is fixed which means that N* = N for all Il. In
this section, however, I assume that the supply is determined by the equilibrium condition in the market for
137
acquiring private information:
(5.1) E[~ (.u) I y* = y *] - C = O, for all.u E {l, 2, ... , M},
where C <== O is the cost of market professional n E {l, 2, ..., N*} when acquiring the signal Yn. The
equilibrium supply of market professionals is determined by solving this zero expected profit condition with
respect to N. This means that N* = N*(J.1,...), and, according to (3.6.3), the supply of corporate insiders
typically reduces the supply of market professionals because of the increased competition in exploiting superior
information.
There are no effects caused by insider trading on the welfare of market professionals since they earn zero
expected profit for all supply of corporate insiders, but the expected trading cost of liquidity traders is affected by
this change in market structure. Figure 4.4 illustrates the expected trading cost using the numerical values
given in table 3.3.
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If N* = N, A,(Jl•• IN) = A.(Jl" I N*) which corresponds to a specific supply of corporate insiders Jl"
(approximately 5 in the example).
Proposition 4.6: If N, N* > N1(where N1is determined by d I.(N1) Id N = O), then
(5.2)
{
O<.u<.u •• =>
.u <==.u•• =>
A(.u I N) > A(.u I N *) since N * > N,
A(.u IN) S; A(.u IN *) sinceN * S; N.
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f.mQf: If, as I have assumed, A(N) is decreasing in N (and N*), these relations follow directly from the
definition of u». Obviously, the condition N >N).. secures that d A.(N) / d N < o. This is because, according to
(2.3.8),
(5.3) Sgn(:~) = - Sgn(N(r + e)r + a[2a r - (J.l + l)(r + e)](r + 1])).
Q.E.D.
We observe that for small numbers of corporate insiders, the equilibrium bid ask spread decreases if the
competition in the securities industry changes from oligopolistic competition with a fixed supply to "perfect"
competition with an elastic supply of market professionals.
Proposition 4.7: Suppose there are entry barriers into the securities industry (and no exit barriers out of the
industry), then
(S.4) E[ti!'(J.l)I y*=y*, N*J ~ E[ti!'(J.l)I y*=y*, NJ.
d-O d=O
1EQf: IfN is fixed and C > O, the trading cost of uninformed traders is
(S.S) {
A,(J.l1 N) u,
A,(J.l1 N*) u,
if J.l :S; J.l •• , and
if J.l > J.l •••
The first follows directly, and the second follows because if the trading cost was I..{J.L IN) Cf when Il> Il··, the
market professionals loose money and would leave. This means that the market is elastic for supplies greater
than Il··, but not necessarily for supplies less than Il··,e.g., because of entry barriers. According to (S.2),A(IlI
N) ~ A(IlI N*l which implies that (S.4) holds. Q.E.D.
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The liquidity traders are better off when there is an elastic supply than when there is a fixed supply of market
professionals. This is because it is better to trade together with market professionals who are trading away all
tendencies of economic rents in the securities industry than together with professionals who expect to make a
profit.
Corollary 4.9: Suppose L is changed from A to B, then the uninformed liquidity traders simultaneously
prefer increased competition among the marketprofessionals.
fm2f: According to (5.4), the liquidity traders are always better off when there is free entry of market
professionals. Q.E.D.
This suggests that if L is to be changed from A to B. then. according to (4.3). this might have negative
consequences for the liquidity traders. These are reduced if the stock market regulators simultaneously increases
the competition in the securities industry. One way of doing this is to remove potential entry barriers in the
legislation.
4.6 DISCRETIONARY LIQUIDITY TRADERS
I draw on Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) who divide the noise or liquidity traders into discretionary and non-
discretionary liquidity traders. The difference is that the discretionary liquidity traders are semi-rational because
they may decide where and when to execute their liquidity need. This section analyzes where and when the
discretionary liquidity traders should trade to minimize their expected trading cost when insider trading may be
prohibited or allowed.
According to (2.2.14). the discretionary liquidity traders increase the totalliquidity trading in security k E
{l. 2. ••.• K} at time t E {O. l. ...• Tk -l} if they are concentrating their trading in this particular security and
period. The demand from discretionary liquidity trader d E {l. 2•...• D} is determined outside the model. but it
is optimal to trade ua in the security and at the time where it is expected to be cheapest to trade within the
liquidity trader' s window of discretion.
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Proposition 4.8: It is optimal/or discretionary liquidity traders to trade in the period and the security with
the lowest expected bid ask spread inside their windows o/ discretion ft. t + 7:} and lk, k + 1C}. There exists an
equilibrium in which the discretionary liquidity traders are concentrating their trades. and if there is a certain
amount o/ informed trading. the equilibrium also implies concentrating with as many informed traders as
possible.
Proof: Obviously, if Ak.t < Ak+l.t+l and discretionary liquidity ttader d is able to choose between trading
security k at auction t and security k+l at action t + 1, it is optimal to trade in security k at auction t. This is
because the expected trading cost of trader d is A O'd, and, according to (2.3.8), it is optimal to trade with as
many other liquidity traders as possible since d AI d O' < o. Among the discretionary liquidity ttaders, this leads
to as concentrated trading as possible. Suppose there exists a security and a period where N = O and Jl = O. then
A = O, leading to concentmtion of discretionary liquidity traders with this period and security in their windows of
discretion. On the other hand, suppose N > N A and Jl> J.l A, then it is optimal to trade with as many informed
traders as possible. This is because when these inequalities are satisfied, A is, per definition, falling with Nand
u, Q.E.D.
This proposition is analogous to proposition 1 in Admati and Pfleiderer (1988), proposition 4 in Pagano
(1989), and proposition 1 in Subrahmanyam (1991). Admati and Pfleiderer find that the discretionary liquidity
traders have an incentive to bunch their trades in a single period (temporal concenttation), whereas Pagano and
Subrahmanyam fmd that the discretionary liquidity traders tend to trade in a single market and security (market
and security concentration); see also Foster and Viswanathan (1990) and Chowdhry and Nanda (1991) for similar
results.
ff there is a stock index future, Subrahmanyam (1991) shows that it is optimal for the discretionary
liquidity traders to concentrate their trading in the index. This is because firm specific or inside information is
diversified away. Nevertheless, ttading in the index may be viewed as diversified ttading and not concentrated
ttading.
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Correlated vs. uncorrelated information
I am now analyzing more closely the identified tendency of clustering, and focus especially on the clustering of
trades in securities and periods where insiders are trading intensively (that is the second type of equilibria
identified above). It turns out that this result depends critically on the assumption that inside information is
correlated with the information acquired by the market professionals.
Proposition 4.9: If the superiorly informed speculators observe uncorrelated information (i.e., cov(Y, y,J =
O), the discretionary liquidity traders prefer to trade in a security and a period where there are no corporate insiders
trading. If, on the other hand, the speculators observe correlated information (i.e., cov(y, y,J = T> O)and N >
NÅ and J.I. > J.l.Å'the discretionary liquidity traders prefer to trade together with as many corporate insiders as
possible.
fmQf: ff the superiorly informed speculators observe uncorre1ated information, the price sensitivity is given by
(2.6.15), and it is minimized when Il = O. On the other hand, the price sensitivity is given by (2.3.8) if the
superiorly informed speculators observe correlated infonnation, and A.{J.1) is minimized when Il is as large as
possible. Q.E.D.
Figure 4.5 illustrates the trading cost as a function of the number of illegally trading insiders when cov(Y, yJ =
Oand when cov(y, yn) = r >O. I use the numerical values given in table 3.3 (and assume that ell = rand 1. = 11;
see section 2.6).
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We observe that the trading cost in a securities market where the two types of superiorly informed speculators
observe uncorrelated information is higher than in a corresponding market where they observe correlated
information. Notice that when cov(Y, yrJ = O, then A(Jl = O)o = ).(Jl ~ 00) o = 0.566 < A(O< Jl < 00) o. This
implies that the uniformed traders prefer insider trading prohibited and effectively enforced.
Proposition 4.11: The liquidity traders prefer the two types of informed speculators to observe correlated
rather than uncorrelased information.
fmQI: The price sensitivity is given by (2.3.8) when cov(y, Yn) = r > Oand by (2.6.15) when cov(Y, Yn) = O.
If r= 4» and 11= l, it follow directly by comparing (2.3.8) with (2.6.15) that the price sensitivity and thereby
the bid ask spread are greater if the speculators observe uncorrelated signals than if they observe correlated
signals. Q.E.D.
This suggests that one way of limiting the damage of insider trading on the welfare of liquidity traders is to
increase the outsiders attention towards internal sources of information. This will make the information of
market professionals correlated with inside information. Disclosure of fmn specific information may make the
two types of information more correlated.
More on my clustering equilibrium relative to tbe one in Admati and Pfleiderer (1988)
Figure 4.6 illustrates the price sensitivity as a function of both the number of illegally trading insiders and the
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amount of liquidity trading when where there are no market professionals as in lemma l on page 10 in Admati
and Pfleiderer (1988).
FIGURE 4.6 Clustering without market professionals
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(1988).
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As long as there is at least one illegally trading insider, the lowest cost equilibrium implies concentration of
discretionary liquidity traders together with as many corporate insiders as possible. Nevertheless, if the liquidity
traders could trade alone without any informed traders, the bid ask spread will be zero. This suggests that if the
welfare of small uninformed traders is the primary concern of the stock market regulators, insider trading should
be prohibited and the law should be effectively enforced. On the other hand, if there are both corporate insiders
and market professionals, the lowest cost equilibrium is an equilibrium where the insiders trade illegally (or
2.
where insider trading is allowed by the regulators). Figure 4.7 illustrates the price sensitivity Aijl, o) when N =
FIGURE 4.7 Clustering with market professionals
10 Number of illegally
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This example suggests that insider trading should be allowed if the welfare of small uninformed traders is the
primary concern of stock market regulators. My clustering equilibrium equals the overall clustering equilibrium
since it is not possible to prevent all informed trading (that is, prohibiting market professionals from trading).
This is because private information may be established, e.g., because some of security analysts have superior
skills when analyzing public information such the accounting report y*. Note, however, that figure 4.7 is very
similar to figure 4.6. If the corporate insiders and the market professionals observe common information with
the same precision (11= e), the two figures are identical since the outside professionals are indistinguishable
from the insiders.
4.7 ELASTIC SUPPLY OF LIQUIDITY TRADERS
The discretionary liquidity traders tend to cluster their trades when and where the corporate insiders are competing
hard or when and where there are no insiders in the market at all. This suggests that the amount of liquidity
trading may depend on the supply of corporate insiders. That is, er = er(JJ.). The analysis above indicates that
er(J.1) should be U-shaped, large when J.1 is large and J.1 is zero. I assume instead that the amount of liquidity
trading is falling with the supply of corporate insiders, and therefore concentrate on only one of the two types or
clustering equilibria. This is consistent with the arguments saying that the outsiders loose "confidence" in
markets with extensive trading by corporate insiders; see, e.g., Charlton and Fischel (1983), page 879 and
Dennert (1991), page 196 for arguments along these lines. The amount of liquidity trading might therefore be a
function
(7.1) ~= --,
Il + 1
where ~ > Ois the amount of liquidity trading when insider trading is prohibited and effectively enforced by the
regulatory agency. This implies that er(J.1 ~ 00) = O as liquidity traders then have completely lost the
"confidence" in the market, and the market has to close.
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7. 1 Welfare of liquidity traders
There are two types of liquidity traders. The first type is the traders who know that they are uninformed, but
their liquidity events have not yet been realized. The second type is the traders whose liquidity events already
have been realized.
Potential liquidity traders
The potentialliquidity traders have a liquidity demand almost surely, but the size of their liquidity demand is
still unknown. In this way, their expected welfare depends on the price sensitivity and their expected trading
volume.
Proposition 4.12: q u is given by (7.1), then
(7.2)
dE[I.i~(.u)1 y*=y*]
__ ~d~-~O ~ =
d.u
_[dA(.u) a(.u) + l(.u) da(.u)].
d.u d.u
The sign may be positive for all u, or negative for small u.and positive for larger .u~ M.
f.mQf: According to (Bl), E[:DtDdijL)IY*=Y*l= - AijL)aijL), and (7.2) follows directly. Then Iuse (7.1), and
find that d cr{JJ.) I d J.1 < O. The next step is to substitute (7.1) into (2.3.8), and find that d A.ij.I.) I d J.1 >O. This
implies that the sign of d E[IWldijL) Iy*=y*l Id J.1 may shift because there are two effects working in the
opposite directions; see figure 4.8 for an example. Q.E.D.
The total effect caused by insider trading on the welfare of liquidity traders depends on the trade-off between the
negative price effect and the positive volume effect Figure 4.8 illusttates using the parametric values given
table 3.3 and aijL = O)= ~= 1.
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If Jl = O. the trading cost is 0.566. and if Jl--+ 00. the trading cost approaches zero. In this example. the positive
volume effect dominates for all Jl. But if N = Oand Jl = O. the trading cost is O. and then it decreases before it
starts increasing towards zero. Thus. the negative price effect dominates the positive volume effect for small Jl
~-M.
Liquidity traders trading a known order size
If some of the liquidity traders know their demand with certainty. the effect caused by insider trading on volume
is irrelevant. The expected profit depends on the price sensitivity or equivalently on the equilibrium bid ask
Proposition 4.13: The expected trading cost of liquidity traders. who have to trade an amount u which is
known to them but not to the market. is
(7.3)
where the price sensitivuy depends on insider trading such that
(7.4)
d E[u (R S - x) I u. y. = y.]--=----------=- > O.
dJl
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IEQf: The trading cost follows straight away from the rule of conditional expectation. I substitute (7.1) into
(2.3.8) and differentiate with respect to J.1. The sign is given by (7.4). Q.E.D.
The expected welfare of noise traders who know that a liquidity event has occurred is falling in the supply of
corporate insiders. Figure 8.9 illustrates.
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The trading cost increases monotonically from 0.566 towards infinity when the number of illegally trading
insiders expands.
Corollary 4.10: Suppose L is proposed to change from A to B, then the liquidity traders who do not know
the size of their trade are against, and the liquidity traders knowing their liquidity demand are infavor.
Proof: This follows from (7.2), (7.4), and the assumption than J1 S M. Q.E.D.
This means that the liquidity traders who do not know their future liquidity demand want to permit insider
trading in order to limit their own trading.
7.2 Welfare of informed speculators
We have seen that the bid ask spread increases with the supply of corporate insiders, this has consequences for
the expected welfare of informed speculators.
148
Proposition 4.14: If (1 is given by (7.1J, the effect caused by insider trading on the welfare of informed
speculators is
(7.6)
d E[ ~ (Jl) I y'" = y ...]--~--------~ < O,and
dJl
(7.7)
~: I insert (7.1) into (2.2) and (2.3) and differentiate with respect to u. The signs are given by (7.6) and
(7.7). Q.E.D.
Figure 8.10 illustrates.
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The expected profit decreases towards zero since the depth and thereby the liquidity converges toward zero. Thus,
this is an example where the market shuts down at the limit due the fact that the corporate insiders are lOO
numerous, and there will be no bid and ask prices at which trading can occur; see Glosten and Milgrom (1985)
and Glosten (1989) for a similar result
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4.8 MARKET PROFESSIONALS VS LIQUIDITY TRADERS
The next proposition compares the liquidity traders attitude towards insider trading with the attitude of the
market professionals.
Proposition 4.15: There might be a conflict of interests between the two types of outsiders. For instance,
the liquidity traders might prefer insider trading allowed when the market professionals prefer insider trading
prohibited.
~: If M> M·, the liquidity traders prefer L = A to L = B. If the enforcement is complete, the market
professionals prefer L = B to L = A, but if the enforcement is incomplete, L = A might also be preferred by the
professionals. Q.E.D.
The market professional such as security analysts are usuallya well deftned group of individuals with relatively
strong organizations to promote their interests vis-a-vis the stock market authorities. On the contrary, the
uninformed liquidity traders are usually a rather diverse group of individuals who might have rather weak
organizations. Needless to say, the small uninformed might easily lose if there is a conflict of interests (see
section 5.5).
4.9 SHORT SUMMARY OF SOME MAJOR CONCLUSIONS
The following effects are caused by insider trading on the expected welfare of the various types of traders on a
stock market exchange where the superiorly infonned speculators operate as price or infonnation manipulators in
the same way as in Kyle (1984, 1985):
• If the stock market regulators are instructed to prevent security traders from trading on inside
information, the corporate insiders would of course lower their expectations of future returns from
trading. But if the insiders expect a small risk of detection (e.g., because of inadequate enforcement or
the camouflage provided by the outsiders), some of them may actually prefer insider trading outlawed.
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This is because breaking the law may increase the market power and thereby the expected profit.
• If their supply is inelastic. the market professionals favor a law which prevents the corporate insiders
from trading because of reduced competition. However. this is not necessarily the case if the
enforcement of the law is inadequate. Trading with a few and powerful insiders reduces the welfare of
the professionals because the illegally trading insiders have a greater market power than several insiders
trading legally.
• Discretionary liquidity traders minimize their trading cost by trading in periods. markets. and
securities where the adverse selection component in the equilibrium bid ask spread is expected to be the
least. This may lead to two types of equilibria: As expected. the discretionary liquidity traders tend to
concentrate their trades in securities where insider trading is forbidden. or. more surprisingly. in
securities where the corporate insiders are very active. The worst case seems to be trading in securities
or periods where a small number of insiders are trading (perhaps illegally). and therefore have a large
price manipulative power.
Chapters 7 - 8 extend this analysis by introducing risk aversion. and market power in the broker - dealership
market.
APPENDICES
This section proves lemma 4.1 and 4.2. Both proofs are based on the stock market equilibrium given by lemma
2.1.
Appendix A Proor or lemma 4.1
At time L2. the expected profit of corporate insider m E {l. 2•...• Ml is
-o
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or. after inserting the price function given by (2.3.7).
Then I substitute in the insider's trading strategy given by (2.3.2) and the net order flow given by (2.A3l). The
result is
(A3) E[ Xm (x - R S) I y* = y *] = a,8 [r - ,8 A {(N + M a) r + M a 71l].
Finally. I insert the trading intensity given by (2.3.3) and the price sensitivity given by (2.3.8). and yield (2.2)
after some straightforward simp1ifications.
In the same way. at time t-2. professional n E {l. 2•...• N} expects to earn a profit (before acquisition
costs)
(A4) E[8n (x - RS) I y*=y*] = ,8 [r - ,8 A {(N + Ma) r + N El].
I insert (2.3.3) and (2.3.8). and yield (2.3). This completes the proof of lemma 4.1.
Appendix B Proor or lemma 4.2
The expected profit of the liquidity traders is
(Bl) E[ii(x - RS)ly*=y*]=E[iily*=y*]E[x - RSly*=y*] + cov(ii.x - RSly*=y*)
-o
= cov(ii. x I y*=y*) - Acov(ii. z I y*=y*) = - AU.
-o
The next step is to insert the price sensitivity given by (2.3.8). The result is given by (2.9). This completes
the proof of lemma 4.2.
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CHAPTER 5
ON PRODUCTION, DISCLOSURE, AND INSIDER
TRADING REGULATIONS
First draft: February 1991,
Current revision: January 1993.
ABSTRACT
A change in the supply of corporate insiders is shown to affect the expected welfare of current shareholders by causing
information, production, and enforcement cost effects. My analysis indicates that if the negative production effect is
very strong, it quickly tends to domintlte the positive information and cost effects. In such a market, I conclude that
insider trading is not desirable as it gives corporate mIlntlgers an incentive to act in their own interests and not in the
interest of their principals. They do this by shirking their duty as suppliers of productive effort. In this way, insider
trading is really an agency problem.
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5.1 INTRODUCTION
I have in the previous chapter used the pure exchange economy characterized by lemma 2.1, and analyzed the
welfare effects caused by a change in the supply of corporate insiders. The change was taken to be the result of
exogenous regulation by the stock market regulators. In this chapter, I extend to a corresponding production and
exchange economy where the enforcement of the regulation is determined as part of the equilibrium. This is
done by recognizing that there are shareholders before trading takes place, and, if it is in their interests, they have
incentives to limit insider trading either themselves or by demanding more control by the public enforcement
agency.
The sequence of events is as follows. First, the corporate managers choose individually an unobservable effort
either to maximize their own expected welfare or to maximize the welfare of current shareholders. The first type
of managers is referred to as "disloyal" whereas the second type is "loyal". Then the "firm" determines the
number of "disloyal" agents, the production of inside information, and the disclosure to the outsiders where the
"firm" means a collective decision made by "loyal" managers. The next event is that the "disloyal" managers
select their trading strategies, and present their orders to the market based on inside information. In the
securities market, there are also market professionals and liquidity traders submitting orders to the price setting
market makers as described in section 2.2. Finally, the payoff of the firm is realized and is therefore common
knowledge. Within this framework, the expected welfare of current shareholders depends on the amount of
insider trading:
(i) If the supply of trading insiders expands in one firm, the securities market becomes hetter informed
about this firm" s future prospects. In this way, its transaction price is a better predictor of the future
value of the firm's securities, and thereby reveals more about the unobserved effort supplied by its
employees. As in the agency literature (see, e.g., HolmstrOm (1979», better monitoring increases the
effort which, of course, is beneficial to the shareholders as the expected value of their securities
increases now and in the future. This effect is referred to as the information effect It tends to be
important if outside sources of information are of low quality, or if there are no disclosures from the
firm,
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(il) There are two types of managers: Corporate insiders are here considered to be "disloyal" since they
may not only trade illegallyon inside information, but also find it optimal to supply less productive
effort than the "loyal" managers. This effect on the total production is referred to as the production
effect It turns out to be important if many employees are trading illegallyand there are small personal
-
costs of shrinking. A different approach is chosen in the next chapter to more clearly describe the
incentive effects of insider trading.
(iii) If some of the corporate managers are "allowed" to operate on superior internal information, less
costs have to be spent by current shareholders to enforce the ban of insider trading. These costs are
high if current shareholders want to effectively prevent corporate insiders from trading, resulting in no
insiders in the financial market.
The trade-off between these three effects determines a unique number of corporate insiders which is "allowed" to
trade illegallyon inside information. Because of the enforcement cost and the revelation by insider trading, the
optimal supply is seldom zero. However, the current shareholders have an incentive to limit insider trading
because of the production effect, but they prefer the stock market authorities of doing it for them by imposing
and enforcing a law prohibiting insider trading.
Public regulation and enforcement are desirable to current shareholders if there are cost advantages in public
regulation and if enforcement or the costs are paid by the security traders, for instance, through an additional
component in the equilibrium bid ask spread. I fmd that the optimally regulated supply of corporate insiders
depends, among other things, on the exogenously specified welfare weights. ff all individuals in the economy
have the same welfare weights and there are no economics of scale in public regulation, the publicly determined
supply would equal the privately determined supply of illegally trading insiders. Nonetheless, if some of the
traders are over-represented in the welfare function, the publicly regulated supply of corporate insiders would be
more or less than the privately regulated supply, depending on whether the favored group prefers insider trading
allowed or DOL
The "loyal" managers are assumed to determine the production of inside information and the disclosure to
the public. They disclose information through the outside signals. On these issues, my model is close to
Fishman and Hagerty (1989) who find that it is optimal for the firm to disclose or tip information to a limited
number of outsiders. This may also be the case in my model, but instead I focus on production and disclosure
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of information to all the outsiders. Nonetheless, tipping of internal infonnation may be a better alternative for
current shareholder than insider trading because the shareholders avoid the negative production effect discussed
above.
Public disclosure is studied, e.g., by Diamond (1985) who within a rational expectations framework shows
that there might exist a policy of voluntary disclosure which makes all shareholders (there are no corporate
insiders or market maker) better off than a policy of no disclosure because of explicit infonnation cost savings
and improved risk sharing.1 This implies that the firms themselves have incentives to disclose internal
information to the public. This conclusion holds even if the firms have some cost disadvantage in producing
information, since disclosed infonnation is perfectly perceived by outsiders rather than being "filtered" through a
noisy price channel. Such effects are not recognized here, but the firms have, nevertheless, an incentive to
disclose information because it is the current shareholders who have control of the firm and they benefit from
public disclosures. These benefits come from the fact that disclosed information reduces their moral hazard (or
hidden action) problem. This is consistent with findings in the principal - agent literature; see, e.g., Holmstrom
(1979).
This chapter proceeds as follows. In the next section, the trading equilibrium given by lemma 2.1 is extended to
a corresponding security market where, for a given precision of the price system, the corporate employees
supply the effort expected of them by their principals. Section three analyzes how the expected effort is
detennined given the outlined assumptions, and analyzes its properties. The optimal number of managers
maximizing their own welfare is detennined in section four and five to maximize the welfare of current
shareholders. The number of individuals maximizing their own welfare is assumed to coincide with the number
of illegally trading insiders. In section five, the foeus is on public regulation whereas, in section four, the foeus
is on private regulation. Section six looks at direct disclosure to the public as an alternative to disclosure
through insider trading. The major conclusions are summarized in section seven. Some formal proofs are found
in the appendices.
1 See Bhattacharya (1989) part ill for an excellent survey on disclosure and its regulation. Ross (1979),
however, argues for and against government regulations and disclosure.
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5.2 TRADING EQUILIBRIUM
I draw on the assumptions specified in section 2.2 and extend by taking into account that the corporate insiders
supply a productive action or effort. This means that the value of security k E (l, 2, ... , K) at time t+ l E (O,
l, ..., Tk-l) is
(2.1) i + e - N(mx + e, B).
where x is given by (2.2.2) and e is the net value of the managers' effort from time t to t+ 1. The term x is
stochastic and may be interpreted as random business fluctuations outside the control of the corporate insiders,
whereas the term e is deterministic and determined by the corporate managers prior to trading. Outsiders such as
the current shareholders observe only the sum x + e, which means that they cannot ex post infer that the insiders
actually have supplied the expected effort e. Nonetheless, the corporate insiders supply the effort they are
expected to supply, but in the next chapter, they may make the effort uncertain and thereby generate superior
information.
Lemma 5.1: Suppose L = A, then there exists a unique, linear pooling of orders equilibrium [(6n1ct, .1mk,).
S/ct: k E {l. 2, ..., Kt}, t E {O, l, ..., Ti-l}, n E {l, 2, ...,N}. m E {l, 2•... , M}] where the trading strategies
of market professionals and corporate insiders are
(2.2) Bn = P (Yn - E(i + el y*=y*]), and
(2.3) åm = B (Y - E[i + el Y* = y *]).
The trading intensities are
(2.4) ~ UP = ,andN (r + e) + M(r + TI) a2
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(2.5) B = ap,
in which
(2.6)
(2.7)
r + 2ea = r + (M + 1) 71'
The market price is set by market makers to earn zero expected profit in the dealership market. resulting in a
transaction price
(2.8) s = .!_ {E[x + e I y.= y.] + Å (f Bn + ~.1m + ii )},R n~ m~
where the price sensitivity is
(2.9) Å = r IN (r + e) + ;- (r + 71) al
Nr + (M+ l)(r + 71)a V
If L = B. then Il replaces M.
The proof mimics the proof of lemma 2.1 and is therefore omitted, everywhere x + e replaces x. This means,
for instance, that the private signals y = x + e + h and Yn= X + e + en are replacing the signals given by (2.2.6)
and (2.2.8) and so on.
In the next chapter, I extend to a production and exchange economy where the corporate insiders may choose
to supply an effort different from what is expected by the securities market; see lemma 6.1 for a concentrated
characterization of the trading equilibrium. This means that by randomizing their selection of effort, the
corporate insiders are able to produce inside information which generates an abnormal return when trading on it
in the securities market.
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Corollllry 5.1: Jf e = O. then lemma 5.1 equals lemma 2.1.
ff there are no effort, then the outcome of the production process equals x. Therefore the payoff is only
influenced by random business fluctuations, and so called insiders trade on a signal correlated with the business
fluctuations and thereby generate abnormal returns (see chapters 2 - 4).
5.3 OPTIMAL EFFORT
The trading model characterized by lemma 5.1 takes a first step approaching a model which considers the
corporate insiders as employees who have to supply some effort to justify their existence, but it does not
explain how the employees choose their supply (see also lemma 2.2). This is the topic of this section. Later
sections look at other managerial decisions such as production of information, disclosure, and regulation of
insider trading by the firms themselves or by the public regulators.
Figure 5.1 combined with figure 2.1 illustrate the extended sequence of events taking into account the
managers' choice ofproductive effort (time t-2 means just before time LI, time 1.3means just before time t2,
andso on).
Time
FIGURE 5.1 Time structure
t-4 t_3
Managerm
chooses individual
efforte ..
The "finn" chooses regulatory effort,
the production of inside information,
and disclosure. y* is realized.
The "disloyal" managers select their
optimal trading strategies as functions
of their forthcoming information y.
At time t-4, the managers in firm k E {I, 2, ..., K} choose an individual action (effort or investment) where
time t E (O, 1, ..., Tk-I). Then at time 1.3, the corporate managers collectively choose the firm's regulatory
effort, the production of inside information, and the quality of the public disclosure. Finally, trading takes place
from time t-2 to t as described in section 2.2. The rest of this section gives the assumptions behind the
managers' choices of individual effort (that is, the decisions taken individually at time 1-4), the other decisions
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(taken together at time L3) are analyzed in sections 5.4 - 5.6.
Assumptions about effort
If insider trading is prohibited by a public law or by a private contract regulating the relationship between the
agents and their principals, the M corporate managers in firm k can generally be separated into Il agents, or in
some respect "disloyal" managers, and M - Il "loyal" managers where OSIl SM. The difference between these
two types of corporate managers is that the "loyal" managers are assumed to maximize the welfare of current
shareholders, whereas the "disloyal" managers are assumed to maximize their own welfare which includes profit
from insider trading. In sections 5.4 - 5.5, the number of "disloyal" managers is determined by the "loyal"
managers' enforcement of the private contract between agents and principals or alternatively by the public
regulatory agency.
I assume that M corporate managers are employed by the current shareholders of firm k and are, from time t
to t+l, supposed as part of their contract to supply a productive effort, The total supply of effort from the
managers is
(3.1)
whereem is the individual effort supplied by manager m e {I, 2, ... , MI. The individual effort is determined
according to the objectives of the M - Il "loyal" and the Il "disloyal" managers. It is only observable to the
supplier (moral hazard). Nevertheless, e is imperfectly inferred through the security price or the future value of
the security which means that if the price informativeness is high, the corporate managers have an incentive to
supply a high effort, The individual effort em can be supplied by a "loyal" or a "disloyal" agent, and the
principals cannot tell whether a particular manager is "loyal" or ""disloyal". The individual effort and thereby the
total effort are never randomized.
I assume that the individual supply of effort in firm k in the period from t to t+1 is costlyand given by a
quadr.aticcostfunction
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(3.2)
C 2-e2 m ifm E {I, 2, ... , M - Il}, and
l [2 ( • )2J .2' c em + c em - em if m E {l, 2, •.• , Il},
where c > 0, c ~ 0, and e* m is the effort supplied by the "loyal" managers. This implies that because c > 0, it
is costly to supplyeffort, and if, in addition, c> 0, the "disloyal" managers feel it as a burden to supply an
effort different from what the "loyal" managers supply. The first-derivative d C(em) I d em = c em + c (em - c· nJ
>°and the second-derivative d2 C(em) I d em2 = c + c > 0, which means that the cost function is increasing and
convex.
The problem of a "loyal" manager m E {l,2, ..., M - Il} is to choose an effort at time t....which maximizes
the expected welfare of current shareholders. That is,
(3.3)
where S(Cm) is the market value of finn k at time t as a function of individual effort (see (2.8» and C(em) is the
individual cost if the effort em is chosen by the "loyal" manager. Managers maximizing (3.3) are called myopic
or short-sighted.
Definition 5.1: An optimal individual effort of "loyal" managers maximizing (3.3) is an effort e*m > O
such that E[S(e*",)] - C(e*",)2E[S(e'm)] - C(e'mJfor all e'm e [O,00).
An alternative objective for the principals is to instruct the "loyal" managers to maximize the future value
of the firm (that is, x + e which is the value at time t+l), and not the current value represented by the value of
the shares determined by the market makers at time L Thus,
(3.4)
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where the individual cost function is given by (3.2). Conditioned em means that at time t-4 the "loyal" manager
knows his effort, but have no other information except the common knowledge about the structure of the
equilibrium. Managers maximizing (3.4) are called far-sighted.
Definition 5.2: An optimal individual effort of "loyal" managers maximizing (3.4) is an effort e**m > O
such that E[x + e**m + Ie".} - C(e**m) :?!E[x + e'm + Ie".} - C(e'"JJor all e'm E [O, 00).
This choice of effort is first best efficient (or Pareto-optimal) because the marginalloog-term revenue equals the
marginal cost of effort.
The compensation paid to the managers for their supply of individual effort at time t+ 1 has to be fmanced.
If the value of firm k is paid out each period as dividend, the dividend dt earned in the period from t-1 to t is paid
out at time t (see (2.2.2». I assume, nevertheless, that a fraction of this amount is used to pay the corporate
managers (M / R) C(e* nJ (or (M / R) C(e** m» to compensate for their individual supply of effort. Notice that
the principals pay each of the managers the cost of supplying the for them optimal effort since all managers are
claiming to maximize the welfare of current shareholders. Then if there are no other investments, the rest dl -
(M / R) C(e* m) is paid out as dividend at time t. This means that S is the net value of firm k at time t (after
the dividend is paid out) since (M /R) C(e*nJ is sunk.
The problem of the "disloyal" managers is to determine an individual effort em which at time t-4 maximizes
their own expected profit
(3.5)
where E[ 7tm1.l. Iem] is the expected profit from insider trading, C( e*m) is the compensation which the insider is
paid by the principals by claiming that he has produced an effort to maximize their welfare, and the last term
C(em) is the actual cost of supplying an effort em which, of course, may differ from the optimal effort e*m-
Definition 5.3: An optimal individual effort of "disloyal" managers maximizing (3.5) is denoted e·m > O
and is determined such that E[tr"fl + [C(e*mJ - C(e-mJl ~E[tr"fl + [C(e*mJ - C(e'"Jl Jor all e'm E [O, 00).
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I have implicitly assumed that the number of "disloyal" managers equals the number of illegally trading
insiders. In this way, there is a strong link between insider ttading and the harm caused by "disloyal" managers
which, as we shall see, creates a strong negative production effect. This strong link may be criticized because in
this model there is no good explanation why managers should stop being agents because they are forced to stop
their trading activity. This means that the production effect exists by assumption and is not a result of the
model.
Optimal choice or errort
The managers' choice of effort is determined to maximize their effort-selection problems given by (3.3) or (3.4)
and (3.5).
LemmtJ 5.2: If the "loyal" managers are instructed to be myopic and the stock market equilibrium is given by
lemma 5.1 where Jl corporate insiders trade illegally, then the optimal indjvidual effort of a "loyal" manager m
E {l. 2•.... M - Jl} is
(3.6) e• = .!. [1 _ _1 J.
m C c5'1'
where the price efficiency
(3.7) 'I' = 1 1+ - +
c5 r
N(c5 + r) Jl(c5 + r)
+
c5r + (Jl + 1) 71 (c5 + rrc5r + 2 E (c5 + r)
Let 'P" be the efficiency when the price is a sufficient informational statistic (see (3.5.11». then 'P5 'Po. The
individual effort of a Ildisloyal" manager m E {l. 2•...• Jl} is
(3.8) c •e:n= --ec + C m·
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The total effort e is in optimum
I (3.9) e* = .!. [M _ _c Jl] [1 _ _1 ].c c+c (pp
The expected value offirm k at time C, is
(3.10) V* = '!'{m + .!. [1 _ _1 ] {.!. (1 + _1 ) M _ _c Jl}}.
R "c eS'!' 2 eS'!' c + c
where m,xis the unconditional expectation of x.
fmof: See appendix A.
This lemma extends part n in Fishman and Hagerty (1989) to a market in which some of the corporate managers
may trade illegallyon inside infonnation (see corollary 5.4 below). In lemmas 6.2 - 6.4. a different approach is
chosen where the corporate insiders are able to supply an effort different from what is expected by the market.
and thereby produce superior infonnation about effort which generates a positive expected profit in the securities
market.
The market price given by (2.8) reveals information about effort At time Lt. the market has its initial
conjecture about effort. Then at time t-3. a public signal reveals information about effort. and the market
revises its expectation. Finally. when the traders trade at time LI submit their orders. the market makers
observe the order flow. The orders are partly based on superior infonnatioo. but the market makers revise their
expectation about effort so that it is not possible to earn money on information about effort (see (A6».
Special cases
The next to corollaries gives the effort and the value of the firm when the price reflects this information
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perfectly and when the price does not reflect any information about effort at all.
Corollary 5.2: If the "loyal" managers are far-sighted, the individual effort, the total effort, and the value of
the firm are
(3.11) •• 1 •• 1 { c} .. 1 { 1 {l C}}em = -, e = - M - -- J.I. ,andV = - mll + - - M - -- J.I. ,
c C c+c R C 2 c+c
respectively. Suppose 'P -+ 00 (which means that the transaction price reflects perfect information), then there is
no difference between shortsighted and far-sighted managers, both types of managers supply an effort resulting in
(3.11).
ftQQf: The individual effort of far-sighted managers is given by (A2). The total effort and the value of the firm
follow easily from the individual effort. If 'I' ~ 00 (which happens, e.g., if N ~ 00), the market price equals the
liquidating value of the security realized at time 1+1. This is because if the order flow reflects perfect
information about the future value of the security, E[x + e I z, Y*=Y*J = x + e. In this case the optimal
individual effort is given by the limit of (3.6) when 'I' ~ 00. This implies that the total effort and the expected
value of the firm are the corresponding limits of (3.9) and (3.10). Q.E.D.
Far-sighted managers maximize the expected value of the firm at time t+ 1 whereas the myopic managers
maximize the value at time t. If the market price reflects perfect information about the future value of the
security, the two maximization problems are identical and must therefore give the same choice of effort and the
same expected value of the firm, The corollary looks at the other extreme.
Corollary 5.3: If 'P = 1 I ~ (which means that the market price reflects no information), there is no
productive effort by the managers and the present expected value ofthefirm equals (1/ R) 1nz.
frQQf: This follows directly from (3.6) - (3.10). Q.E.D.
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If the market price does not reflect any information, the "loyal" managers minimize the cost of supplying effort
which means that e* = O. The security price is not taken into consideration because a positive effort give no
positive effect on the security price. I mentioned above that Fishman and Hagerty (1989) is a special case of the
model presented here, the next corollary emphasizes the differences.
Corollary 5.4: If the "loyal" manager is shortsighted (this implies that M = l), mz = J.I. = O,r~ 00, and R
= l,then
(3.12) e' = N ~ and V· = N ~ [1 - N ~ l
c[(N + 1)~ + z s] c[(N + 1)~ + 2e] 2[(N + 1)~ + z e]]'
fmQf: This follows directly from (3.9) and (3.10). Q.E.D.
This total effort is almost equal to the total effort in Fishman and Hagerty (1989); see their example on page
641. The difference is caused by the fact that Fishman and Hagerty's informed outsiders (who are market
professionals) observe common and not diverse information (which means that (N + 1) (~+ e) replaces [(N + 1)
~ + 2 e] in (3.12».
On the properties of the optimal choice of errort
This subsection discusses some of the most interesting properties of lemma 5.2 regarding the managers' choice
ofeffort
Proposition 5.1: If 'l' < =. then
(3.13) V( . I myopic managers) < V( . I far - sighted managers).
fmQ{: The net value of the fmn to current shareholders is given by (3.10) when the corporate managers are
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myopic, and by lim'l'-+oo V('P) when the managers are far-sighted (see corollary 5.2). We see directly frOID
(3.10) that if 'II < 00, then V(JJ.) is less than its limit when the price informativeness approaches infinity.
Q.E.D.
The expected liquidating value of the firm is highest if the corporate managers are instructed to be far-sighted and
maximize the expected net value of the firm at time t+ 1. The reason is that the market price is a noisy predictor
of the future value, and it is, of course, best to use the future value itself.
Proposition 5.2:
(3.14) d V < O and d V > O.
de d 'P
fmQf: This follows by differentiating (3.10) with respect to the relevant variables. Q.E.D
The expected value of the firm decreases with the cost of making effort and increases with the price
informativeness.
5.4 PRIVATE REGULATION
At time L3, the "loyal" managers meet and decide the number of "disloyal" managers by maximizing thc value
of firm k after taking into account the firm's cost of limiting the number of "disloyal" managers. Thus, Il* is a
solution to
(4.1)
1
Max V(Jl) - - C(Jl),
OSJlSM R
where the firm' s cost function is assumed to be of the type
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(4.2)
I assume that k ~ Oand the cost function therefore decreases with J.I.~ M (because d C(J.I.)/ d J.I.= - k (M - J.I.)<
O). It is more costly for large firms to effectively prohibit insider trading than smaller firms because C(JJ.)
increases with M which is the total number of employees in the finn and therefore a measure of firm size. The
cost is financed in the same way as M C(e*m); see section 5.3.
Definition 5.4: An optimal supply of "disloyal" managers Il* is a supply such that V(Il*) - C(1l*) ~ V(Il')-
C(Il')for all Il' E ID, Ml.
The next lemma characterizes the optimal supply:
Lemma 5.3: The optimal supply of "disloyal" managers, denoted Il*, is determined by maximizing (4.1), or
as a solution to the condition
(4.3) 1 { 1 [cll M ] d'l' [ 1] c }- -- -- - - - + 1 - - -- - k(M - Il) = O,c ~ '1'2 C + C ~ 'I' d Il ~ 'I' c + c
where
(4.4)
frQQf: Condition (4.3) is the first order condition of (4.1), and (4.4) follows straightforwardly from (3.7).
Q.E.D.
Figure 5.2 illustrates two cases where the "disloyal" managers choose unique solutions. I have used the
numerical values given in table 5.2 (see appendix C) if not specified otherwise.
174
2.
Supply of illegally trading
insiders
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FIGURE 5.2: Optimal supply of "disloyal"
managers
3.
j_.
If information is disclosed. J.1. = 2.777. and the net value of the firm is 2.339. ff illegal insider trading is the
sole method of disclosing information. J.1. = 5.099. and the net value of the ftrm is 1.999. Thus. if there are
other methods for disclosing information than insider trading. the optimal supply of illegally trading insiders
tends to be less and the net value of the firm tends to be higher.
There are according to (4.3) three effects which the "loyal" managers have to take into account when they
determine the optimal supply of "disloyal" managers: First. if c < 00. then. according to (3.8). the "disloyal"
managers produce less than the "loyal" managers. Notice that if c = O. the "disloyal" managers do not supply
any effort at all. This means that if J.1 increases. more managers becomes "disloyal" and the total production and
thereby the value of the ftrm decreases. This effect is called the production effect ff '¥ < '¥. and J.1 is
increasing. then, according to (3.7), (3.9), and (3.10), there is a positive effect on the supply of effort and
thereby on the value of the firm, This effect is called the information effect Finally, if k > O, it is cost-saving
to increase the number of "disloyal" managers which means that there is an effect increasing the value of the
firm, This effect is referred to as the cost effect Table 5.1 summarizes the effects.
~E [O.~v] + + +/(-)
TABLE 5.1: Effects on value caused by Il J.1
Total effect
~E ~v.M) + + -/(+)
Pe - ~c:tianelliocl,. ID.rar-timaelliocl,. Co - Cootelliocl. oadpvio. CIXØIoDt.
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The net value of the finn as a function of the number of "disloyal" managers tends to increase and then decrease,
suggesting that O< Il* <M as in the figure above. But the net value may be increasing or decreasing for all Il
~M.
Corollary 5.5: Suppose 'I' -+ 00, then
(4.5) 1P. * = M - 2: O.
k (c + c)
fmQf: This follows easily from (4.3). If the Il given by (4.5) is negative, then Il* = O. Q.E.D.
If the "loyal" managers are far-sighted, they reduce the supply of "disloyal" managers because they supply less
effort than "loyal" managers, and not because they are potential insiders. We see that if k, c, or c -+ 00, Il* =
M. On the other hand, if the "loyal" managers are myopic, no closed form solution exists for Il*.
Proposition 5.3: If k 5 k: and 'I' :i? '1", p.* = O. On the contrary, if" > k:" and/or c > c', Jl* = M
Otherwise, O < p.* < M.
f.mQf: Clearly, the problem given by (4.1) is continuous. If qJ -+ 00 and k = O, then according to (4.5), Il* =
O. Now let k' 2:Obe the largest k where Il* = O, and let at the same time Y ~ 00 be the lowest qJ where Il * =
O. If k -+ 00, then Il* = M since otherwise the cost of enforcement is infinite. Let k" be the lowest k where
Il * = M. Finally, if c -+ 00, then Il* = M because, according to (3.8) all the managers are "loyal" and there is
no negative production effect Now let c' be the lowest c where Il* =M. Q.E.D.
Insider trading is effectively prohibited if there is no cost of enforcing the law and if insider trading is not needed
to disclose information about effort. On the other hand, insider ttading is allowed if the cost of enforcement is
high and the insiders otherwise act almost as "loyal" managers.
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5.5 PUBLIC REGULATIONS
I have so far assumed that there is a privately enforceable contract which regulates what the employees in firm k
are supposed to do. Roughly speaking, they should maximize the expected welfare of current shareholders.
There are two ways of organizing the enforcement:
• A private employment contract means that the employers and the employees agree on what the
employees should or should no do. The control or enforcement of the contract could be delegated to the
"loyal" employees or to a control committee appointed by the current shareholders. In this way, the
enforcement should maximize their welfare.
• In addition to the private contracts, there could be a set of universal contracts which are best enforced
by a governmental agency. Such public contracts or laws may be optimal, for instance, if there arc
economics of scale in regulation and enforcement, or if something is considered inappropriate in the
view of the society.
Usually the relationship between agents and principals is regulated by a combination of both private and public
contracts.
I assume that there exists a governmental agency (like the Securities and Exchange Commission in USA)
whose duty it is to enforce the financial market regulations which are viewed as socially desirable. The
government considers insider trading inappropriate and has consequently made it illegal. The enforcement
agency is instructed to enforce the law to maximize a social welfare function given exogenously by the political
bodies. Nevertheless, the agency does not prevent all insiders from trading as this regulatory strategy is too
costly.
Regulation and enforcement are costly. The private cost of enforcement is given by (4.2), and the public
cost is given by a similar cost function:
(5.1) K(Jl) = K (M - pl,
2
where K ~ o. If the governmental agency uses an amount of money K(JJ.), it reduces the number of corporate
insiders operating on internal information from M to J.l where O ~ J.l ~ M. The gain is hopefully increased
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social welfare. Nevertheless, the amount used by the regulatory agency to limit the supply of corporate insiders
has to be financed, I look at two methods:
• The companies listed on the stock exchange have to pay a fee K(Jl) to the exchange or directly to the
agency to cover the cost of enforcemenL
• The security traders have to pay an additional component in the bid ask spread which ultimately is
used to cover the enforcement costs.
There may, of course, be a combination of a fee paid by the current shareholders and an additional component in
the equilibrium bid ask spread paid by the security traders. Other methods of financing law enforcement is also
possible.
Financing through a fee
If the companies have to pay a fee depending on the desired level of enforcement, the optimal public enforcement
of the insider trading law, denoted Jl**, is determined in the same way as Jl* in section 5.4.
Proposition 5.4: If k :<?K (public enforcement is cheaper than private enforcement, holding other parameters
constant), then Jl.* tends to be larger than Jl.**.
fmQf: First, Jl* is determined by (4.3), and Jl** is determined by (4.3) where k is replaced by K. If k ~ K,
then d V(J.1*) I d Jl - d C(Jl *) I d Jl = Oand d V(J.1*) I d Jl - d K(J.1*) I d Jl > O. This means that in order to obtain
d V(Jl **) I d Jl - d K(Jl **) I d Jl = O, Jl** has to be less than Jl*. The reason is that my numerical analyses
show that the net value of the fum falls with Jl when Jl > Jl*. A more general proof is difficult partly because
there are no close form solutions for Jl* and u**. Q.E.D.
Economics of scale may make public enforcement less costly than private enforcement, Then the number of
corporate insiders which is "permitted" to trade illegally is larger if the law or contract is enforced by the private
firms themselves than by the governmental agency.
178
Financing through the bid ask spread
I am now turning to the other case in which the enforcement of the law is financed by an additional component
in the equilibriwn bid ask spread.
Lemma 5.4: Suppose the price setting market makers expect to earn a positive profit which goes to cover
K( J.l) ~ O. then there exists a unique. linear quotation driven security market equilibrium [( 6n1ct• ..1mkt). SkI; k E
{l. 2•...• K}. t E {O.l •...• T/("l}. n E {l. 2•...•N}. m E (l. 2•...•M)] of the same structure as lemma 5.1.
The trading intensities are
(5.2) B = ap. and
(5.3) p = [Nr + (J.l + l)(r + 7])a]A.·
r
where the price sensitivity is
(5.4) A. = K (M - J.l )2 +
20' (
K (M - J.l)2)2 [N (r + E) + J.l (r + 7]) a2] r2
+ 2 •
2O' [Nr + (J.l + l)(r + 7]) a] O'
ftQQf: See appendix B.
Lemma 5.4 extends lemma 5.1 to a quotation driven equilibrium where the price setting market makers earn a
positive expected profit, I have not found any extension of the Kyle type models allowing market makers to
earn a fixed return other than zero. However. the cost component in the bid ask spread is recognized in the
market microstructure literature; see, e.g., Stoll (1985), pages 79 - 80. The next corollary follows directly from
the lemma
Corollllry 5.6: IfK = Oor L = A. lemma 5.4 is identical to lemma 5.1.
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In lemma 5.1 the price setting market makers expect. before the net order flow is actually realized, 10 earn zero
profit for every realization of the order flow (see (2.2.15», whereas in lemma 5.4 they earn on average a positive
revenue which goes 10 cover KUL) ;;::O.
If z2 > var(z I y*=y*), the market makers actually earn more than KUL), but if the order flow z2 < var(z I
y*=y*), they earn less. The market makers quote the bid ask spread before they observe the net order flow and
have 10 stick 10 the bids and asks after they observe the incoming orders; see Admati and Pfleiderer (1989) for a
similar market where orders arrive one by one. A securities market of this type is called quotation driven. On
the contrary, a securities market where the market makers set the equilibrium bid ask spread after they have
observed the net order flow is called order driven. Lemma 5.1 may both be interpreted as quotation or order
driven.
Proposition 5.5: For a given supply of corporate insiders 1l:5 M, A(K = O) < A(K > O). This implies that
seK = O)< seK > O), fJ(K = O)> fJ(K> O),andB(K = O)> B(K > O) (where s is the equilibrium bid ask spread
given by (33.2». In addition, every trader is worse off(and the market makers face increased risk)
fmgf: The first inequality follows by comparing (5.4) with (2.9). The other three inequalities follow from
(3.3.2), (5.2), and (5.3). The traders lose because their trading costs are proportional with Å (see section 4.2)
Q.E.D.
If the cost of enforcing L = B is borne by the traders, the equilibrium bid ask spread is higher, leading to less
informed trading and 10 a reduction in the expected profit of the traders. This implies that they prefer that the
cost of enforcing the law is paid by the current shareholders.
Proposition 5.6: The welfare of current shareholders increases if the cost of enforcing L = B is borne by the
traders. Nevertheless, the effort of corporate employees and thereby the gross value of the firm are.for a given
supply of corporate insiders, independent of the means of financing the enforcement.
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Proof: If the cost of enforcement is borne by the traders, the net value of the finn increases from V(Jl) - C(Jl) to
V(Jl). Finally, e* and V* are both independent of how the enforcement cost is financed because the product of A.
P is independent of financing (see, e.g., (A9». Q.E.D.
This suggests that current shareholders prefer the enforcement of the law prohibiting insider trading to be public,
and borne by the traders via an additional component in the equilibrium bid ask spread The traders do not agree
so there is a conflict between current and future shareholders.
Optimal enforcement by the regulatory agency
Above the enforcement of L = B is determined to maximize the expected welfare of current shareholders. Th is is
not necessarily the objective if the enforcement is public. The reason is that the regulatory agency has lo
enforce the security market law according to the instructions given by the authorities (and ultimately by the
parliament). As we know, politicians may easily be influenced by various interest groups promoting the
interests of their members. Regulation and enforcement may therefore reflect a balance among the
heterogeneous interests of diverse groups (see Haddock and Macy (1987».
This is taken into account by assuming that the regulatory agency maximizes a social welfare function
when determining the public enforcement of the law prohibiting insider trading:
where W= (WI, W2, w3, W4) is a vector of exogenously given welfare weights which determine how much the
welfare of one group counts relative to the welfare of another group. The weight of the current shareholders is
normalized to one, and the regulatory agency always takes its full cost into account, On the other hand, the
welfare weights of the various types of market participants are determined by their political power which again
depends on the group's cohesiveness. As suggested by Haddock and Macy (1987), well defined groups such as
corporate insiders and, especially, market professionals, might have more influence than rather diffuse groups
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such as the liquidity traders.
Definition 5.5: An equilibrium enforcement effort by public regulators, denoted Jl**, is an enforcement
effort such that W(Jl**)~ W(Jl')for all u: E [0, MI.
I arn now analyzing Jl** for various welfare weights w, starting with the case where the groups are equally
weighted.
Proposition 5.7: If K = k and w = (1, 1,1,1), then Jl** = Jl*.
fmQf: In this case, W(Jl) = V(Jl) - K(Jl) = V(J.1) - C(J.1), and the two functions share therefore the sarne
maximum. The reason is that the securities market is considered to be a zero sum garne, and it has therefore no
relevance for the social welfare function given by (5.5). Q.ED.
If the welfare of the security traders does not matter, the optimal enforcement is, as outlined in section 5.4, to
maximize the welfare of current shareholders. This, of course, gives the same Jl as the solution to condition
(4.3).
Some numerical results
It may be realistic to exclude the welfare of the corporate insiders from the social welfare function. After all
they are breaking the insider trading law.
Proposition 5.8: Suppose K = kand w = (0, 1,1,1), then there exists a set of parameters where Jl** is
larger than Jl*.
fmQf: I use parameters in table 5.2, and obtain Jl** = 3.009 > Jl. = 2.777. However, ifN increases from 2 to
12, Jl.* = 1.303 < Jl. = 1.386. Clearly, Jl*. is not larger than Jl. for every sel of parameters. Q.E.D.
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It the stock market reguJators ignore the welfare of the illegally trading insiders, the number of such traders
might be larger than in a corresponding securities market where the stock market regulators maximize the
expected welfare of current shareholders. The reason for this is that the insiders who know that they are going to
be inside the market, prefer less competition.
The public Jaw enforcement may as mentioned be affected by the political power of various organizations
taking care of the interests of their members. If some of the traders have a powerful organization, they may
convince the reguJators that their welfare should be over-represented in the social welfare function. Jf, for
instance, small traders, trading for reasons other than information, have an organization with much sympathy
among politicians and regulators, then W4 is larger than one.
Proposition 5.9: Suppose ws increases, then J.L**tends to increase.
fmQf: I use the parameters in table 5.2, and obtain Il*· = 3.009. Ifw 4 is increased from 1 to 4, Il*· increases
to 3.780. No example of the opposite is found. Q.E.D.
If liquidity traders prefer L = A and their view is over-represented in the social welfare function, it leads to an
enforcement which is less effective than if insider trading was regulated to maximize the expected welfare of
current shareholders.
Proposition 5.10: Suppose M and "4 are relatively large. then there might exist an equilibrium where J.L**
=M and J.L*<M.
fmQf: If M is large, the liquidity traders prefer insider trading allowed or the Jaw prohibiting insider trading not
enforced. Since W4 is large, Il** = M. However, the current shareholders want the Jaw enforced, and they
choose to do it themselves. Thus, Il· < M. I use the parameters given in table 5.2 and find that when W4 >
77, Il·· = M and Il· = 2.777. Q.E.D.
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This suggests that if the public enforcement is very ineffective in the view of current shareholders, they have an
incentive to strengthen the enforcement themselves.
5.6 PRODUCTION AND DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION
In the two previous sections, Jl was detennined as part of the equilibrium. Yet all the parameters could be
detennined endogenously in the same way as u, Here I will restrict myself to determine the quality of inside
information and the quality of the signal disclosed to the public where the respective qualities are inversely
related to 1\ and 'Y.
Fishman and Hagerty (1989) analyze a model which is equal to the common information version of
corollary 5.4 to detennine the optimal quality of information disclosed to a limited number of outsiders (thus, e
and N are detennined endogenously). Their main result is that firms may spend more on disclosure than is
socially optimal because firms that attract investors by disclosing infonnation have larger market values (see
their propositions 2 - 3). It is, of course, possible to obtain similar result in my setting, but I focus instead on
disclosure as a tool for "loyal" managers to reduce the need for insider trading as a method of disclosing
information to the financial market.
Before the "loyal" managers may disclose information to all the outsiders, they must have produced some
internal information to disclose. I assume that production and disclosure are linked together by a linear
technology:
(6.1) r = TJ + v,
where v ~ O is noise which is not removed from the public disclosure y*, but is removed from the internal
signal y. If v = O, the public disclosure is as precise as inside information. However, y* does not necessarily
equal y because they are diverse signals. If it is cheap to produce infonnation and costly to disclose it to the
public, v > O.
At time L3, the problem of the "loyal" managers is to
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(6.2) o~. V(p., 1], v) - c(p.) - D(1], v),
lI~O.v~O
where D(11,v) is the cost of producing inside information and disclose some of it to all the outsiders. Iassume
that
(6.3) c· k·D( 1], v) = -c-.-. -+-1]- + k.. + v '
where c-, c=, k-, k·· ~ O. This implies that it does not cost anything to produce and disclose noise as D(Tl ~ 00,
v ~ 00) = O, but disclosing information is costlyas 0(11 < 00, v < 00) > O.
Definition 5.6: An optimal managerial strategy {p.*, 1]*, tt'} of "loyal" managers is a managerial strategy
such that V(J.l*, 1]*, r") - C(J.l*) -D(1]*, tt') ~ vtu', 1]', r') - C(p.') -D(1]', r')/or all u: E [O, M}, 1]' E [O,
=l, l'E [1]', oo}.
I concentrate on 11*and y* because J.1* is analyzed in sections 5.4 - 5.5. As was the case for J.1*, there is no
closed form solution for 11*or y*.
Proposition 5.11: If c- < c· " then 1]* = O. However, if c· > c- " then 1]* > O.
fmQ{: If c- = O, the costofproducing information is independent of11, and 11*=0. This is because d V('I') / d
'fl> O and d 'fl / d 11< Owhich implies that d V(Tl) / d 11< O. Let c-' ~ Obe the highest c- where 11*= O. If c-
~ 00, then 11*~ 00 because otherwise the net value of the fum becomes infinitely negative. Let c-' S; 00 be the
lowest C· where 11*> O. Q.E.D
If it is cheap to produce inside information, the "loyal" managers have an incentive to increase the precision of
inside information because it increases the price informativeness either through direct disclosure or insider
trading.
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Proposition 5.12: If k· < ks', then t' = 71*(and v* = O). Nevertheless, if k» > ks', then t' > 71*(and v*
> O).
:emm: If k· = O, the cost function is independent ofv, and v* = O. This is because d V('I') / d 'I' > O and d
V(v) / d v < O which implies that d V(v) / d v < O. Let kw' ~ O be the largest k· where v* = O. If k. ~ 00,
then v* ~ 00 because otherwise the net value of the fum is infinitely negative. Let k·' S 00 be the lowest k-
where v* >O. Q.E.D.
If it is relatively costly to disclose information directly to the public, the "loyal" manager do not disclose as
precise information as they possess.
Proposition 5.13: Suppose the "loyal" managers have regulated the firm to maximize the net value of
current shareholders, but the governmental agency instruct the firm to reduce the supply of corporate insiders
evenfurther (thus, p, decreases from p,* to p,**). The new overall optimum means that 71tends to decrease from
71*to 71**and r tends to decrease from 1* to t'*.
:fm2.{: If J.I.changes exogenously from J.I.* to J.I.** (holding 11* and 'Y*are fixed), the net value of the firm to
currentshareholders falls from V(J.I.*, 11*, 'Y*)- C(J.I.*) - 0(11*, 'Y*)to V(J.L**, 11*, 'Y*)- C(J.L**) - D(11*, y*).
One way to limit the reduction in the net value of the fum is to change 11from 11* to 11** and y from y* to
'Y**so that V(J.I.**,11*, 'Y*)- C(J.I.**)- 0(11*, 'Y*)S V(J.L**,11**, 'Y**) - C(J.I.**) - 0(11**, 'Y**) < V(J.I.*,11*,
'Y*)- C(J.I.*) - 0(11 *, 'Y*). It is optimal to set 11** S 11* and 'Y**S "f because of the reduction in the positive
informational effect caused by insider trading. The reduction is compensated through a more precise disclosure.
This is supported by thorough numerical analyses. Q.E.D.
This suggests that if number of corporate insiders is for some reason or another reduced by the security market
regulators (e.g., because insider trading is considered "unfair"), it simultaneously leads to better internal
information and to better disclosures to the public. The reason is that the infonnation effect caused by insider
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trading is reduced, and the managers have 10 compensate for the loss by improving the direct disclosure which
perhaps also means that they have to increase the quality of internal information. Still the reduced supply of
corporate insiders reduces the net value of the firm.
My results may suggest that the kind of information which should be prohibited is inside information that
would otherwise soon be incorporate into the transaction price through public announcements. This indicates,
as suggested in Kyle (1989), that close substitutes for publicly announced data should be banned, but not
necessarily trades which are based on private research that compliments public sources of information (see also
Manne (1966». Insider trading may be considered 10 be a method 10 disclose the value of business secrets
without telling the securities market and thereby the competitors explicitly what they are (see, e.g., Charlton
and Fischel (1983».
5.7 SHORT SUMMARY OF SOME MAJOR CONCLUSIONS
I have developed a simple production and exchange economy, and used it to analyze the supply of productive
effort when some the employees are maximizing their own expected welfare and not the expected welfare of their
current shareholders. As part of maximizing their own welfare, the agents trade on inside information. J
identify three effects on the welfare of current shareholders caused by a law (or contract) prohibiting "disloyal"
behavior which includes insider trading:
• If the supply of corporate insiders is reduced, there is a negative infonnation effect which reduces the
value of the firms listed on the stock exchange. The reason is that insider trading is a way of
disclosing information through the prices which makes them a possible control device for the current
shareholders to monitor their agents. This effect is less important if the firms disclose information
voluntarily or there are mandatory disclosure requirements.
• If the supply of corporate insiders is reduced, there is a positive production effect which increases the
value of the firms listed on the stock exchange. This is because there is a link between being an agent,
maximizing his own expected profit, and being a corporate insider. If the employees such as corporate
managers cannot trade on inside information, they become "loyal" and therefore maximize the expected
welfare of their principals.
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• If the supply of corporate insider is reduced, there is a cost effect which may decrease the value of the
firms listed on the stock exchange. This effect is caused by the fact that enforcement might be
relatively costly.
Given these effects, it is easy within the model to construct examples where insider trading should be prohibited,
but not completely enforced as is the situation in many highly developed financial markets such as the NYSE,
TSE, and LSE.
A major weakness in this analysis is that there is assumed to be a strong link between agents and corporate
insiders. If the number of corporate insiders is reduced in the financial market by outlawing such trades, the
number of agents is also reduced. This is not necessarily the case, corporate employees may be prevented from
trading on inside information, but may still act as "disloyal" agent within the firm by shrinking their duties vis-
a-vis their principals.
I extend in the next chapter to a corresponding production and exchange economy where the unfaithful
insiders in some respects are even more unfaithful as they supply an effort different from the effort expected by
the market This implies that the corporate insiders have privileged information generated by their own choice
of effort In this way, the corporate insiders are actually manipulating the production process to obtain inside
information.
APPENDICES
This section contains the formal proofs of lemma S.2 and S.4. Appendix C gives the numerical values used in
the example.
Appendix A Proor or lemma 5.2
The "loyal" and the ""disloyal~ managers have two different effort-selection problems given by (3.3) or (3.4) and
(3.S) respectively.
If the "loyal" managers are far-sighted, their effort-selection problem is given by (3.4). I insert the cost
function given by (3.2) and obtain the first order condition
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(Al) 1 - cem = 0,
or
(A2) ••e =m 1c
The second order condition is - c < 0, and I conclude that this choice of effort produces a maximum. If 'I' ~ 00,
(3.6) equals (A2).
If instead the corporate managers are myopic or shortsighted, their effort-selection problem is given by
(3.3). I insert the transaction price given by (2.7) and the cost function given by (3.2), and yield
(A3) Max ..!_{E[E[i + e Iy.] Iem] + A.E[E[z Iy.] I em] - ~e!},
0."'0 R 2
where the net order flow
(A4)
N
Z = P I,(Yn - E[i + el y.]) + JlB (y - E[i + el y.]) + u.
n-l
At time L4, y. is not realized and it is therefore a stochastic variable. But the manager knows that y. will be
realized at time L3 and takes it into account The future revelation of superior information is taken into account
through the adjustment caused by the net order flow. The next step is to use the rule of conditional expectations
andobtain
1 {[ - cov(i + e, y.) ( Y· -) l [- cov(z, y *) ( Y* - ) l c 2}(AS)Max- E E[x+e]+ (_) [_ ] lem +A.E E[z]+ (_) [_] I em --em'
0.",0 R var y. E Y• var Y* E Y* 2
in which
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cov(y*, i) =
(NP + JLB)r (i + e) + prea + JLBii + li _
~+ r a-l
(A6)
where ec is the market's conjecture about total effort We observe that the market orders from the informed
speculators and the liquidity traders are not driven by public information. This means that (AS) simplifies to
where ecm is the market' s conjecture about the effort supplied by manager m. After taking the expectation, I get
l c s ( c) )m, + e + -s:-- em - em +1 " + r(A8)Max - ,e.2:0 R Å{N P (e _ec _ -~-(e _eC)) + /lB (e _ec __ ~_ (e _ec ))}_ E.e2m m ~+rm m m m ~+r m m 2m
or
1{ M-l [1 - Å P (N + /l a)] r c s + Å P (N + /l a) r c 2}
(A9) ~ R m, + ~le~ + ~ + r em + ~ + r em - '2em .
According to (3.Cl), the informativeness of the transaction price (which is measured by 'l' = 1 I var(x I S,
y*=y*» equals
(AIO) 'l' = l
r [l - Å P (N + /l a)]
~+r= ---~--~--~~r[I - Åp(N + /la))"
The next step is to insert (2.4) and (2.9) into (AIO). The result is given by (3.7). Finally, I substitute (AIO)
into (A9), and obtain
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(All) l { M-I e
C
Max - m + Le~ + -!!!...
c_ <!O R x m=l t5 'I'
+ [l - .i,]e _ .£e2}.t5'1' m 2 m
The first order condition is (ecm and l',ecm are taken to be constants, suggesting that the manager has Nash-
conjectures)
(A12) [l - _l ] _ c e = O.s 'I' m
where 'I' is given by (3.7). The optimal choice of individual effort given by (3.6) follows directly. The second
order condition is - c < O, and I may conclude that the manager' s choice of individual effort produces a
maximum.
The "disloyal" manager m E {I, 2, ... , Il} chooses an individual effort em which maximizes the effort-
selection problem given by (3.5). I insert the cost function given by (3.2) and yield
(A13)
where e*m is a constant given by (3.6). In this chapter, I assume that the managers cannot trade on effort
generated information which means that E[ 1tm1.l. Iem] is a constant independent of em' This implies that the
"disloyal" manager has a constant revenue, and the problem is to minimize the cost function. The first order
condition is
(AI4)
The optimal choice of effort is given by (3.8). The second order condition is - (c + c) < Owhich means that I
have found a maximum.
The total effort is
(AlS) e* = (M - .fl) e: + .fl e~.
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I insert (3.6) and (3.8) and yield (3.9).
The expected value of the firm at time 1.4 as a function of the "loyal" managers' supply of individual effort
is
(A16)
where I have inserted (3.8). Notice that the principals pay all the managers for supplying the effort of a "loyal"
managers because the principals cannot distinguish "loyal" from "disloyal" managers. I insert (3.6) and yield
(3.10). This completes the proof of lemma 5.2.
Appendix B Proof of lemma 5.4
I want the market makers 10 earn a positive expected profit which equals the cost of enforcing the law
prohibiting insider trading. This means that the equilibrium condition in the dealership market with competitive
market makers is
(Bl) E[-z(i - RS) I z, y*=y*] = K{Il),
giving the linear price function given by (2.8). The price sensitivity is
(B2) 1 cov{i, z I y*=y *) K(~)'" = ) +--=r.var(z I y* = y * z
In this way, the price sensitivity depends of the size of the order flow. Such quotation is called order driven
because it depends on the observed orders. Thus, the equilibrium bid ask spread is adjusted after the
intennediaries have received the orders.
I want A. to be independent of z. One way of doing this is 10 assume that the transaction price is linear in
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the net order flow and the price setting market makers have to quote the price sensitivity before they observe the
net order flow. This means that the intermediaries have to hold on to the quoted spread after they actually
observe the realization of net order flow. Such a way of determining the bid ask spread is called quotation
driven.
(B3) E[A. I y* = Y*] = E[COV(i~ i ~y* = y *) + K!Jl) I y*= y *] = cov(i, z I y* = y *) + K(Jl)
var(z I y* = Y*) z2 var(z I y* = Y*)
The price setting market makers do not earn a profit to cover K(J.I.) for all realizations of z, but only on average,
implying that they earn more than K(J.I.) if z2 > var(z I y*=y*) and lose if the opposite is the case. I insert (5.1)
and (A4) and yield
(B4)
A. = 13 (N + Jl a) + K (M - Jl )2
132 [(N + Jl a)2 r + NE + Jl2 a2 11] + a'
where p is given by (2.A30) and restated in (5.3). I insert (5.3) and obtain
(BS)
This equation has one positive root given by (5.4). Equation (5.2) follows from (2.3.4). This completes the
proof of lemma 5.4.
Appendix C Example
Table 5.2 gives the numerical values used to illustrate the optimal choice of J.1.
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lADLE 5.2: Numerical values
o = 2 [o- = 1] N = 2
'Y = 2 c = 1 M = 10
e = 2 c = 1 J.l E (1.2 •...• Ml
TI = 1 k = 1/20 R = 1
mx = O
Notice that the "disloyal" managers are expected 10 produce only half of what the "loyal" managers are expected
10 produce (because c I (C+ C)= lfl).
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CHAPTER 6
INSIDER TRADING ON EFFORT GENERATED
INFORMATION
First draft: April 1991,
Current revision: November 1992.
ABSTRACT
I examine insider trading as a mechlmism prOMOtingma1IIJgerialeffort. My findings show thal trading on effort
generated informtJtion promotes an eq,ulibrium sllpply of effort thal is either incentive compatible or destrllCtwe. This
is because corporate ma1IIJgersof higher than average quality are motivated to sllpply an effort higher than expected,
and, symmetrically, the managers of lower thlm average quality find it easier to swpris« the marke: !Ty slIpplying an
effort less than expected. In this way. effort is random which generates SlIperior information lUlaVailableto outsUlers.
I compare the expected effort and its volatility when insider trading is the sole incentive mechanism with a
CO"esponding 1IIIJrkl!twhere insider trading is prohibited. The ma1IIJgersare instead motivated !Ty a linear outcome-
contingent incentive scheme. My restdts indicate thal insider trading is not desirable as an incentive mechanism
because the linear outcome-contingent scheme prodllCes a higher expected effort and redllCes the volatility of the effort
choices.
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6.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter extends the pure exchange economy characterized by lemma 2.1 to a corresponding production and
exchange economy where the corporate employees maximize their own expected profit. They do this by
supplying an effort different from what is expected by their principals and by the securities market in general.
Hence, the employees are considered to be agents who choose the individual effort which maximizes their own
expected profit and not necessarily the one that maximizes the expected profit of their principals. By choosing
an unexpected effort, the employees generate inside information exploitable by trading in the securities market.
This in tum may suggest that there is a close link between information gathering and production in general.
Clearly, this incentive effect has to be taken into consideration when evaluating the desirability of insider trading
regulations in fmancial markets.
The major problem in the agency model is that the principals do not directly infer the action of their agents by
observing the outcome of the production process. A partial solution is to implement an outcome-contingent
incentive scheme which motivates the agents to supply an effort consistent with the interest of their principals;
see, e.g., Holmstrom (1979) for a theoretical discussion. The question raised here is whether insider trading per
se is such a mechanism or, as implicitly suggested in chapters 2 - 4, merely trade on superior information. If it
turns out that insider trading really has incentive effects, then, as originally pointed out by Manne (1966), it
may be desirable to allow such trades at least if no other mechanisms provide the desired effort at significantly
lower costs.
There are few who have analyzed this question formally. One is Dye (1984) who analyzes incentives and
insider trading in an agency model extended with a simple security market where one manager may trade on
internal information. His findings indicate that if the manager is initially compensated through an earning-
contingent contract, the welfare of that risk averse insider and all of the risk averse shareholders can be improved
by insider trading (see also Easterbrook (1985». Note, however, that this does not generally establish the
superiority of schemes that have, as one component of compensation, profits from insider trading. Rather, it
establishes that insider trading is one mechanism that may be used by the shareholders to improve on earnings-
contingent contracts either because of incentive effects or its risk sharing properties.
196
Another area of literature relevant when discussing these issues is the articles and papers analyzing various
other effects caused by insider trading. Often these articles use extended exchange economies where investments
or production are allowed (see, e.g., Manove (1989), Ausubel (1990), Dennert (1990), Fishman and Hagerty
(1992), and Leland (1992». Leland, for instance, studies insider trading in a security market model which
recognizes the monopoly power of a single corporate insider, and finds that the expected production is larger
with insider trading than without. He concludes that if the amount of investment is highly responsive to current
stock prices, the total welfare tends to increase with insider trading. However, the insider does not supply any
productive effort. Instead production happens because the supply of the fum' s stock is decided by "the fum",
possessing no inside information, to maximize expected profit for its original shareholders. Production means
that the original stockholders earn more money by selling more shares to satisfy the demand. Leland's insider
does not even decide the supply of the stock, so there are no function initially justifying his existence. The
other papers are affected by the same critique because they do not recognize the corporate insiders as agents,
supplying effort to maximize their own welfare.
Iextend the framework used in the earlier chapters to a principal - agent setting with the following sequence of
events. First, the principals hire several risk neutral employees who have a non-observable ability to make
effort. Then the hired employees maximize their own expected profit by individually choosing such an action.
Their effort is not directly observed by the principals or any other outsiders because random business
fluctuations outside the control of the employees are affecting the output and thereby making it noisy. Finally,
the corporate employees become insiders in the securities market, and trade on effort generated information to
compensate for their supply of effort. Insider trading is allowed because their trades are part of the remuneration
contract with their principals. All agents are risk neutral excluding risk sharing considerations from the
analysis.
There are two typeS of equilibrium choices of effort. An incentive compatible choice is one in which the
corporate employees choose to supply an effort greater than expected, and, correspondingly, a destructive choice
is one in which the employees choose to supply an effort lower than expected by the market The employees,
of course, know their own ability, and always choose the supply of effort which gives them the highest expected
profit In equilibrium, the employees with lower abilities than average tend to be destructive whereas the
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employees with higher abilities tend to surprise the market positively. The amount of effort generated
information increases with the uncertainty about the quality of the firm' s employees. and decreases with the cost
of surprising the market Surprising the market is costly. among other things. because it hurts the long run
reputation of the managers (see. e.g .• HolmstrOm (1982». Nevertheless. if it becomes more costly to surprise
the market, the corporate employees have less inside information which in tum is shown to benefit outsiders
such as market professionals and liquidity ttaders.
Insider trading as an incentive mechanism gives some of the corporate employees an incentive to supply a
low effort to generate superior information. This suggests that insider trading is not very effective as an
incentive mechanism. and it is confirmed ifwe compare insider trading with linear outcome-contingent incentive
schemes. I find that a large sub-class of linear outcome-contingent incentive schemes dominates insider trading
because insider trading leads to less expected effort and increases its volatility. My results run counter to the one
obtained by Manne (1966). He claims that the perfect remuneration device for entrepreneurs is to allow them to
trade on information generated by their entrepreneurial activity. The conclusion is that insider trading is not
effective as an incentive mechanism (but may have positive risk sharing effects as shown by Dye (1984».
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. The next section discusses the assumptions. and section
three presents the resulting trading equilibrium. This equilibrium extends lemmas 2.1 - 2.2 to a common more
general equilibrium. Optimal effort with insider trading as the sole incentive scheme is the topic of section
four. and the overall equilibrium in the resulting production and exchange economy is presented in lemmas 6.4 -
6.5. Section five discusses the properties of the equilibrium. focusing on the employees' choice of effort, and
section six analyzes. e.g .• what happens to the welfare of all participants if the corporate employees surprise the
market by choosing an unexpected effort Sections seven concentrates on a question related to the employees'
choice of effort, namely their choice of business risk with insider trading as an incentive mechanism. Insection
eight, insider trading is compared with other alternative incentive mechanisms in Older to analyze whether insider
trading is the most effective way to motivate employees to supply a productive effort Section nine concentrates
on whether the current shareholders are able to confiscate the abnormal returns earned by the corporate managers
and other employees by punishing them if the future value of the firm differs from the expected value. Finally.
section ten summarizes the major conclusions. Some formal proofs are found in the appendices.
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6.2 ASSUMPTIONS
I draw on the stock market economy outlined in section 2.2. and extend it to a corresponding economy where (i)
the corporate insiders are employees who consequently have to make a costly individual effort which is not
directly observed by the outsiders. and (li). if they choose 10 supply an unexpected effort. the corporate insiders
are able to trade on a new source of infonnation which is not correlated with the random business fluctuations
tmded on in earlier chapters.
I start by assuming that the future value of firm k E {l. 2•...• K} is a random variable with two
components
(2.1) x + e.
The first term is the net effect caused by random business fluctuations whereas the second term is the net effect
caused by security-specific events on the value of firm k. Examples of security-specific events are the
productive effort and the investment decisions provided by the corporate employees. This implies that e may
depend on the number of employees. How the corporate managers determine their supply of effort is analyzed
separately in sections 6.4 - 6.5. using the trading equilibrium given by lemma 6.1. Until then. the effort
component in the future value of the security is given exogenously. I assume that
(2.2) i - N(mx• a). e - N(me• ø). and
cov(i. e) = O.
where N( .•. ) implies that the random variable is normally distributed with a publicly known mean and
variance. As we see. the two components in (2.1) are not correlated.
There are two signals disclosed to the public just before trading at time t E {O.l •...• Tk - I}; see figure
6.1. One of the signals is correlated with the random business fluctuations; the other is correlated with the total
effort of corporate employees. Inthis way.
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(2.3) y* =x+gandY· =e+j.
I assume that
(2.4) g - N(O, r), l-N(O, tp), and
cov(g, l) = cov(g + l, x + e) = o.
The public information is used to update the expectations and variances of the two components in the future
value of the security. This means that
(2.5) x - N(E[XI y*=y*], r = ..!...L) ande -N(E[el y.=y.], Cl> = øtp),6+r ø+tp
in which limy-+aoE[x Iy*=y*] = mx, limq>-+aoE[e Iy--Y·] = me, limy-taor= S, and ~ Cl> = cj). In this
way, disclosing information to the public reduces the underlying uncertainty about the future value of the
seemity.
In addition to the public signals y* and y., there are three private signals which are observed only by a
limited number of individuals. The corporate insiders share one signal correlated with the random fluctuations
and one signal correlated with the total internal effort:
(2.6) y = x + ii and Y = e + I,
(2.7) ii - N(O, ,,), I-N(O, l), and
cov(ii, I) = cov(ii + I, x + e) = cov(ii + I, g + l) = o.
Each of the market professional observe one signal each correlated with the random business fluctuations
influencing the future value of the seemity.
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(2.8)
where (en is noise and has nothing to do with effort)
(2.9) eD - N(O. e) and
cov(eD• ii + i) = cov{eD• i + e) = cov(eD• g + ]) = O.
Note that YD is a diverse signal (each observer observes his own realization) whereas y and Y are both common
signals (all observers share one signal). The signals observed by superiorly informed speculators are both
carelated and uncorreJated because
(2.10) COV(f. V I I) = cov(V. fn I I) = O and cov(Y. Yn I I) = I",
where I= {y*=y*. Y·=Y·•... } is an information structure which presents public information which includes the
realizations of the public signals. but not the future realization of the transaction price. See section 2.2 for
further comments on these issues.
Both corporate insiders and market professionals have an incentive to trade on non-public information al the
call auction at time t E {O.l ••..• Tk - 1}. This is because superior information generates expected profit. I
assume that the corporate insiders are risk neutral which means that the portfolio-selection problem of insider m
E {l. 2•...• M} is
(2.11)
where S is the transaction price and 1m = (y. Yl represents inside information available to the corporate insiders.
The corporate insider is not compensated in any other way than through insider trading. but insider trading is
compared with an alternative incentive mechanism in section 6.8. The solution of (2.11). denoted åm(Y. Y) is
the market order coming from corporate insider m, and it is at time LI submitted. together with orders from
other traders. to the price setting market makers. The market professionals are risk neutral which means that the
portfolio-selection problem of professional n E {l. 2 •.••• N} is
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(2.12)
where Yn represents the privately acquired signal. The solution of (2.12). denoted 9n(yn). is the market order
coming from professional n, and it is at time t-l submitted. together with orders from other traders. to the
matket makers.
There are in addition to the informed speculators three types of uninformed individuals. The first type is the
stable owners who are risk neutral and own a fraction (l -v) e [O.1] of the fum. They are assumed to hold
their initial position in the period from t to t+1. The second type is w (D + 1) uninformed liquidity traders
where w e [O. 1]. They are risk neutral and own a fraction v of the fum. and differ from the stable owners
because they. in addition to hold stocks. choose to trade in the period for exogenous reasons. The third type of
uninformed traders are (1 - w) (D + 1) pure liquidity traders who do not own any initial position in the firm. but
take long or short positions according to their liquidity needs. The net demand from the liquidity traders is
(2.13)
In this way. the liquidity traders create noise so the market professionals and the corporate insiders are
camouflaged in the net order flow.
The transaction price is determined by risk neutral dealers or market makers. They are supposed to act
competitively which means that market maker q e (1. 2•...• Q) has to quote a bid ask spread and thereby a
market price according to the equilibrium condition in the dealership market.
(2.14) E[- (~) ((i + e) - R S) I Z. I] = O.
where z is the net order flow from the informed speculators and the uninformed liquidity traders. S is the
ttansaction price determined by the market makers, and conditioned z is the information generated by observing
the net flow of orders.
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The next table summarizes the share positions and the cash distributions to all the individuals present in the
economy.
rABLE 6.1: Share position Cash distributions
Stable owners 1 - v (1 - vXi + e)
Liquidity trading owners v + w ii v (i + e) + w ii ((i + e) - R S)
Pure liquidity traders (l - w) o (1 - w) ii ((i + e) - RS)
N _ N
Market professionals L8n L8n((i + e) - R S)
n-l n-l
Corporate insiders
M_
l:~m((i + e) - R S)Låm
m-I m-I
Q
- fZq((i + e) - RS)Market makers - LZq
'1-1 '1-1
~otal 1 i + e
The sum of share positions is normalized to unity which means that the supply of shares is non-flexible.!
Figure 6.1 gives the sequence of events around time t where the shares of finn k are traded ('-I means just before
time 1, l2means just before time lit and so on).
FIGURE 6.1 The time structure of trading
t.3 t.l t.l t t+l
y* andy· Market professionals Y, y and YD are Market makers x+eis
are determine OD (y D) and realized. The orders observe Z, take the realized and
realized. corporate insiders are submitted to the opposite position, consumed.
determineAm(y, Y).
market makers. and set S.
1 In Leland (1992) production means that the supply of shares is flexible and determined to maximize the
welfare of the initial owners of the fum. This extension is also possible in this model, but in section 6.4 a different
approach is chosen.
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Note that the informed speculators fonn their demand at time L2 before they at time LI actually observe the
realizations of their signals Y, Y and yn- This means that their demands are functions of the forthcoming
signals. On the contrary, they have at that time already incorporated the realized public signals y* and Y· into
their demand functions. Thus, at time L2 some stochastic variables are realized, others are going to be realized
in the near future.
6.3 TRADING EQUILIBRIUM
This section gives the trading equilibrium in the outlined economy and thereby extending both lemma 2.1 and
2.2 to a common generalized equilibrium. This equilibrium is used in sections 6.5 - 6.9 to analyze the effects
of insider trading on production.
umllUl 6.1: There exists a unique, linear trading equilibrium [(D,,/ct,LlmA:t, UkI),Ski,· n E {l, 2, ..., N}, m E
{l, 2, ..., M}, k E {l, 2, ..., K}, t E (O, 1, ..., TA;-l}Jjorsecuritykatauctiont. Thetradingstrategiesojthe
market professionals and the corporate insiders are
(3.1) Ba = P(Ya - E[il y*=y*]), and
(3.2) lim = b(Y - E[ely·=y·n + B(y - E[ily*=y*]),
where the trading intensities are
(3.3)
(3.4) b = ap, and
(3.5) B = ap,
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in which
(3.6) a=
(Nr + (M + l)(r + 71)a) Cl>~------~~--~~~,mW
(M + 1) (Cl> + l) r
(3.7)
r + 2e
a= --~--~r + (M + 1) 71·
The transactionprice is
(3.8)
where theprice sensitivity
(3.9)
.t = Cl> IN (r + e) + M {(r + 71)al + (Cl> + l) al}
(M + 1) (Cl> + l) a V u .
JfL = B, then Jl replaces M.
fmgf: See appendix A.
ff the total effort supplied by the corporate employees in firm k from time t to t+l depends on their number,
also its expectation and variance will depend on the number of employees. Inthis way, Cl> = CI>(M, •••) would be
determined as part of the equilibrium; see section 6.4 for further elaborations. These corollaries follow
immediately.
Corollary 6.1: Suppose the corporate insiders and the market professionals observe only correlated
information, then the trading equilibrium is given by lemma 2.1.
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fmQf: If t ~ 00. then a = O. b = O. and P. B. and ). have the values given by (2.3.3). (2.3.4). and (2.3.8)
respectively. Q.E.D.
Corollary 6.2: Suppose the corporate insiders and market professionals observe only uncorrelated
information. then the trading equilibrium is given by lemma 2.2.
fmgf: IT'll ~ 00. then a. = O. B = O. and P. b, and A. have the values given by (2.6.10). (2.6.11). and (2.6.15)
where a is given by (2.6.12). Q.E.D
Lemma 6.1 could easily be extended to numerous of market architectures. For instance. to the case where there
are two types of corporate insiders. one observing infonnation correlated with the random business fluctuations
and another observing information correlated with the firm-specific component in the future return of the
security. Notice that this situation equals the one in lemma 6.1 if the numbers of the two types of insiders are
identical.
'.4 OPTIMAL EFFORT
I have assumed that the information represented by signal Y is correlated with the term e in the future value of
security k e {l. 2 •...• Kl; see (2.6). Ife is the value of the total effort supplied by the corporate employees. Y
is said to be generated by total effort. I did not in the previous sections specify how information is generated
from effort. This is the topic of this section.
At time L4. corporate manager m e {l. 2•...• Ml delermines his optimal action em which could in general
include effort choices. investment and production decisions. project selections etc .• but the managers' choice of
action does not affect the random business fluctuations or vice versa. The optimal action is determined to
maximize expected profit, Thus, ifL = A. em is determined by
(4.1)
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where C(e.n) is a stochastic cost depending on the individual choice of action or effort. The conditional c and em
represent superior infonnation about the manager's own cost structure (that is, the manager's type or quality)
and his own supply of effort.
Definition: The optimal individual action or effort e*m is an effort such that E[trm(e*m) I em. c. II ?::
E[tr"l.e'"J I em. c. Il for all e'm where 1Cm is the profit of manager m E {l. 2•...•M}.
The total effort is the sum of the individual efforts (that is, e = l:em) where the optimal individual effort e*m is
characterized by the next result.
Lemma 6.2: Suppose L = A. then the optimal choice ofeffort of manager m E {l. 2..... M}. denoted e*m.
is a solution to the first order condition:
where Å is the price sensitivity. The second order condition secures that the found optimum is a maximum and
If the corporate managers of firm k E {l. 2, ....K} are of the same quality. the price sensitivity is given by
(3.9) and the tenn (1 + (cov(l'.e".. emI I) I var(em 11)))2 =M2.
f.rgQf: See appendix B.
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A choice of effort satisfying (4.2) and (4.3) is an optimal choice of effort. Notice that if l = O, the corporate
manager is certain about the value impact of (total) effort on the future value of the security. Otherwise, the
corporate manager becomes uncertain from time 1.4 to time t-2. In this way, time may make the corporate
insiders uncertain about their own productive effort which, of course, has consequences for trading in the
securities market,
Now suppose that
(4.4)
where
(4.5) F, r, em e R and C - N(E(C I i], var(c I i) = e).
This means that C(em) is minimized when em = em - (c I 1) where E[em - (c I 1) Il] = em - (E[c Il] I 1) and
E[E[em - (c I 1) 11]] = em because E[E[c I In = O. In this way, the cost function reflects that the corporate
managers expect to pay the lowest individual cost of effort when they supply the pre-specified level of effort em'
Supplying a different level of effort is expected to give greater costs because the managers then have to work
hard or shrink where C(em -+ ± 00) -+ 00. Shrinking is costly because it may hurt their long time reputation
(see, e.g., HolmstrOm (1992». The reputation effect, however, is not explicitly modeled.
Lemma 6.3: Suppose there is only one type of corporate managers in each firm (that is only one realization
ofc)and
(4.6) M
2 ~ (~ + (M + 1) I.)
f>
(M + 1)2 (cl» + 1.)2 Å '
then there may exist a choice of effort satisfying both (4.2) and (4.3). The optimal individual choice of effort is
charactoized by
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(4.7) _* (M + 1)2 (4)> + II Å.em = em - feM + 1)2 (4)> + 1)2 Å. _ M24>>(4)> + (M + 1) l) C,
which means that
(4.8) (
2 2 )2_ I i (M + 1) (4)> + l) Å. e
var(em ) = C (M + 1)2 (4)> + 1)2 Å. - M24» (4)> + (M + 1) l) .
The variance o/total effort ø=Ml var(em / I).
fmQf: See appendix C.
We see that the variance of total effort is determined as part of the equilibrium, but fl»=Ml var(em Il) turns out
to be a rather complex equation in fl». This is because var(em Il) depends non-linearly on fl». However,
numerical analyses indicate, given the restrictions that exogenous parameters are positive, that there tends to be
only one real root greater than zero. No close form solution exists in general. Itherefore introduce a somewhat
strange restriction on the cost function in order to avoid analyzing the equilibrium numerically because it seems
not to alter any results obtained by analyzing lemmas 6.1 - 6.3 numerically.
Assumption: Let
(4.9)
where
(4.10) s > 1 + (M + 1)~ e .
MO'
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This assumption reduces the equation fl;) =Ml var(em I I) to an equation with a unique solution because Cl» now
enters linearly in var(em I I). Nonetheless, the private cost of effort depends on the number of corporate
managers and the liquidity of the market
Lemma 6.4: Suppose (4.9) holds and there is only one type cf managers in each firm, then the variance of
total effort is unique:
(4.11)
(M + l)l [N (r + e) + M (r + 17) al]
fl;) = M[M(s _ l)l C1 _ (M + l)l sjal e,
where a is given by (3.7) and a is given by (4.15) below. The individual effort is therefore
(4.12)
M + 1 M [N (r + e) + M (r + 17) al]
Ml a M (s _ l)l C1 _ (M + l)l e c.
ftQQf: Iuse the simplifying assumption (4.9) and then insert (3.9) into (4.8). The result is given by (4.11).
Then Iuse (4.9) and insert (3.9) into (4.7), and get (4.12). Notice that (4.10) follows from (4.11) because fl;)
must be non-negative. Q.ED.
Figure 6.2 illustrates how the optimal individual effort is determined by using the numerical values in table 6.4
(see appendix F).
Expected
profit
Individual effort
FIGURE 6.2 Optimal eft'ort
0.4
1.3 1.4
-0.1
E[e.ll]=e. e!
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The optimal effort em* = 1.113 > em = 1.000 because the corporate manager is assumed to be of type c = -1 <
E[c I Il = O. The total expected profit (evaluated before y is realized) is 0.124. Thus, the managers of above
average quality supply more effort than expected. They may therefore expect to earn an abnormal return on
inside information. This type of equilibrium is later called incentive compatible.
Corollary 6.3: If e = Oor S ~ 00, lb = O and e*m = em.
fmQf: This follows directly from (4.11) (and (4.12». According to (2.5), if cp = O,e = Obecause then the
market knows the type of the managers in firm k. Q.E.D.
This suggests that if it is very costly to surprise the secmities market by supplying an effort different from what
is expected, the corporate managers do as the marlcet expects (before the signal y. is realized; see (4.13) below).
ff e = O, the managers are not able to surprise the market because their quality and thereby their effort is
publicly known.
Lemma 6.5: Given (4.9) and that e*m is equal/or all managers infirm k, there exists a unique trading
equilibrium[(B,ua, .1mkt, Ukt), Ski; n E {l, 2, ..., N}, m E {l, 2, ..., M}, k: E {l, 2, ..., K}, t E (O, 1, ..., Tk
-1)] where the trading strategies are given by (3.1) - (3.2) and the transaction price is given by (3.8) where
rational expectations means that
(4.13)
The trading intensities are
(4.14) 1p=
s - 1
M (s - 1)2 a - (M + 1)2 e
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B = ap, and b = a pwhere ais given by (3.7) and
(4.15) a = Nr + (M + l)(r + 71)a
(M + 1)r
The price sensitivity is
(4.16) il= 5-1
(M + 1)a
M [N (r + e) + M (r + 7J) al]
M (5 - 1)1 a - (M + 1)1e
fI:wlf: I use assumption (4.9) and insert (4.11) into (3.3), (3.6), and (3.9). The given results follows
straightforwardly. Rational expectations mean that E[E[em 11]]= em and when y. is realized at time 1-3 , the
value is adjusted as shown in (4.13). Q.E.D.
Together lemmas 6.4 - 6.5 form a production and exchange equilibrium. It is used in the following sections to
discuss insider ttading on effort generated information.
Corollary 6.4: Jf B = Oor S ~ 00, the trading intensities ofinjor1l1l!dspeculators are given by (2.33) and
(2.3.4). The price sensitivity is given by (4.3.8).
£mm: This follows directly from (3.5), (4.14), and (4.16). Notice that b > O,but the demand caused by effort
generated information is zero. Q.E.D.
Naturally, when the cost of smprising the market is very high, there would be no effort smprise and therefore no
demand caused by effort generated information. We are back in the securities market setting studied in chapters 2
- 4.
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(;.5 ON THE PROPERTIES OF THE EQUILIBRIUM
This section analyzes the equilibrium characterized by lemmas 6.4 - 6.5, but focuses most on the individual
choice of effort,
On the managers' choice or errort
The managers' individual choice of effort is stochastic to outsiders, but known to all the corporate managers in a
particular finn.
Proposition 6.1: There exist two types of effort choices. An incentive compatible choice of effort is
de/inedase*m > E[em/ /) and a desmætive choice ofeffortis defined ase*m < E[em/ Il. With insider trading as
the sole incentive mechanism, the probability of ending up in a incentive compatible choice equals the
probability of ending up in a destructive choice of effort (or investment policy).
fmQf: The two types of effort choices follow directly from (4.12), and the probability of ending up below its
expectations equals 1/2 because e.n is normally distributed from the outsiders' point of view. Q.E.D.
Corporate managers generate inside infonnation by choosing an effort that surprises the securities market, If the
managers is of type c < O, they supply more effort than expected. Such managers are therefore of high quality.
On the other hand, if the managers are more effort averse (c > O), they supply less than expected. Thus, an
optimal effort strategy motivated by insider bading implies making effort stochastic to keep the market
uncertain about the supply of effort
Proposition 6.2: The optimal amount ofindividual effort (and thereby the total effort) increases with the
market's expectationabout individual effort and decreaseswith the corporatemanager's realized cost of supplying
effort.
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fr.QQf: This follows directly by differentiating (4.12) with respect to the relevant variables (which is E[E[em I1]]
= em and c). Q.E.D.
Measured in expectation, effort is supplied because the financial market expects that the managers to work. IfL
= A, the corporate managers always tty to surprise the market to generate inside information. A higher realized
cost of supplying effort leads to less supply.
Proposition 6.3: For a given expectation of effort and a given realized cost of supplying effort, the total
effort surprise measured by til has these unique comparative statics:
(5.1) del» O del» O and del» O<, >, < .
du de ds
The rest of the comparative statics may both be larger and less then zero depending on the size of the exogenous
parameters involved.
fmgf: I use the closed fonn solution given by (4.11). The comparative statics are obtained by differentiating
with respect to the relevant variables. Q.E.D.
For instance, if s, which represents the cost of making effort increases, the amount of effort generated
information Cl» is reduced.
Short on the properties or the trading equilibrium
The properties of the trading equilibrium are analyzed in chapters 3 - 4 using the limit given by corollary 6.1
above. Nonetheless, there are some interesting aspects about the more general trading equilibrium which give
additional insight.
The price sensitivity and thereby the equilibrium bid ask spread depend on the adverse selection problem
faced by the price setting market makers. In this chapter, there are two independent adverse selection problems.
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The first is created solely by the corporate insiders because they observe effort generated information. The
second adverse selection problem is created by the corporate insiders and the market professionals together
because they both observe information about business fluctuations.
The market efficiency is the ability of the transaction price to transmit information from informed to
uninformed.
LemltUl 6.6: The price informativeness is
(5.2)
fmgf: A measure of market efficiency is 'I'= 1/ var(x + e I S.!). and (5.2) follows directly from the structure
of the equilibrium. Q.E.D.
The price informativeness tends to increase with the supply of corporate insiders since they reveal both effort
generated information and information about business fluctuations. Notice that because of risk neutrality. the
noise traders do not affect market efficiency.
Corollary 6.5: If s ~ 00 or 6 = O. then the price informativeness is given by (35.7). In addition. d 'P/ d s
>0.
emm: The limits and the comparative static follow directly from (52). Q.E.D.
For instance. if e = O. then the quality of corporate managers is publicly known and. as long as the market is
semi-strong efficient. the transaction price always reflects such information. The market efficiency increases
with the cost of acquiring effort generated information because less superior information is produced by the
corporate managers.
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6.6 WELFARE EFFECTS
Table 6.2 gives the expected profit of stable owners, owners which in addition trade to satisfy their liquidity
needs (such as hedging), pure liquidity traders, market professionals, corporate insiders, and market makers at
time t.a.
TABLE6.2: Expected profit
Stable owners (1 - v) E[i + e I i]
Liquidity trading owners v E[ i + e I i] - w Acov( u, z I i)
Pure liquidity traders - (1 - w) ACOV(U, z I i)
Market professionals
Market makers A var( z I i) - cov( i + e, z I i)
The total profit available to the participants is the expected future value of the firm minus the expected cost of
supplying effort.
Lemma 6.7: The total expected profit to stable owners, liquidUy trading owners. pure liquidity traders. market
professionals. corporate managers. and market makers are
(6.1) E[(1 - v) ~i~ I iJ = (1 - v) E[i + e I i].
0-1
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(6.2) [
o n-i _] _
E v l:ii'~ + w l:iif+ll I = vE[i + el Il - wÅO',
ozl d-l
(6.3) E[(l - w) ~liif+l I iJ = - (l - w) Å u,
d-l
(6.4) E[~ii': IiJ = N(r + e)~ (M + 1)2 a2 Å '
(6.5) = M {(M + 1)2 Å e + a2 (r + 71) _ F}, and
M2 (s - l) (M + 1)2 a2 Å
(6.6) E[ fii'~ I iJ = O,
q-l
where a is given by (3.7). a is given by (4.15). and Å is given hy (4.16).
fmQf: Equations (6.1) - (6.6) follow straightforwardly from the setup in table 6.2. Note that this is a special
case of lemma 6.9 with a more elaborate proof given in appendix D. Q.E.D.
As we see, the expected profit of most participants depends, either directly or indirectly through the price
sensitivity, on the managers' cost of supplying an effort different from what is expected.
Corollary 6.6: If w = O.F = O. and either s ~ øo or e = O. the expected profit of market professional n E
{I. 2..... N} and corporate insider m E {I. 2 ..... M} is given hy (4.2.2) and (4.23) respectively. The total
expected profit of the D + l liquidity traders is given hy (4.2.9).
fmQf: This follows straightforwardly from (6.3), (6.4), and (6.5). Q.E.D.
ff it is too costly to surprise the security market by supplying an unexpected effort, this, of course, implies that
the corporate insiders do not profit from effort generated information simply because they do not have any. In
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this case, the price sensitivity (or the bid ask spread) only reflects the adverse selection caused by superior
information about business fluctuations, leaving the market professionals and the liquidity traders with the same
trading cost as in chapter 4.
Proposition 6.4: Ifs increases, the welfare of market professionals, liquidity trading owners, and pure
liquidity traders increases. The welfare of stable owners is unchanged. The welfare of corporate insider may
both increase and decrease. If,for example, s increases from s· (where s· is a large constant), the welfare of
corporateinsidersdecreases.
ftgQf: It follows from (4.15) that A. decreases in s. We see directly from (6.2), (6.3), and (6.4) that the welfare
of liquidity trading owners, pure liquidity traders, and market professionals increases. The welfare of corporate
insiders depends on their two sources of infonnation. If s increases, the expected profit on effort generated
information decreases, but the expected profit on infonnation about random fluctuations increases. However, if
s > S· (suggesting that s has to be large), the expected effect on the expected profit from insider trading on Y
dominates the expected effect on the expected profit from y. Q.E.D.
This suggests that one way of reducing the expected gains which the corporate managers have earned on insider
trading is to make it more costly for them to trade on effort generated information; see section 6.9 for an
approach where the current shareholders control the corporate managers by punish them for unexpected
outcomes.
s.: OPTIMAL CHOICE OF BUSINESS RISK
I have in the previous sections assumed that the risk caused by random business fluctuations is given
exogenously. Nonetheless, the corporate managers may influence these fluctuations through their selection of
new projects. This section is used, within the framework of the outlined model, to discuss how managers
should select new investment projects in order tomaximize their own expected profit by trading in the securities
market.
218
The effort selection problem of corporate manager m E {I, 2, ... , Ml is given by (4.1). It is easy to extend
to a setting which includes a (collective) choice of business risk: represented by r. Thus, the extended decision
problem of manager m is to
(7.1) ~ E[~m [(x + e) - R S] - C(em) I em' c, il,
rElr_.r"",,)
which, according to (6.5), is equivalent to
(7.2)
where the subscript indicates which expressions that depend on r. I have implicitly assumed that there are no
managerial costs of choosing a riskier technology, implying, e.g., that the principals do not punish the
managers for selecting a risky before a safer technology and that there are no reputation effects, and that the
managers' optimal choice of technology, denoted P, is public. Figure 6.3 illustrates the optimal choice of
business risk: given the numerical parameters in table 6.4 (see appendix F).
Business risk
r
Expected
profit
FIGURE 6.3 Optimal choice or
business risk
The optimal strategy is to select the portfolio of projects that makes the finn as risky as possible, meaning that
I'* = rMAX = 4. However, if the managers, as in the next section are punished if they select too risky projects,
their expected profit may decrease in the amount of business risk:.
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Proposition 6.5: The corporate managers tend to select risky projects before safer projects. Thus. pc =
TMAX.
lEm: The price sensitivity tends according to (4.16) to increase with the riskiness of the firm (i.e., d Ar / d r
> O). This means that the first term in (7.2) increases with r. The effect on the second term is more
ambiguous, but the direct effect on r tends to dominate. This implies that also the second term is increasing in
the riskiness of the firm, Q.E.D.
This is consistent with Leftwich and Verrecchia (1983). They conclude that the value of information is an
increasing function of the variance of the outcome. This implies that superior information is generated if
something unexpected happens, and unexpected events such as random business fluctuations happen more often
to risky projects.
This suggests that there is an important difference between information generated through effort and more
random information. The reason is that effort created information may have positive incentive effects which is
hardly obtainable with information not directly controlled by the managers. Regulators hunting illegally trading
insider should therefore concentrate on quasi-insiders such as tippees who have obtained their information
without supplying any effort.
6.8 INSIDER TRADING AS AN INCENTIVE MECHANISM
This section compares the insider trading equilibrium with two related equilibria. They are obtained in a similar
production and exchange setting, except for the fact that insider trading is effectively forbidden (that is, L = B
and Il = O). Instead the corporate managers are compensated through a linear sharing rule, but the securities
market is still open SO that the other traders, including the market professionals trading on private information,
may satisfy their demand. The first of these equilibria is first best efficient (or Pareto-optimal) as the principals
directly observe the abilities of their agents, and pay them just the cost of supplying the desired effort. In the
second equilibrium, the managerial type and thereby their choice of effort are not directly observed by the
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principals. This implies that the principals face both an adverse selection (hidden information) and a moral
hazard problem (hidden action). giving the corporate managers an infonnational advantage which is an
opportunity 10 maximize their own expected profit The principals are assumed 10 effectively prohibit insider
trading. and are instead using a linear sharing rule to motivate the agents to supply the desired level of
productive effort
First best
Now assume that the type or quality of corporate managers and thereby their effort are perfectly observable by
the principals. This suggests that the hired agents have 10 select the effort that maximize the liquidation value
of the firm minus their cost of supplying the desired level of effort In this way. corporate manager m E {l. 2 •
•..• M} has 10
(8.1)
where C(em) is the private cost function given by (4.4). The tenn em in (4.4) may be interpreted as the effort
supplied by a manager of average quality which is assumed 10 be unaffected by actions from the principals. This
assumption means that em is a publicly known constant The first best effort is determined by the first order
condition:
(8.2) 2c-l
2f
This choice of effort is first best efficient (or Pareto-optimal) because the marginal revenue equals the marginal
cost of supplying effort If c is observable. the principals. paying the agents no more than the cost of
supplying the desired level of effort, would like a corporate manager to supply an effort greater than average if
the manager's quality is higher than average (that is when c < O) and vice versa Finally. notice that the first
best effort decreases if the cost of supplying effort increases.
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Second best
Instead assume that the principals cannot directly observe the type or quality of their corporate managers.
However. the principals observe the output at time 1+1 which according to (2.1) is influenced by a random tenn.
Then the principals offer the managers a linear sharing rule. and they accept the offered contract if it gives a
positive expected profit (which means that the participation constraint is fulfilled). In this way. the problem of
manager me (1.2 •...• M) is to
(8.3)
where A. bER. The f1l'S1: order condition gives
(8.4) eO = e -m m
2c-b
2f
The individual second best choice of effort when L= B is normally distributed with expectation em - (2 E[c Il] -
b) 12 f and variance (111)29.
Proposition 6.6: If b < 1. then eOm< e··m, and ifb = 1, eOm= e" m. The expected individual production
increases with b.
fmQf: This follows by comparing equation (8.2) with (8.4). The last sentence follows because d e-m Id b > O.
Q.E.D.
This is a version of the result obtained by HolmstrOm (1979) and Shavell (1979). Proposition 1 in the last
article implies that if the agents are risk neural. there exists a Pareto-optimal fee schedule under which the agents
are paid the outcome minus a constanL
222
L = A vs L = B with an linear outcome-contingent incentive scheme
If insider trading is allowed (L = A), the individual effort of corporate manager m e {l, 2, ... , M} is given by
(4.7). This effort is
(8.5) _* cem = em - ~'
in which f> k (see (4.6» where k is a constant which is determined by market variables such as liquidity and
the number of corporate insiders. \
Proposition 6.7: Suppose/is given by (4.9), then insider trading as an incentive mechanism is firs: best
efficient if
(8.6) 1 - sc = < 0,
2
where s represents the cost o/ surprising the market. Nevertheless, the probability that insider trading is afirst
best efficient incentive scheme is zero.
frgQf: I set (8.5) equal to (8.2), and yield (8.6). Because c is stochastic and continuous, the probability that c
equals one particular value is zero. Q.ED.
If the corporate managers are of this particular quality higher than average, they are induced to supply the first
best effort. Otherwise, their supply is not efficient
Proposition 6.8: Suppose
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(8.7) b > - _2_ E[c I il,
s - 1
then
(8.8)
Nevertheless.for all b,
(8.9)
£mm: These inequalities follow easily from e-m and e*m which are given by equations (8.4) - (8.5). Notice
that
(8.10) [s _ l [- - l k E[c I il bE em I I, L = B = E em I I, L = A + f(f _k) + 2f'
and condition (8.7) follows straightforwardly by setting the two last tenns greater than zero and solve for b.
Q.E.D.
IfE[c Il] = Oand b = O, implementing insider trading as an incentive mechanism gives the same expected effort
as prohibiting insider trading. Nonetheless, if the insiders are initially expected to be of high quality (which
means that E[c Il] <O), insider trading indeed has positive incentive effects, but the same incentive effects can
be obtained without insider trading by increasing b. Finally, notice that the variance of effort always increases
with insider trading.
Iconclude that risk neutral principals prefer insider trading prohibited and replaced by a linear outcome-
contingent incentive scheme A + b (x + e). In addition, it is easy in this risk neutral economy to implement a
first best efficient incentive scheme by setting b = 1. This result contrasts the one obtained by Manne (1966)
who claims that insider trading is an efficient incentive scheme. Nevertheless, insider trading may be desirable
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to risk averse principals because a (1arge) position taken by corporate insiders may improve the risk sharing as
shown by Dye (1984); see chapter 8 for further comments.
(;.9 OPTIMAL CONTROL OF INSIDER TRADING
In this section the cost function given by (4.4) is slightly changed to give further insight into the equilibrium
forces which are present in securities markets allowing insider trading. Specifically the quadratic term in
individual effort is replaced by a quadratic term in output to reflect that the principals may try to confiscate some
of the gains from insider trading. Thus,
(9.1)
inwhich the first term is a fee paid by each manager to the current shareholders for the right of trading on inside
information and the two last terms represent the manager's individual cost of supplying the effort Cm. The
corporate managers have to pay a fee because inside information is expected to have a relatively high value, and
consequently the current shareholders design a mechanism which transfer some of it to them. The part of the
cost function reflecting the cost of effort equals Fif the manager's choice of effort is em which in equilibrium is
the market's expectation about the manager's supply of effort. If the manager is of a type which appreciates
making effort, realized c <O, and if the manager is of a type which does not like to make effort, c > O.
Equilibrium
The trading intensities and the price sensitivity turn out to be identical to the ones produced by the cost function
given by (4.4), but as we shall see, the distribution of expected profit has changed because of the transfer from
corporate managers to their principals.
Lemma 6.8: If (9.1) replaces (4.4) and f is given by (4.9). the equilibrium parameters ø. b, B. tJ. and Å. equal
the ones given in by lemmas 6.4 - 6.5.
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The proof mimics the ones of lemma 6.4 and 6.5 and is therefore omitted. The current shareholders control the
managers' payment through s. They may therefore reduce the effort surprise by increasing s.
Proposition 6.9 By choosing s very large, the current shareholders may eliminate the effort surprise and
thereby the amount of effort generated information.
fmQf: According to (4.11),
(9.2) lim w(s) = O.
• -+-
The effort surprise and the amount of effort generated information are measured by w and are therefore
eliminated. Q.E.D.
Ifs approaches infmity, the corporate managers are forced to stop the production of effort generated information.
They do this by always choosing the action expected by the securities market Nevertheless, the next subsection
shows that such a choice of s is not consistent with a long term equilibrium as corporate managers have no
incentive to participate. But some punishment is always optimal at least to satisfy the viability condition given
by (4.10).
Welfare
Table 6.3 gives the expected profit of all the participants in the production and exchange economy summarized
by lemmas 6.4 - 6.5 when the transfer of money from the managers to the shareholders is taken into
consideration. Compare with table 6.2 above.
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TABLE 6.3: Expected profit
Stable owners (1 - v) {E[x + s I il + Mfvar(x + s I i)},
Liquidity trading owners v {E[ x + e I il + M f var( x + s I i)} - w Å cov( Ii, z I i),
Pure liquidity traders - (1 - w) Å cov(ii, z I i),
Market professionals
Market makers Å var( z I i) - cov( x + e, z I i)
The total expected profit is the outcome at time t+ 1 minus the cost of making effort. Notice, however, that if F
is small, the total cost of making effort is expected to be positive because cov(e.n, c I1) <O. With F small, the
realized cost is always positive in equilibrium as the corporate managers who enjoy making effort (realized c <
O) always supply a positive amount of effort whereas the managers who find effort costly (realized c > O) instead
supply an effort less than expected. A supply less than expected pleases these managers and therefore gives a
positive contribution to the expected welfare.
Lemma 6.9: The total expected profit to stable owners. liquidity trading owners. pure liquidity traders. market
professionals. corporate managers. and marlæt makers are
(9.3) E[(1 - v) t1i~I iJ = (1 - v) {E[X + el il + MS)2 (r + [(M t 1)2~]2 aJ}.
o-l (M + 1 Å M s - 1
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(9.5) E[(1 - w) ~1~+1 I iJ = - (1 - w) Å 0',
d-l
(9.6)
(9.7) = M [(M + 1)2 Å e + a2 (r + 11) - a2 sr _F], and
M2 (s - 1) (M + 1)2 a2 Å
(9.8) E[fi~ Ii] = O,
q-l
where a is given by (3.7), a is given by (4.15), and Å is given by (4.16).
fmQf: See appendix D.
We observe that the expected profit of most participants depends on the current shareholders' punishment of
outcomes different from what is expected.
Corollary 6.7: The expected profit of variaus traders have thefollowing values when s approaches its two
limits:
(9.9) .~or E[(I- v)fi~(s) I iJ -+ + 00,
0..1
..... 1+(M+l' re,M;;
(9.10) + 00,
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(9.11)
[
D+l ]lim E (I - W)2,i~+l(S) I i = - (I - W) O" limA(S) < O,
• -+ - d.l .-+-
[
D~ Jlim 9 E (I - W)2,~+l(S) I i ~-00,
......l+(M+l)re dzl
~Ma
(9.12) lim E[f~(s) I iJ = r limp(s) > O,
• .....- D-l N r + (M + I) (r + 77)a ......-
[
N ]lim E 2,i:(s) I i = O,
......l+(M+l)re DzllM;;
(9.13) .~ E[fi!(s) I iJ ~ - 00, and lim 9 E[fi!(S) I iJ ~ + 00.
mzl ......l+(M+l)re m=l
~Ma
fmQf: According to (4.16),
(9.14) r ~N (r + e) + M (r + 77)al, andlim A(S) = ---:------:----:--
......- Nr + (M + I)(r + 77)a O"
lim A(S) ~ + 00•
......l+(M+l)re~Ma
The limits (9.9) - (9.13) follow directly by taking the respective limits of (9.3) - (9.7), being aware of the two
limits for A.. Q.ED.
When insider trading is allowed, then according to (4.10), the current shareholders have to punish corporate
managers if the future value of the firm differs from what is expected by the market before trading to obtain a
viable equilibrium. This means that current shareholders have to determine S at time t-4 presumably to
maximize their expected profit, The result above indicates that the optimal selection of S is s* = 1+ (M + I)
(9 IM a)lfl or s* ~ 00, but this is not the ease.
Proposition 6.10: Jf s = 1 + (M + 1) (a I M 0")112 or s ~ 00, then the market given by corollaries 63 -
6.4 collapses.
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~: If s approaches its lower limit, the market collapses because the pure liquidity traders expect to lose an
infmite amount of money caused by the faet that the equilibrium bid ask spread approaches infmity (see (9.11)
and (9.14». Losing an infinite amount is not consistent with equilibrium behavior. If s approaches infinity,
the corporate managers expect to lose an infmite amount of money (see (9.13». This means that there are
nobody who are willing to aet as corporate managers. Q.E.D.
The non-existence of an equilibrium at the limits suggests that current shareholders have to detennine s within
certain bounds.
Optimal selection or s
The structure of the scheme punishing the corporate managers for unexpected outcomes is given by the first
term in (4.4) where f is assumed to satisfy (4.9). This implies that the only parameter left for the current
shareholders to decide is s. In this way, their maximization problem is
(9.15) Max e E[i + e + ( M ~1 (i + e - E[i + e I i]r + w li (i + s - R S) I iJ,
• > l+(M+l)~ M+ 1 .t
subject to the participation constraints
(9.17)
The first term in the objective function is the future value of the firm, the second term is the transfer from the
corporate managers to compensate for personal use of inside information, and the third term is the expected
trading profit of owners trading as liquidity traders. Thus, all these factors are taken into account when the
current shareholders determine s.
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Condition (9.16) is the participation constraint of corporate managers. The first tenn is the profit from
insider trading, the second term is the amount paid for the privilege of insider trading, and the last tenn is the
cost of supplying effort. In this way, rational behavior means that corporate managers will only participate if
they expect to profit from such behavior. Condition (9.17) is the participation constraint of pure liquidity
traders. This condition turns out to be necessary to preclude destabilizing control strategies, and the maximum
amount of money theyare willing to pay for satisfying their liquidity needs is denoted u.
The optimal control policy s* is either an inner optimum or on one of the boundaries. Mter studying the
problem numerically, the fust order condition to (9.15) produces a minimum, implying that s* lies on one of
the boundaries.
Lemma 6.10: Suppose U> U', then there exists an optimal control policy s* E [Smill. smaJ determmed by
current shareholders such tha: their control problem given by (9.15) - (9.17) is maximised. The lower limit
Smi" is determined such thas (9.17) holds with equality whereas the upper limit SmIJ% is the largest S such that
(9.16) holds with equality. Jf U> U":!!!U' (where U' and U" are constants). then
(9.18) s* = smin = 1 + (M + 1) e
:fmQf: See appendix E.
We see that current shareholder should increase the price of allowing insider trading if, for instance, the
uncertainty about the managerial quality increases. This is because greater uncertainty about managerial quality
leads to more effort generated information which may subsequently be used to generate more expected profit on
insider trading.
Corollary 6.8: Jf U ~ "". then s* = 1 + (M + 1) (a I M (1)1/2.
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IE2f: This follows directly from (9.18). Q.E.D.
If the pure liquidity traders trade whatever the market conditions are, e* is to destabilize the market to earn
unbounded profiL When Cl» ~ 00, the market is called unstable.
Corollary 6.9: If U > U", then
(9.19)
where a is given by (3.7) and a is given by (4.15). The trading intensities are B = ap, b = a p, and
(9.20)
(1 - w) O'
p = (M + 1)aU .
The price sensitivity is
(9.21) A.= U
(1 - w) 0"
fmgf: IfU> U", (9.17) holds and I insert (9.18) into (4.11), (4.14), and (4.16), and obtain equations (9.19)-
(9.21). Q.E.D.
We observe that when the participation constraint of pure liquidity traders is binding, the variance of total effort
does not depend on the uncertainty about the quality of corporate managers. Instead it depends on parameters
such as w and U which detennine the constraint (9.17).
Proposition 6.11: Suppose U > U", then
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(9.22) d~ > O ~ > O d~ > O d~ d~da ' dw ' dU ' du < O, and d[Ål _ limÅl] > O.
0-+-
~: This follows from differentiating (9.19) with respect to the relevant variables. Note that
(9.23)
where lim.__ I.. is the price sensitivity in a corresponding security market with no effort generated infonnation
(see (9.14) or (2.3.8». Q.E.D.
The variability of managerial effort increases when the component in the bid ask spread reflecting effort
generated information increases. This is because the corporate managers have to generate more infonnation for a
given level of expected profit if the component in the spread reflecting effort generated infonnation for some
reason increases.
(;.10 SHORT SUMMARY OF MAJOR CONCLUSIONS
I have found that there under certain conditions exists a production and exchange economy with insider trading as
the mechanism promoting managerial effort. My findings show that compensation through insider trading
motivates half of the corporate managers to supply an effort greater than expected whereas the other half is
motivated to supply an effort less than expected. The average effort depends on the market's pre-trade
expectation about effort which again depends on the public expectations about the ability of managers. A higher
pre-trade expectation leads to a higher average effort, reflecting that the shareholders should set high standards for
their managers. This symmetty in effort choices suggests that insider trading as an incentive mechanism is not
very effective, and insider trading may very easily be dominated by other incentive mechanisms such as linear
outcome-contingent schemes.
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APPENDICES
This section contains the proofs of the lemmas which are not proved directly in the sections which they are
presented.
Appendix A Proof of lemma 6.1
I start by deriving the trading strategy of the corporate insiders trading on both effort generated information and
information about random business fluctuations. Secondly. I find the trading strategy of the market
professionals trading solelyon information about random business fluctuations simply by adjusting the
corresponding trading strategy derived in the proof of lemma 2.1. Thirdly. the response of the price setting
market makers is derived. Finally. the closed fonn solutions of the trading intensities and the price sensitivity
given in lemma 6.1 are found.
A 1 The trading strategy of the corporate insiders
The portfolio-selection problem of insider m E {l. 2 ••..• M} is given by (2.11). I insert the price function
given by (AI7) below and provide this equivalent problem.
whereIm represents the manager's inside infonnation and I represents public infonnation (that is. I = {y*=y*.
s=r: ....} and 1m = (y. Y}). The corporate manager observes the realizations of the public signals y* and y. and
then fonns a stochastic trading strategy which depends on private information represented by the signals y and Y
(see figure 6.1 for the sequence of events). It is straightforward to come from (AI) to the following problem.
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The first order condition is
or
(A4) . _ 1 ([ _] ]) 1 [ N _ M-l_ _ ]åm = - E x + e I 1m, I - E[X + e I I - - E ~ Bn + ~ åm I 1m, I .
2 Å 2 DKI m-I
Note that the second order condition is - 2 Å < O. This means that Å > O to obtain a viable equilibrium. The
next step is to simplify the expectations. It is sttaightforward to show that
(AS) [
_] cov(x+e,YIY,I)(_ [_ ])
Ex + e 11m, I = E[x + s I I] + (_ _) Y - E Y I y, I
var Y I y, I
cov(x+e,YIY,I)(_ [__ ])
+ (_ _) y - E y I Y, I ,and
var y I Y, I
I insert (AS) and (A6) into (A4). The result is
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- 1(A7)å =-m 2Å
( (
N _ M-l_) _ )
cov e - Å L 6n + Låm , Y ly, I
n-l _ mal (V _ E[V Iy, Il)
var(Y I y, I)
( (
N _ M-l_) _)
cov i - Å L 6n + Låm ,y lY, I
+ n-l _mal (y _ E[y I V, I])
var(y I Y, I)
The corporate manager is rational and therefore foresee the structure of the market professionals' trading
strategies given by (3_1)_ This means that
[
N _ M-l_ ]
(A8) E I6n + I åm I I = O,
n-l mal
(A9) COV(i - Å (fOn + !åm), y I v, I) = r - (N fJ r + (M - 1) B (r + 71»)Å, and
n-l mal
( (
N _ M-l_) _ )
(AlO) cove - Å I6n + Iåm ,Yl y, I = «I» - (M - l)B(fl> + l)Å_
n-l m-l
Now I insert (AS), (A9), and (AlO) into (A7) and yield
(All) - 1å =-
m 2 Å
«I» - (M - 1) b (fl> + l) Å (V _ E[V I - I])
(fl> + l) y, +
r - (N P r + (M - 1)B (r + 71»)Å (_ [_ _ ])
()
y - E Y I Y, I
r+71
or the trading strategy is as it is given by (3_2)_ The trading intensities are
(A12) «I»b = ,and
(M + 1)(<<1» + l) Å
(A13) B = (1 - N fJ Å) r
(M+, l)(r + 71)Å -
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A2 Trading strategy of market professionals
I find the trading strategy of the market professionals simply by extending (2.3.1) to the case where Cl> > O. But
since the professionals do not observe effort generated information, the new trading strategy equals (3.1) where
the trading intensity is (see (2.A29»
(A14)
(1 - MBA.) r
p = [(N + 1)r + 2 el A. •
Note, however, that the price sensitivity (and thereby the trading intensity) will be different here than in chapter
2.
A3 The price response of market makers
The Q price setting market makers are forced by the competition in the dealership market to set the bid ask
spread so low that they make zero expected profil In this way, the equilibrium condition in the dealership
market is
(AlS) E[-z((i + e) - RS)li,I] = O,
where the conditioned z is the information obtained from observing the order flow time l This suggests that the
market makers face an adverse selection or a differentiation problem to the pricing of securities. This price
function follows directly from (AlS).
(AI6) S = .!. E[i + e I i, Il,
R
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(Al?) s = .!. {E[x + el Il + A.i},
R
where the sensitivity of the market price toward changes in the equilibrimn order flow is
(AI8) A. = cov(x + e, i I I)
var(i I I)
The equilibrimn order flow is pooled so the price setting market makers cannot distinguish orders coming from
uninformed liquidity traders from orders coming from informed speculators. Thus,
(AI9)
N_ M_
i = L9n + Låm + u.
n-l m-I
I insert (3.1) and (3.2) and get
(A20)
N
i = Mbe + (Np + MB)x + PLeD + MBh + MbI + u
-MbE[eIY·=Y·] - (Np + MB)E[xIY*=y*].
The next step is to insert this into (A18). The result is
(A2l) A.= ~p+M~r+Mb~
M2b2 (cl» + l) + (NP + M B)2r + N p2 e + M2B271+ a·
A4 Closed form solutions
I insert (A14) into (A13) and get
(A22) B = ar
[Nr + (M + l)(r + 71)a] A.'
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where a is given by (3.7). I insert this into (AI4) and the result is
(A23) p = [Nr + (M + l)(r + 7])aJA.·
r
The nest step is to substitute (A22) and (A23) into (A2I) which yields (3.9) after some straightforward but
tedious algebraic simplifications. I then substitute (3.9) into (AI2). (A22). and (A23) to get (3.3). (3.4). and
(3.5). This completes the proof of lemma 6.1.
Appendix B Proof of lemma 6.2
IfL = A. the effort-selection problem of manager m E {l. 2•...• Ml is at time L, given by (4.1). I insert the
ttading strategy given by (3.2) and the price function given by (3.8). The result is
(Bl) ~ E[b (Y - E[Y I y.=y.]) (x + e) - {E[x + e I Il + Ai}) I em. il +
E[B(Y - E[xly*=y*])(x + e)-{E[x + ell] + Ai}) I em' i] - E[C(em)lem,c,i],
where z is given by (A20). The manager's expected profit is the sum of the expected profit from trading on
effort generated information and privileged information correlated with business fluctuations minus the expected
costs of effort.
Ifmd that (see (4.A6»
(B2) E[B (y- E[x I y* = y*]) (x +e)-{E[x + el 1]+ Ai}) I em, il = cov(B y, (x +e)- li I em' i)
= B [r - A (N P + MB) r + MB 7])] = a
2
(r + 7]) r
2
2'
[N r + (M + l)(r + 7]) a1 l
where I have inserted (A22) and (A23). Because the corporate manager's two sources of information are
uncorrelated, the expected profit from trading on IaDdom fluctuations does not depend on the manager's choice of
effort.
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Effort generated information represented by the signal Y gives the corporate manager the following expected
profit,
where z' is the remaining order flow. This simplifies to
(BS)
(B6)
The next step is to insert (BS) and (B6) into (B4). The result is
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(B?)
I then differentiate with respect to em and get
This implies that the corporate manager is assumed to recognize that bis choice of individual effort affects the
transaction price, the effort choice of other managers, and the expectation about effort among outsiders (see
comments in appendix C).
I insert (AI2) and end up with
The manager's choice of effort is determined by the first order condition of the manager's effort-selection
problem given by (Bl). By using (B9), I get (4.2). The second order condition is given by (4.3) where d2 E[em
Il] Id em2 = Obecause E[em Il] obviously have to be a linear function in em. This completes the proof of
lemma6.2.
Appendix C Proof of lemma 6.3
If the cost function is given by (4.4), its expectation given available information at time '-4 (when the effort
decision ismade) is
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where conditioned c and em mean that the corporate manager knows bis quality or type and thereby his own
individual effort. but to outsiders such as price setting market makers c and em are stochastic variables. This
implies that
(C2)
I differentiate with respect to em and obtain
(C3)
I insert this into (4.2) and solve for em where E[E[em I 1]] = em because of rational expectations. The double
expectation is used because em is determined at time l4 just before the signal y. is revealed to the public. The
result is
(C4)
I assume that there is only one type of managers in each firm. This assumption makes the optimal choice of
effort consistent with the information structure in trading equilibrium (see (2.6» and to the chosen equilibrium
concept (see appendix B). The total effort is therefore known to each manager at time t-4 because e = M em.
Given this assumption, the individual effort given by (4.7) follows from (C4). Outsiders do not observe em and
individual effort is therefore a normally distributed variable with expectation em and the variance given by (4.8).
This completes the proof of lemma 6.3.
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Appendix D Proor or lemma 6.9
The expected profits of the participants are summarized in table 6.3. Stable owners have two SOUICeS of income
which are their initial position and their share of the transfer from the managers for the privilege of trading on
inside infonnation. Thus,
(Dl) E[(l - vrti~ I i] = (1 - v){E[X + e I i] + Ms 2 (r + <I»}.
o-l (M + 1) A.
I insert Ml var(e.n Il) where var(e.n Il) is given by (4.8), and yield (9.3). The liquidity trading owners have also
two sources of income, but they have to pay a cost for changing their initial position at time t. This means
that
(D2) [
o D+l _J { _ MS}
E vL i~+ wL ~+l I I = v E[x + e I I] + 2 (r + <1» - w A.0'.
~ ~ ~+QA.
I substitute in for <I> and yield (9.4). The pure liquidity traders have no initial position. But they have to pay a
cost for taking long or short positions in security k at time lo and (9.5) follows straightforwardly. The market
professionals expect to profit from their trading because they observe a private signal correlated with the random
business fluctuations which influence the future value of security k. I find that (see (4.AIO»
(D3) E[fi~liJ = Np{r - A. [(NP + MB)r + pe]).
n-l
I insert (3.5) and (A23). Mter straightforward simplifications, the result is given by (9.6). The expected profit
of corporate insiders comes from inside information, but is reduced by the transfer to the owners and the cost of
making effort
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(D4) E[fi!: li] = M[B{r _ Å [(NP + MB)r]}_ sr 2 ]_ M(l - s)et» _ [F - J.
m-l + MBll (M + 1) Å (M + 1)2 Å 2...}4.>e
linsen (3.5), (A23), and (4.8) where l = o and f is given by (4.9). The result given by (9.7) appears after
straightforward calculations. The market makers are assumed to earn zero expected profit which gives (9.8)
directly. This completes the proof of lemma 6.9.
Appendix E Proor or lemma 6.10
First, consider the problem without the participation constraints
(El) ( [ 2 ]2 )Max E[x + s I il + Ms 2 r + (M + 1) Å e - w Å 0'.I> l+(M+ll.J! (M + 1) Å M (s - 1)
When s approaches its lower limit or infinity, the value of the objective function approaches infinity (as is the
case with (9.10) when v = 1). This means that the first order condition produces at least one minimum on the
range (1 + (M + 1) (9 IM 0)1!2, 00), and ifthere exists a local maximum, a larger value can be found near one
of the limits.
Ifwe add (9.17), then s· ~ Smin where Smin is unique and given by (9.18). I fmd (9.18) by solving (9.17)
holding with equality. Finally, if we add (9.16), s· < 00 because otherwise (9.16) does not hold. This implies
that s* E [Smin, Smax < 00] where Smax is the largest S where (9.16) holds. According to (9.13), smax must
exist. Now define U E R+ such that when U ~ U, smin S Smax and when U <U, Smin > Smax' If the latter
is the case, the equilibrium does not exist because the two participation constraints cannot be satisfied
simultaneously. If (9.16) holds with equality only when S = smax, then the constraint holds on the whole
interval from Smin to Smax. This seems always to be the case when I analyze the problem numerically, but I
have not been able (or rather bothered) to prove it in general. If U is large, s* = Smin because smin is near the
lower limit 1 + (M + 1) (9 I M 0)1(2 and the maximum is on the limit set by (9.17). Let U' be the lowest U
where s· = Smin. This completes the proof of lemma 6.10.
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Appendix F Example
The following numerical values are used in figures 62 - 6.3 to illustrate the equilibrium in the production and
exchange economy given by lemma 6.3 - 6.4.
rrABLE 6.4: Numerical values
r = 2 N = 2 F = O
e = 2 M = 10 em = l
e = 2 a = l E[e I I] = O
71 = l s = 7.5
With this set of numerical parameters, s has to be greater than 5.919 to obtain a viable insider trading
equilibrium.
REFERENCES
Ausubel, L. M., 1990, "Insider Trading in a Rational Expectations Economy," American Economic Review, 1022 -
1041.
Dennert, J., 1990, "Insider Trading and the Allocation of Risks," Discussion Paper #17, London School of
Economics.
Dye, R., 1984, "Insider Trading and Incentives," Journal of Business, 295 - 313.
Easterbrook, F. H., 1985, "Insider Trading as an Agency Problem," Chapter 4 in J. Pratt and R. Zeckhauser,
"Principals and Agents: The Structure of Business," Harvard Business School Press, 81 - 100.
Fishman, M. J., and K. M. Hagerty, 1992, "Insider Trading and the Efficiency of Stock Prices," Rand Journal of
Economics, 106 - 122.
Holmstrom, B., 1979, "Moral Hazard and Observability," Bell Journal of Economics, 74 - 91.
Holmstrom, B., 1982, "Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective," In "Essays in Economics and
Management in Honor of Lars Wahlbeck," Swedish School of Economics.
Leftwich, R. W., and R. E. Verrecchia, 1983, "Insider Trading and Managers' Choice Among Risky Projects,"
Working Paper #63, Center of Research in Security Prices, Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago.
245
Leland, H. E., 1992, "Insider Trading: Should it be Prohibited?" Journal of Political Economy, 859 - 887.
Manne, H. G., 1966, "Insider Trading and the Stock Market," Free-Press.
Manove, M., 1989, "The Hann from Insider Trading and Informed Speculation," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 823 -
845.
Shavell, S., 1979, "Risk Sharing and Incentives in the Principal and Agent Relationship," Bell Journal of Economics,
55 - 73.
246
SYMBOL GLOSSARY
OF PART In
(see also the symbol glossary of part IT)
a 205,212 ecm 190
a 164,205 em 208
A 222
e'm 167,168,207
A 163
e·m 167,169,207,209,210
b 204
b 222 e··m 168
p 163,179,204,211,232 C'tm 168, 169
B 164,204 en 201
B 164 e 201
c 167,208 f,F 208,209
c, c' 167, 176
ell 199
c-, c-', c·· 185 4> 200,210,232
CO 167,173,208 g 200
d 202 y, y*, y**, y' 184,185,186,200
cit 168 r,rMIN,rMAX,r* 164,200,219
a 199 h 200
D 202 Tl, Tl*, Tl**, Tl' 184,185,186,200
DO 185 i 200
Am 163,201, 204 l 200
e,e* 163, 166, 170, 199 I,1m 201
ec 190 j 200
em 166,206, 207
247
q> 200 Smin, Smax, s* 231
k 163, 199 a, ad 202
k, k', k" 174, 176
S 164, 167,205
k·,k·',k" 185, 186
t 163, 199
K 163,199
1.1,1.2, 1.3, •.. 165,203
KO 177
K 177
T, Tk 163, 199
A 164,179,205,212,232 u, Ud 202
L 163,164 U, U, U' 230,231
m 201 v 202
mx, Ille 170, 199 V*, VO 170,172,173
1.1 166 w 202
1.1*,1.1** 173, 174, 182, 186 W, WI, W2, w3, W4 181
1.1' 174, 182, 185 WO 181
J.1v 175 x 163, 199
M 166,201 Y 200
n 201 Yn 201
N 201 Y* 200
v,v* 184, 185 ye 200
1rJ>, 7tnN,1too, 1tqQ 181,216,217 Y 200
1tjl,1tmM 168, 181, 217
'1', '1'., '1" 169, 176,215
z 202
q 202
On 163,202,204
Q 202
e 208
R 164
s 180
S, S· 209,218
248
PART IV
OTHER EXTENSIONS
249
250
CHAPTER 7
INSIDER TRADING IN AN IMPERFECTLY
COMPETITIVE MARKET WITH RISK AVERSE
AGENTS
First draft: November 1990,
Current revision: December 1992.
ABSTRACT
A change in the secllrily fIIIlI'/cetlaw from allowing to banning insider trading is shown to affect the expected profil and
the risk exposure of all the traders. TaJr.e,for instance, the IUlinfoT'l'Måand semi-rationalliqllidity traders whose welfare
depends on their expected trading costs and the risA:of trading at a price different from the ftltllre valMeof the secllrily.
The expected trading cost is determined by the eqll.ilibrilllllbid ask spread and their trading vollUlle.where the spread
depends on adverse selection and risk compensation. As in previous chapters. the adverse selection component is
catUed by the price dijferenJialion problem of fIIIlI'ut makers. It may either increase or decrease with the supply of
corporate insiders. depending on the change in the insiders' marut power. However. the risk compensation
component is catUed by the aversion of mm/cet makers towards variations in the price deviation. It is shown to be
reduced by insider trading. This is because corporate insiders improve the informativeness of the pooled order flow.
and thereby reduce the risA:of taking the opposite position vis-a-vis the traders. Insider trading has also a desirable
effect on the liqll.idilytraders' risk premi&unbecatUe corporate insiders tend to bring the transaction price nearer to its
lUIderlying valMebased on privileged inj'ormalion. This sllggests that the welfare of liquidity traders are improved by
intensive insider trading.
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7.1 INTRODUCTION
I extend the risk neutral and imperfectly competitive market characterized by lemma 2.1 to a corresponding
economy where all the participants are risk averse. This means that the difference between this and the previous
approach is that now the participants demand risk premia to compensate for the risk of losing money on their
uncovered positions.
Market makers
I assume that there are price taking behavior in the dealership market, resulting in a sort of Bertrand price
competition among the limited number of price setting market makers (see, e.g., Fudenberg and Tirole (1991),
page 12). This means that the market makers are satisfied with earning zero expected utility which in tum
indicates that their expected welfare is not affected by changes in the activities of corporate insiders. However,
risk averse market makers expect to earn a positive expected proflt to compensate for the risk of always taking
the opposite position vis-a-vis the various demanders of immediacy. This trading risk is caused by variations in
the difference between the transaction price and its future value, and compensation takes place through the
equilibrium bid ask spread. In this way, there are two components in the quoted bid ask spread, one reflecting
the adverse selection problem and one reflecting the risk compensation.
Liquidity traders
The risk adjusted trading cost of semi-rational noise or liquidity ttaders equals the expected trading cost plus an
appropriate risk premium. The expected trading cost depends on the equih'brium bid ask spread and the trading
volume, whereas the risk premium depends on risk aversion and the trading risk. This implies that the risk
adjusted trading cost is a tax on liquidity traders that subsidizes the acquisition of private information and its
subsequent dissemination through the price system (see, e.g., Kyle (1989b), page 159). The importance of the
bid ask spread when evaluating the desirability of insider trading is recognized by, e.g., King and ROell (1988),
pages 169 - 170.
252
If the supply of corporate insiders increases, the adverse selection problem faced by the price setting market
makers depends on whether the entering new insiders have additional non-public information or they just
compete with existing insiders. But an additional supply of corporate insiders reduces the risk compensation of
market makers because informed trading reduces the trading risk. The reason is that insider trading reveals
information through the net order flow which in tum reduces the uncertainty of the future value of the security
and thereby the uncertainty associated with current trading. These effects suggest that insider trading tends to
reduce the bid ask: spread and consequently the expected trading cost of liquidity traders. Nevertheless, if the
supply of insiders is relatively small (e.g., shifting from zero to one), the spread and the expected trading cost
may increase due to the arrival of new non-public information.
Risk averse liquidity traders also take into account their risk exposure. It depends on their risk aversion and
their trading risk where the risk in tID1l depends on their position in the securities market and the variance of the
difference between the current price and its future value. If insider trading expands, there are two effects on the
variance of the pricing error. Insider trading reveals information about the future value of the security, reducing
the fundamental uncertainty, and drives the current price nearer to its underlying fundamental, reducing the
possibilities that the price at which the liquidity traders trade are influenced by uncertainty generated by noise.
This indicates that an increase in the supply of corporate insiders has a desirable effect on the risk exposure of
liquidity traders.
I have argued that insider trading tends to decrease the expected trading cost and the trading risk of liquidity
traders. The weight of these two effects, working in the same direction, depends on the risk aversion. If,for
instance, the liquidity traders are relatively risk averse, the effect on their trading risk is important for the net
effect on their risk adjusted trading cost In this way, relatively risk averse discretionary liquidity traders want to
trade in markets, securities, and periods where the risk of trading is low. This suggests that viable equilibria are
to some extent dispersed and not concentrated, because the trading risk makes it desirable to trade together with
informed traders such as corporate insiders and avoid trading together with too many noise traders. Noise traders
create noise trader risk which increases the trading risk.
A major problem with liquidity traders is that the size of their trades are given as noise determined outside
the equilibrium, and the only remaining decision is for the discretionary liquidity traders to decide where and
when to execute their orders. If the trading cost of fully rational noise traders increases due to informed trading
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which erodes market liquidity, their trading would. as suggested by Kyle (1989, page 159), be reduced as part of
the equilibrium. This is exactly what happens to the endogenously determined trading by the rational hedgers in
Spiegel and Subrahmanyam (1992). The reason is reduced risk sharing possibilities due to reveJation of superior
information.
Corporate insiders
The risk adjusted profit of the corporate insiders equals the expected profit from insider ttading minus an
appropriate risk premium. The expected profit depends on the covariance between their trading strategy and the
pricing error, whereas the appropriate risk premium depends on their risk aversion and the risk associated with
insider trading.
If the supply of perfectly camouflaged and illegally trading insiders increases, the covariance between their
trading strategy and the pricing error decreases. This is because of the reduction in the pricing error due to the
infonnation revealed to the price setting market makers through the influence of corporate insiders on the net
order flow. Hence, competition among the corporate insiders decreases the expected profit generated by trading
on inside infonnation. Risk averse insiders take also the risk of trading into account. and if their supply
increases, their risk exposure is reduced because of the reduction in the pricing error due to infonnation leakages
to the price setting market makers.
I have identified two effects on the risk adjusted profit of corporate insiders and argued that they are working
in opposite directions. The net effect is influenced by their risk aversion, but even if the insiders are reJatively
risk averse, the effect on expected profit dominates. This suggests that corporate insiders, who are able to uade
illegally without being discovered and punished. prefer insider trading prohibited and enfm:ec1. However, this
does not necessarily imply that all insiders prefer a ban on insider trading because if some of them are prevented
from ttading by the surveillance of the stock market regulators, they do not expect to earn any supernormal
profit at all.
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Market professionals
The risk adjusted profit of quasi-insiders such as the privately infonned market professionals equals the expected
profit minus an appropriate risk premium. The expected profit depends on the covariance between their trading
sttategyand the pricing error, while the risk premium depends on the professionals' risk aversion and their
ttading risk.
The expected profit of market professionals tends to decrease with the number of corporate insiders when
this number is small, but tends to increase for larger supply. The first effect is caused by an increase in the
direct competition among the two types of superiorly infonned speculators, whereas the second effect is caused
through the reduction in the adverse selection problem of the price setting market makers (see section 4.3 for
further elaborations). On the other hand, risk averse market professionals also take into account that insider
trading tends to reduce their trading risk and therefore their risk exposure. This is because insider ttading tends to
reduce the variability of the pricing error.
In this way, there is a trade-off between the effect on expected profit and the effect on risk exposure. The
importance of these two effects on the risk adjusted profit of market professionals is detennined by their risk
aversion. For instance, if the professionals are relatively risk averse, the positive effect on risk exposure tends
to be important, and reduces the usually negative effect on expected profit which in turn leads to an increase in
the expected risk adjusted profil Nevertheless, the market professionals tend to prefer insider ttading outlawed
and the law effectively enforced.
Notice that the quasi-insiders are not "arbitrageurs" so they must not be confused with such traders studied
in most previous research on insider ttading regulations (see, e.g., Leland (1992), page 863). The ttading
sttategies of arbitrageurs are generally detennined on the basis of public infonnation generated by correctly
anticipating or observing the equilibrium price. Inmy model, there is no arbittage because there is nothing to
gain by following trading sttategies based on any public infonnation or the current ttansaction price. This is
because the transaction price is set by competitive market makers trading away all such gains in the dealership
market.
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On some of the other studies on insider trading
This chapter is closely related to the literature on risk averse and imperfecdy competitive markets like Admati
and Pfleiderer (1988a) and Subrahmanyam (1991). None of these articles, though, deal with insider trading
regulations per se, but their financial market approach is in my view the best approach to analyze regulations on
the use of various types of information. Their equilibrium restated in corollary 7.1 is a special cases of my
equilibrium given by lemma 7.1.
InAdmati and Pfleiderer (1988a) there are no market professionals only corporate insiders. The risk averse
insideJs observe a common signal, and submit orders, together with the orders from the liquidity traders, to the
risk neutral and competitive market makers whose duty is to set the market clearing price. The linear and
imperfecdy competitive equilibrium has no closed form solution, but is characterized by a fifth-order equation.
Their findings suggest that the total value of inside information may increase in the number of informed traders
because of a better allocation of risk. However, the value of information to each trader tends to decrease because
of increased competition. This indicates that banning insider trading increases the individual welfare of illegally
trading insiders, but may reduce their total welfare. Admati and Pfleiderer also observe that if the number of
speculators is small, the effect of risk sharing is stronger, while if the number of speculators is large, the
competition effect is stronger. This indicates that there is a trade-off between coordination, i.e., less
competition, and risk sharing when evaluating the desirability of prohibiting insider trading. These effects are,
of course, present in my more general version of their trading model.
Subrahmanyam (1991) focuses on the trading cost of uninformed liquidity traders in a trading model
identical to the one in Admati and Pfleiderer (1988a), except that he extends the analysis to the case of risk
averse market makers. The properties of the equilibrium such as liquidity and price efficiency are analyzed, and
the most interesting welfare result is that when the information acquisition is endogenous, Subrahmanyam finds
that the trading cost of liquidity traders is not always monotonically declining in the amount of noise trading.
This suggests that if liquidity traders are able to time their trades, they may prefer to trade in a dispersed fasbion
as opposed to their behavior in the concentrated trading equilibrium of Admati and Pfleiderer (1988b).
Nevertheless, as long as there is at least one corporate insider, it is optimal to trade together with as many
insideJs as possible. This implies that uninformed and risk neutralliquidity traders may prefer insider trading
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allowed.
My study confirms the skepticism towards insider trading found in the previous literature focusing directly
on whether such trading should be prohibited or not, Leland (1992). for instance. concludes on page 862 that if
the investment is inflexible to changes in the current stock price. the net welfare of the participants tends to be
lower when insider trading is permitted where. according to his table on page 877. corporate insider gains but
arbitrageurs and liquidity traders lose. The main difference between his approach and mine is that Irecognize
competition among the corporate insiders.
The rest of the chapter proceeds as follows. The next section is used to discuss the additional assumptions
needed to extend from the risk neutral market characterized by lemma 2.1 to lemma 7.1 characterizing the
corresponding risk averse market Unfortunately. the risk averse equilibrium has no closed form solution so I
have to analyze it numerically. Ianalyze the properties of lemma 7.1 in sections four. five. and six. focusing
on the effects on the trading intensities. the price sensitivity. and the market efficiency respectively. The effects
caused by insider trading regulations on the welfare of corporate insiders. quasi-insiders like market
professionals. and uninformed liquidity traders are analyzed in sections seven and eighl Finally. seetion nine
concludes the chapter. The numerical values used in the example and the formal proofs of some of the lemmas
are found in the appendices.
7.2 ASSUMPTIONS
Idraw on the multi-period. multi-seeurity market specified in sections 2.2 - 2.3 and extend it to a corresponding
economy where the corporate insiders. the market professionals. the liquidity traders. and the price setting market
makers are all risk averse.
In this setting. rational behavior implies that market professional n e {l. 2•...• N} maximizes expected
utility given diverse information represented by the signal YD. Iassume that the professional's utility function
is
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(2.1)
where 9n (x - R S) is the professional' s final wealth and PN is the common risk aversion coefficient of all the
market professionals trading in security k E {l,2, •.., K} at the auction at time te {O, l, •.., Tk-1}. In this
way, the utility function is exponential which means that U' > O,U" < O, and - U" IU' = PN (i.e., U is of the
CARA-class).
The professional's portfolio-selection problem consists of finding the ttading strategy 9n which maximizes
the certainty equivalent or the risk adjusted profit, and it becomes quite easy because of the exponential utility
function and nonna1ly distributed variables:
(2.2)
where On is the optimal ttading strategy which at time t-1 is submitted, together with the orders from the other
secmity ttaders, to the price setting market makers. Notice that the ttading strategy of market professionals is
independent of their initial wealth (here nonna1ized to zero) because of exponential utility function (and normally
distributed variables).
In the same way, corporate insider m E {l, 2, •.., M} maximizes his or her risk adjusted profit given the
information represented by their common signal y. Again the utility fnnction is assumed to be exponential,
leading to the following portfolio-selection problem.
(2.3) Max E[åm (i - RS) I y, y*=y*] - PM2 var(åm (i - RS) I y, y*=y*),A.
where PM is the common risk aversion coefficient of all corporate insiders, and 4m is the insider's ttading
strategy which at time LI is submitted, together with orders from the other ttaders, to the price setting market
makers.
The liquidity traders have not acquired private infonnation correlated with the future value of the finn and are
assumed to determine the size of their ttades outside the model. Nevertheless, the D discretionary liquidity
ttaders are risk averse and evaluate the risk adjusted cost of trading a random amonnt of shares before they choose
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strategically in which securities and periods to trade, This suggests that discretionary liquidity traders maximize
the certainty equivalent given public information and the information generated by their own ttades by choosing
the securities and periods to trade. Hence. the liquidity traders are semi-rational, The risk adjusted trading profit
of liquidity trader d E (1. 2•...• D} equals
(2.4)
where 'Ild is the discretionary liquidity trader's planned trade and PD is the common risk aversion coefficient of all
liquidity traders. After calculating the certainty equivalent trading costs for every k and t and given their
intervals of discretion. the liquidity traders choose in which securities and periods to trade. and submit their
random orders to the dealers. In models where risk averse traders have initial positions in the risky assets. there
might exist a Nash equilibrium without noise as in Bossaerts and Hughson (1991) and in Spiegel and
Subrahmanyam (1992). In the next chapter. a similar setting is rigged by replacing the irrationalliquidity
traders with mtional and wealth maximizing hedgers.
As in Subrahmanyam (1991). the market makers are also assumed to be risk averse. and by assuming
competitive behavior in the dealership market, the dealers or market makers are forced to set the ttansaction price
to make zero expected utility given the information content generated by observing the net equilibrium order
flow. Thus.
(2.S) E[zq (RS - i) I z. Y*=y*] - P; var(Zq(RS - i) I z. Y*=y*) = o.
where Zq = z IQ is the part of the order flow handled by market maker q E (1. 2 •..• , Q}. z is the pooled order
flow from the demanders of immediacy. and PQ is the common risk aversion coefficient of all the market
makers. It is straightforward by using the rules of conditional expectation and conditional variance of normally
distributed random variables to show that the equilibrium price
(2.6) s = !{E[ily*=y*] + lz}.
2S9
where the price sensitivity (see alS() Subrahmanyam (1991), page 430 for an approach where the market makers
are risk averse)
(2.7) cov(i, Z I y*= y*) ~Å = + ~ var(i I Z, y*=y*).var(zl y*=y*) 2Q
The first term is a component reflecting the price differentiation problem or the adverse selection problem to the
pricing of security k (see (2.2.19», while the second term is a component compensating the market makers for
the risk of always having to take the opposite position vis-a-vis the various types of traders.
This implies that the price process of security k from 1=0 to t=TIt, denoted Sltto is no longer a strict
martingale, but a so called supennartingale which is adjusted for the fact that the superior information is short
lived (that is, useful for only one period; see section 2.2). A supermartingale SIrt is defined by E[XIt,t+l IZltJ S
SIrt; see, e.g., Billingsley (1986), pages 484 - 485, and, as in Kyle (1989a), prices over-react relative to their
unbiased level. Finally, notice that this approach is consistent with general pricing theory under homogenous
beliefs. Roughly speaking, the price of a claim XIt,t+l is Sitt = E[Xk,t+l U'(Xt+l)] = E[Xk,t+l] E[U'(Xt+l)] +
coV(XIt,t+l' U'(Xt+l» where Xt+l is the value of the market portfolio at time t+l and U'(Xt+l) is its marginal
utility. If I normalize E[U'(Xt+l)] to unity, we see directly that the price equals the expectation plus a risk
premium; see, e.g., Duffie (1992), pages 3 - 13 for further elaborations.
7.3 EQUILIBRIUM
Idefine a Nash-type equilibrium in this setting. An imperfectly competitive equilibrium is (1) a price system
{SIrt}and (2) a specification of the trading strategies of the privately informed traders {ankto åmkt} such that (i)
the informed speculators maximize expected utility and (li) the prices are set by competitive market makers
making zero expected utility.
Le",,,", 7.1: A pooling of orders equilibrium in security k E {l, 2, ...•K} at the (call) auction at time t E
{O. l, ...•Tl - l} is denoted [(811k1• .dmlt. "dia); SJal. The trading strategies of marke: professionals and
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corporate insiders ore
(3.1) On = Il(Yn - E[x I y* = y.]), and
(3.2) lim = B (Y - E[x I y*=y*]),
respectively. The trading intensities are characterized by
(3.3) Il [l - MBl] r
= [(N + l)r + 2e]l + PNvar(x - RSIYn' y*=y*)(r + e),and
(3.4) B = [l - Nlll] r
(r + 71){(M+ l)l + PMvar(x - RSI y, y*=y*)}'
in which
[
l _ ]2 [( ) R2 ]_ - _ _* * re 2 N - l Il e +
(3.5) var(x - R S I Yn' Y = Y ) = r + e l ((N _ l) Il + M B) + l M2 B2 71 + u ' and
(3.6)
The transaction price of security k at time t is
(3.7) _ l{ (N_ M_ )}S = - E[xly*=y*] + l LOn + Låm + li ,
R n-l m-I
where the Q risk averse and competitive market malcers set the price sensitivity
(3.8) l = as + re,
where
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(3.9)
(3.10)
If L = B. then Jl. replaces M.
fmQf: See appendix A.
This lemma extends lemma 2.1 to a corresponding equilibrium where both the ttaders and the price setting
market makers are risk averse. It is straightforward to alter the equilibrium to the case where both types of
informed speculators observe either common or diverse information or to the case where the corporate insiders
observe diverse information and the market professionals observe common information; see section 2.2 for
details on the information structures.
Special cases
Some of the earlier studies on asymmetric information in financial markets appear as special cases of lemma
7.1.
CorolltJry 7.1: Suppose N = Oand Pa = O. then
(3.11)
(3.12)
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fmQ.{: This follows from (3.4) and (3.8). Q.E.D
The equilibrium in Admati and Pfleiderer (1988a) given by their equations (3) and (4), and lemma 1 and 2 in
Subrahmanyam (1991) is a special case of corollary 7.1 in which r is normalized to unity. Nevertheless,
Subrahmanyam extends inhis lemma 4 to the case where there are risk averse market makers (PQ > 0, but there
is still only one type of superiorly infonned speculators). IfIinsert (3.11) into (3.12), the price sensitivity is
determined by a fifth order equation which has a unique positive real root (see proposition 1in Subrahmanyam
(1991».
Corollary 7.2: Suppose M = O and Q = l, then
(3.13) P
= [(N + 1) r] l + PN {e [ 1 - ]2 r + l2 [(N - 1) p2 e] (r + e)}' and
+ 2 e l (N - 1)P + a
r
(3.14)
emm: This follows from (3.3) and (3.8). Q.E.D
If the semi-mtionalliquidity traders are replaced by rational, maximizing hedgers (see section 8.1 for an approach
where the total hedging demand, denoted H v2 m, replaces the totalliquidity demand represented by 0'), this
corollary equals the equilibrium conditions for the most general model discussed by Spiegel and Subrahmanyam
(1992) in their appendix B, pages 327 - 328.
Extensions
In the next chapter, I extend the analysis to a stock market equilibrium which has lemma 7.1 as a special case.
There the market makers realize their market power as inKyle (1984), and the liquidity traders are replaced by
263
hedgers as in Spiegel and Subralunanyam (1992). Then I use the equilibrium to evaluate the effects of insider
trading regulations on the welfare of informed speculators, uninformed hedgers, and individuals supplying
intermediacy (including arbitrageurs competing with the market makers) much in the same way as in this
chapter.
On the existence of an equilibrium - the faxed point
I insert (3.8) into (3.3) and (3.4). The results are p = f@, B) and B = g(P, B) which determine the equilibrium as
the related fixed points P* = f(P*, B*) and B* = g@*, B*). Figure 7.1 illustrates how the fixed points are
determined using the numerical values given in table 7.4.
Trading
intensity
FIGURE 7.1 On the existence and uniqueness of
Trading O. 3 the equilibrium
intensity o. 26
~=f(~B* I~= 1)
0.2
0.1 0.16 0.2 0.26 0.3
* = 0.133 B* = 0.200
The related fixed points are calculated by a converging sequence (<Pi, Bi); i = O, 1, 2, ••.}. The initial values
@o,Bo} are chosen, for instance, to be the trading intensities in a corresponding seemly market with risk
neutral agents. Then I use (3.3) and (3.4) to calculate the next values PI = f(po, Bo}and BI = g(Po, Bo) and so
on until the sequence converges at P* and B*.
Proposition 7.1: There exists a unique, linear equilibriwn {(P, B*); Å*J given by (3.1) - (3.10).
fmgf: To prove the uniqueness, I apply the contraction mapping principle (see, e.g., Duffie (1988), page 191).
It holds as the mapping, given by the right hand side of (3.3) and (3.4), are strict contractions from a complete
metric space [O, -} into itself. Obviously, [O,oo} is a metric space (d(a, b) = O<=> a = b, d(a, b}= d(b, a), and
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d(a, c) s d(a, b) + d(b, c) where a, b, c E [0,00) and d is a positive, real-valued function on [0,00) x [0,00) called
a meuic) and it is complete because every Cauchy sequence converges (that is, a sequence {sj} is Cauchy if there
exists an integer J so that d(Sio Sj) ~ e E (0,00) for all i, j E {l, 2, ... J larger than J, and a sequence (sil
converges if there exists s E [0,00) such that d(Si, s) -+ O). Equation (3.3) is a strict contraction because I f(f3j'
B*) - f(Pi, B*) I< c I f3j- J\ I where c E (O, 1) and i < j. This means that IOf(f3, B*) I af3 I< c for all f3E [O,
00) and c E (O, 1) which by inspection is obviously the case. In the same way, equation (3.4) is a strict
contraction, implying that the related problem given by (3.3) and (3.4) together is a strict contraction. Q.E.D.
Nonetheless, Ihave no closed fonn solution. Itherefore choose to analyze the equilibrium numerically. This is
done by presenting an example based on the numerical values given in table 7.4. This example forms the basis
for all the illustrations thioughout the chapter.
7.4 TRADING INTENSITIES
The trading strategies of the market professionals and the corporate insiders are according to (3.1) and (32) linear
responses to superior information where the trading intensities given by (3.3) and (3.4) measure how responsive
these speculators are to infonnational changes. The trading intensities depend on factors such as the risk
exposure.
Proposition 7.2: Suppose the stock market is given by (3.1) - (3.10), then
(4.1)
fmQf: This follows easily by differentiating (3.3) and (3.4) partially with respect to the relevant variables.
Q.E.D.
Other things equal, the trading intensities of market professionals and corporate insiders are higher, the lower
risk aversion they have. This means that risk averse speculators trade less than corresponding risk neutral
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speculators because they take into accouet the various risks associated with security trading and therefore find it
optimal to reduce their trading.
Proposition 7.3: Suppose the stock market is given by (3.1) - (3.10), then
(4.2) iJ fJ < O and ~ B < O.
iJ var( x - R S lYD' Y'" = y *) iJ var( x - RS ly, y* = y *)
fm2(: This follows by differentiating (3.3) and (3.4) with respect to the relevant variables holding other
variables constant Q.E.D.
The trading intensities of superiorly infonned speculators are higher, the lower risk of ttading at a price different
from the future value of the security. This suggests that risk averse speculators reduce their trading if, for
instance, there is much Wlcertainty about the demand from the noise or liquidity traders. On the other hand,
infonned trading tend to reduce the trading risk because it brings the price nearer to its Wlderlying fundamental
value. Figure 7.2 illustrates how the conditional variances given by (3.5) and (3.6) depend on the number of
illegally trading insiders.
FIGURE 7.2 The variance of the price deviation
The variance 1.3 given various information sets
of the
pice deviation 1. 2&
1.2
1.1&
1.1
1.0&
2.
The munber of illegally
trading insiders
0.9&
In this example, the variance of the price deviation given privately acquired information is a monotonically
decreasing function (which decreases from 1.306 when J1= O to 0.949 when J1= 10), whereæ the variance given
inside infonnation is a unimodal function (which increases from 0.944 when J1 = O to 1.096 when J1 = 2, and
then falls to 1.018 when J1 = 10).
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If the supply of corporate insiders increases, the trading risk of market professionals decreases. This is
because insider trading reveals information to the market makers, brings the transaction price nearer to its
underlying fundamental, and thereby reduces the volatility of the pricing error. According to (3.6), the trading
risk of corporate insiders does not depend directly on their own supply because each insider knows his own
demand and the demand from the other corporate insiders. This suggests that their risk effect is indirect and it
depends mainly on how the market makers react to the larger number of corporate insiders in the order flow.
This accounts for the fact that their execution risk may increase in the insiders own supply due to the increase in
the equilibrium bid ask spread for small supplies of corporate insiders; see section 7.S for an analysis of the
price response of market makers.
On the motives ror trading
The superiorly informed speculators trade because they have better (or more precise) information than the
marlcet.
Proposition 7.4: Suppose the slock market equilibrium is given by (3.1) - (3.10), Ihen
(4.3) lim p(e) = O and lim B(71) = O.
£ ....- ,,_.-
fmgf: These limits follow from (3.3) and (3.4) holding other variables constanL Q.E.D.
This means that in this model there is no trading caused by risk sharing only trading motivated by superior
information and exogenously given liquidity events. This is because initially, before ttading takes place, there
are no risky positions. However, if there were an effect caused by the initial wealth, rational shareholders in
general would like to trade in order to share the risk even if they have no private information. As originally
shown by Hirshleifer (1971), there would in such a market also be an effect caused by an early resolution of
uncertainty on the risk sharing possibilities. These issues are discussed in the next chapter.
U,7
Market professionals
Ibave also examined numerically the trading behavior of the market professionals when the supply of corporate
insiders changes.
Proposition 7.5: The trading intensity of market professionals lI:JJIiJ. to be a unimodalfunction in the supply
of corporate insiders u:
(4.4) Sgn(dP) = - Sgn(J.l.fJ - J.I.) where lim P{J.I.) ~ lim P{J.I.) ~ O,
d J.I. 1'-+0 1'-+-
where Jlp. among other things. is a function of p = (PN. PM. Pa). Jf P = (O. O. O) and 71 = O. then J.I./J ~-and
fJ(J.I.) is a monotonically decreasingfunction {see (3.2.4)for a proof).
These tendencies are established after systematical, numerical analyses with the values given in table 7.4 as the
base case. Technically, it is done by studying what happens ~(J.L) if the numerical values of all the exogenous
parameters are changed systematically. Figure 7.3 illustrates what happens.
The trading
intensity 0.1.8
M
0.2 FIGURE 7.3 Trading intensity of market
professionals
0.1.6
0.14
0.1.2 l!4L IPQ= 1)
The number of illegally
1.0. trading insiders2. 4. 6. 8.
We observe that the trading intensities fall in the interval [O, 10], but when PQ = O, the ttading intensity is
really a unimodal function. This is because ~ijJ.= OIPQ = O)= 0.203 > ~ijJ.-+ 00 IPQ = O)= 0.183 > p.(J.Ip= 9
IPQ = O)= 0.139 where· indicates the minimum. However, p.ijJ.= OIPQ = 1) = 0.163 > ~ -+ 00 IPQ = O)=
0.086, suggesting that ~ijJ.)is monotonically decreasing in J.L. I conclude that the market professionals tend to
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trade more aggressively when L = B than when L = A.
Corporate insiders
Risk averse insiders care about the risk of trading at a price which differs from the underlying value of the
security. This trading risk increases, for instance, when uninformed traders intensify their trading because they
may push the transaction price in the wrong direction so that the corporate insidersrealæe a loss (noise trader
risk), or when the internal information becomes more noisy because the insider then face a greater risk of
making a bad decision and thereby realize a loss (fundamental risk).
Proposition 7.6: The trading intensity of corporate insiders WIlls. tofall monotonically in their own supply
(4.5) dB < Owhere lim B(.u) > lim B(.u) = O.
d .u Jl-+O Jl-+-
Figure 7.4 gives an example.
Trading
intensity 0.3
M
0.4 FIGURE 7.4 Trading intensity or corporate
insiders
0.2
o.i.
The nwnber of illegally
~----~2~.----- ..~.-----6~.-----8·.-----i.~0.~Uw~
Weobserve thatB·(J.I.=O IPQ =0) =0.403 >B(J.I.-+oo IPQ=O)=O and B·(J.I.=O IPQ = 1) = 0312 > B(J.I.-+ 00
I PQ = 1) = O. If the illegally trading insiders are perfectly camouflaged by (or as) outsiders, Iconclude that
corporate insiders have a desire to trade harder when L = B than when L = A. Nonetheless, M - J.1 insiders
choose to follow the law.
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7.5 PRICE SENSITIVITY
The equilibrium condition in the dealership market given by (2.5) expresses that even if they are limited in
number, the price setting market makers behave competitively and therefore expect to earn no economic rents
from their activity. Hence, the stock market exchange is taken to be a non-profit organization which sets the
price sensitivity and thereby the equilibrium bid ask spread without exploiting its privilege as the only supplier
of immediacy.
Proposition 7.7: Suppose the stock market exchange is given by (3.1) - (3.10), then the equilibrium price
sensitivity increases monotonically with its adverse selection component. Thus,
(5.1)
cH. > O,
oas
(5.2)
fmgf: The derivative given by (5.1) is obvious from (3.8). The limit follows directly from (3.9) - (3.10).
Q.E.D.
If for some reason the adverse selection problem faced by the price setting market makers increases, the price
sensitivity and thereby the equilibrium bid ask spread increases. According to (5.2), the market makers have to
take into account the adverse selection problem to the pricing of securities. If the market makers are risk
neutral, no risk compensation is needed.
Proposition 7.8: Suppose the stock mlJrket equilibrium is given by (3.1) - (3.10), then the equilibrium
price sensitivity increases monotonically with its risle compensation component. Thus,
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(5.3) o i.. > O,
ore
(5.4) orc < O, ore > O ore < O, andoQ o PQ , o 'I'
(5.5) lim rc(N, M, e, 71) <:: O.
N-+O.M-+O.
£.....-1 _1m .,_.-
fmgf: I differentiate (3.8) with respect to re and obtain (5.3), and, according to (2.7), the risk compensation is
(5.6)
where 'I' is the price infonnativeness given by (6.1). I differentiate (5.6) with respect to the relevant variables
and obtain (5.4). The limit follows from (3.10). Q.E.D.
Risk averse market makers have to be compensated for the risk of always taking the opposite position vis-a-vis
the demanders of immediacy, leading to a higher price sensitivity than is the case in a correspon~g market with
risk neutral pricing. This is consistent with the findings in the market microstructure literature, for instance,
Ho and Stoll (1981). They model the dealer as a risk bearer who takes on unwanted inventory, and the cost of
holding an inventory position is reflected in the bid ask spread. The more risk averse the dealer is, the wider is
the spread, and hence the larger is the trading cost.
The risk bearing component in the equilibrium bid ask spread increases when the number of market makers,
their risk tolerance, or the market efficiency decreases. In this way, if the security price is a good estimate of the
underlying value, the market makers face less risk of loosing money. They therefore lower the risk bearing
component in the equilibrium bid ask spread. The same happens if they increase in number as their risk bearing
capacity gives a better risk sharing. When Q _. 00, the risk sharing is complete and the market makers do not
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need to be compensated for the execution risk because of a complete diversification of the order flow on the
continuum of dealers. In this respect. the market makers form a syndicate to share the risk of holding inventory;
see Wilson (1968).
Finally, notice that the price sensitivity is positive even when there are no informed trading. The reason is
that risk averse market makers have to be compensated for the risk of trading together with the noise or liquidity
tradels.
Proposition 7.9: Insider trading WJJlJ. to increase the price inj'ormlJtiveness and thereby to reduce the risk
compensation component in the bid ask spread:
(5.7) arcap'
arc a'¥
= -- -- < O.a'¥ ap'
This suggests that insider ttading may reduce the bid ask spread, but the spread also contains the adverse
selection component
Proposition 7.10: The price sensitivity WJdJ. to be a unimodal/unction in the supply o/ corporate insiders
(5.8) Sgn(dd 1) = Sgn(p..l - p.) where lim 1(p.) > lim 1(p.) > O,
p. " .....0 " ......
where p.1>among other things. is a/unction of p = (PN. PH. PQ).
Figure 7.5 illustrates.
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Theprice
sensitivity
FIGURE 7.s Price sensitivity
I find that ).,·(JJ.1 = 1.5 IPQ = O) = 0.632 > ).,(JJ. = O I PQ = O)= 0.543 > ).,(JJ. -+ 00 I PQ = O)= 0.200 and ).,·(JJ.1 =
1.51 PQ = 1) = 0.789 > ).,(JJ. = O I PQ = 1) = 0.704 > ).,(JJ. -+ 00 I PQ = 1) = 0.595. Hence, the unimodality of
the price sensitivity and the bid ask spread observed in the risk: neutral case carry over to the risk averse case,
suggesting that the bid ask spread may be less when there are several insiders in the market than when there are
none.
7.6 MARKET EFFICIENCY
The informativeness of the securities market is its ability to communicate information through the price
system. Public information is always reflected in the price due to the construction of the equilibrium with price
taking behavior in the dealership market In addition, some of the private information held by the informed
speculators is also reflected in the price system because infonned ttaders reveal infonnation through their orders.
Lemma 7.2: The price informativeness is
(6.1)
If L =B, thenM is replaced by IL
Emgf: The price efficiency is measured by the parameter 'I' = 1/ var(x I S, y*=y*), and (6.1) follows by
straightforward calculations. Q.E.D.
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The first tenn is the precision of the public signal, and the second tenn is the additional precision caused by
privileged infonnation revealed by the transaction price.
Proposition 7.11: Suppose the stock marke: equilibrium is given by (3.1) - (3.10), then
(6.2) 0'11 < O 0'11 > O 0'11 > O 0'11 < O 0'11 < O 0'11 O 0'11 > O and 0'11 > o.or 'oN ' oM 'oe 'of'/ 'ou < 'op , oB
:emof: This follows from differentiating (6.1) with respect to the relevant variables holding other variables
constant Q.E.D.
Inthis way, the price infonnativeness tends to increase with the amount of informed ttading and decrease with
noise.
For instance, if the unexpected trades by noise or liquidity traders, represented by a, increase exogenously,
there is a tendency of declining price efficiency. This is because the superiorly infonned speculators scale up
their ttades less than proportionally due to their risk aversion. Note also that increased risk aversion decreases
the market efficiency; see Subrahmanyam (1991) proposition 2 for a similar result
Proposition 7.12: The price informativeness WJds. to increase monotonically in the supply of corporate
insiders:
(6.3) d'¥ > Owhere lim '¥(#l) < lim '¥(#l) < ee,
d#l ,,~o ,,~-
Figure 7.6 gives an example.
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I find that 'l'(J.l = O I PQ = O) = 0.641 < 'l'.(J.l -+ 00 I PQ = O) = 1.618 and 'l'(J.l = O I PQ =1) = 0.596 < 'l'·01-+
00 I PQ =1) = 1.180. The price effICiency is reduced ifL changes from A to B.
7.7 WELFARE EFFECTS
The welfare of the demanders as well as the suppliers of immediacy is measured by their expected risk adjusted
profit which equals the expected profit minus an appropriate risk premium.
Market makers
I assume that the market makers are compensated for the risk of taking the opposite position vis-a-vis the
demanders of immediacy, but they earn zero expected utility given the information inferred from the equilibrium
orderflow.
lAmma 7.3: The pre-trade value ofmarlcet making is
(7.1) 1 (( 1 + )2 2 [ var( Zq Iy* = Y*) . ])Ce = --log - - P =0,
q 2pQ PQcov(zq,RS-ily*=y*) Q var(RS-ily*=y*)
where Zq = Z I Q.
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(7.2)
(7.3)
(7.4)
Em!Jf: See appendix B.
The value of market making is driven to zero because of the equilibrium condition in the dealership market
given by (2.5). This means that the price setting market makers act competitively although they are Iimited in
number. On the other hand, the market makers in the next chapter act strategically by increasing the price
sensitivity beyond the competitive one given by (3.8).
Proposition 7.13: Suppose the stock market equilibrium is given by (3.1) - (3.10), then the risk adjusted
value of market making has these two limits as a function of the risk aversion coefficient:
(7.S)
fmQf: First, notice that because of (2.5), Ceq = O for all parameter values. Therefore the value of market
making must also be zero when PQ -+ 00 or PQ = O. Then I apply L' H6pital's rule (see, e.g., Chiang (1984),
page429):
d 10g[(1 + P et - p" v ]
IOg[(I+pc)"-p2v] dp =lim(I+PC~C-pv
(7.6) lim = lim-----; ........" ..---
p-+O 2 p p-+O d [2 p] p-+O (1 + P c) _ p2 V
dp
= c,
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where c and v are two constants and p is the risk aversion coefficient. In this way, the proposed limit cov(Zq, R
S - x I y*=y*) follows directly from this use of L' H6pital's rule. Q.E.D.
When the marlcet makers are risk neutral, the value of marlcet making is expected profit. If PQ>O, the expected
profit is positive but equals the risk premium.
Liquidity traders
Trading by noise traders is motivated by random liquidity events, suggesting that the Ud is given outside the
equilibrium. Nevertheless, some of the noise traders are able within certain limits to decide when and where to
trade.
Lømmtl 7.4: There exists a I'D < PD•such that the risk adjusted value of following a random trading strategy
is
(7.7)
where the total amount of liquidity trading U = I Ud and the variance of the pricing error conditioned on public
information is given by (7.4 J.
fmQ{: The given restriction on the risk aversion coeffICient is caused by the condition that (1 -I']) c)2 - r2D v >
O in order that 10g«1 -I']) c)2 - rlo v) is to exist. Isolve the second order equation and obtain the upper limit
PD' = (cl (c2 - v» + «c21 (c2 - v)2) - (11 (c2 - v»)1I2. The rest of the prooffollows directly from appendix B.
Q.E.D.
If,for instance, Cedkt > Cedk,t+lo then liquidity tIader d e {l,2, ..., D} should choose to trade in period t rather
than in period t+1.
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Proposition 7.14: Suppose the stock market equilibrium is given by (3.1) - (3.10), then there exists a set
ofparameters where in some regions
(7.8) iJCed O iJCed O iJCed _.I iJCed O< ,-- < ,-- < O, "'"' ( _ ) < ,
iJpo iJud iJÅ iJvarx-RSIy*=y*
where
JEgf: The signs of the derivatives in (7.8) follow from differentiating (7.7) partially with respect to the
relevant variables, and then choosing a set of parameters that fits. Finally, the limits in (7.9) follow
analogously from the use of L' H6pital's rule in (7.6). Q.E.D.
H the liquidity traders are risk neutral, the value of a random trading sttategy is the expected profit, The ttading
risk given by (7.4) tends to increase with noise or liquidity trading, and to decrease by insider or other informed
trading. It is therefore often called noise ttader risk, but the noise ttader risk is purely market created while the
trading risk also depends on the fundamental risk. Noise traders creating risks are consistent with De Long,
Sh1eifer, Summers, and Waldman (1990).
Propositiøn 7.15: The value o//ollowing a random trading strategy le.lJIll to be a unimodal/unction in the
supply of corporate insiders:
(7.10) Sgn( d;;d ) = - Sgn(lld - Il).
where Ild. among other things. is a/unction 0/ PD. If PD > I'D" (where I'D" is a relatively large constant), then
Ild = O.implying that Cetill) is a monotonically increasing/unction/or all IL
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Figure 7.7 illusttates Cect as a function of J1.
FIGURE 7.7 The value ofrandom
trading
-0.12
-0.14
-0.16
The risk
adjusted profit -o. 18
I fmd that Cect(JJ.= O I PQ = 1) = -0.185 < Cect-(JJ.-+ 00 I PQ = 1) = - 0.115 and Ced(JJ. = O IPQ = O) = -0.152 <
Cect -(I.l -+ 00 I PQ = O) = -0.053. The ftgure is consistent with the proposition above because Po = 1 > Po",
which makes Cect(JJ.)monotonically increasing. Figure 7.5 implies that Po = O< Po", making Ced(JJ.)= - Å(JJ.)
Proposition 7.16: Suppose the stock mm/cet equilibrium is given by (3.1) - 3.10), then
(7.11) oCed < O, 0:lC:d < O, and o Ced < O,
oas u no o red
(7.12) red = ad var(i - RS I Y*=y*).
fmQf: According to (5.1) and (5.3), as and re increases A., and, according to (7.8), the parameters A., ad, and
var(x - R S Iy*=y*) decrease Cect. Q.E.D.
The risk adjusted trading cost of liquidity traden decreases if the price setting market makers face an increased
adverse selection problem, the market makers have to be compensated more for the risk of ttading against the
order flow, or the risk exposure of the liquidity trader increases. Moreover, the supply of corporate insiders
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influences Ced through these components. Both asOL) and rcOL) were analyzed in section 7.5, allowing me to
concentrate on RciOL).
Figure 7.8 illustrates how the risk of trading al an unfavorable price depends on the supply of corporate
insiders.
8.
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FIGRUE 7.8 The variance of the price diviatiOll
The trading given public information
risk 1.6
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1.4
0.8 var(x - R SI y*=Y·'PQ = O) M
As we see, insider trading reduces the variance of the price deviation (from 1.735 towards 0.902 when PQ= Oand
from 1.560 towards 0.618 when PQ = 1), suggesting that the risk exposure ofliquidity traders is improving with
J.1. This is because insider ttading increases the price informativeness and therefore reduces the risk of trading at
an unfavorable price.
Table 7.1 summarizes the identified effects caused by ccxporate employees ttading on inside infonnation on
thewelfare of liquidity traders.
TABltE 7.1: E"ects on Ced caused by All
~ as re red ISUIl
J1 E [0, J1dl + +
J1E (J1d, J111 + + +
J1E (J.LN-) + + + +
................. n: ..... "'f _ ............. ..,._.- ....J&l--
If the supply of insiders increases from zero to J.Id C!: O, the total effect on the welfare of liquidity traders tends to
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be negative due to the strong negative adverse selection effect However, if the supply increases further, the
total effect is positive.
Corporate insiders
As in Admati and Pfleiderer (1988a) and Subrahmanyam (1991), the value of insider trading is measured by the
certainty equivalent or the expected risk. adjusted profit Due to the complete camouflage supplied by the noise
traders, the illegally trading insiders take the probability of being caught by the stock market regulators to be
zero.
LemllIll 7.5: The risk adjusted value o/inside infoT7l'tationis
(7.13) 1 [( 1 + )2 [var(åm I y*=y*) .J]Cem = -- log - - - p'f.t ,
2 PM PM COV(åm, x- RS I y*= y*) var(i -RS I Y*= y*)
where the variance o/the pricing error is given by (7.4),
(7.14) cov(åm, x - RS I Y*=y*) = B [(1 - Å(Np + MB»)r - MBÅ77], and
(7.15) var(~m I y*=y*) = B2 (r + 77).
fmgf: See appendix B.
The risk adjusted value of inside infonnation is the expected profit from insider trading minus an appropriate risk
premium.
Proposition 7.17: Suppose the stock market exchange is given by (3.1) - (3.10), then
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(7.16) _ aCem _ > O, aCem
a cov(åm, i -R S I y* = Y*) avar(åm I y* = Y*)
and aCem < O.
aPM
O aCem O<, ( ) < ,avar i -RS I y*=y*
emw:: This follows by differentiating (7.13) with respect to the relevant variable holding other variables
constant. Q.E.D.
In other words, the expected risk adjusted profit from insider trading in security k at time t increases if the
correlation between the insider's trading strategy and the future value of the security increases, the correlation
between the insider's trading strategy and the transaction price decreases, the variability in the insider's end-of-
period position in the security decreases, the variability in the pricing error decreases, or the insider's risk
aversion decreases,
Proposition 7.18: Suppose the stock market equilibrium is given by (3.1) - (3.10), then
(7.17) lim Cem(p..) = O and lim Cem(p..) = E[åm (i =) I y*=y*] = cov(åm, i -RS I y*=y*).
p .. -+- P.. -+O R S
fmQf: This follows analogously from the use of L"HOpital'srule in (7.6). Q.E.D.
If the corporate insiders are risk neutral, the relevant measure of value is the expected profit. On the other hand,
completely risk averse individuals have no use for superior infonnation since they do not take any positions in
the risky securities at aU. Notice also that if the corporate insiders observe noise (n -+ 00), y is of no value in
the security market.
Proposition 7.19: The value o/inside in/ormation WJIJJ. to be a monotonically tkcreasingfunction in the
supply of corporate insiders:
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(7.18) dCem < O.
dJ.l
Figure 7.9 illustrates how the value of observing the signal y depends on the number of traders sharing the
signal.
Therisk 0.3
adjustedprofit 0.26
0.2
0.1.5
0.1.
0.06)l~~~h~'~~~1!~~~~~::~====;:M~ mV'" PQ= Thenumberofillegally
2. 4. 6 . B. 1.O. trading inside!s
FIGURE 7.9 The value of inside
information
We observe that Cem·(JJ.= OI PQ = O)= 0.319 > Cem(JJ.-+ 00 I PQ = O)= Oand Cem·(JJ. = OI PQ = 1) = 0.261 >
Ce.n(JJ.-+ 00 I PQ = l) = O.
The expected risk adjusted profit increases with expected profit and decreases with risk exposure where the
risk aversion detennines the weight on these two effects. Insider trading affects both the expected profit and the
risk exposure. Table 7.2 summarizes the effects.
JlE [0,-) +
TARLE 7,2: ERects on Ce. caused by 4J1.
rClza
More corporate insiders in the securities marlcet reduces the expected profit of the insiders already in the marlcet
(see (3.3.4», as well as the risk exposure. Nevertheless, the negative effect on expected profit tends to dominate
the positive effect of risk exposure for all PM. I may conclude that corporate insiders prefer insider trading
allowed except insiders who plan and think they can get away with illegal trading on inside infonnation.
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Market professionals
The value of privately acquired information is measured by its certainty equivalent or the risk adjusted profit
from trading. That is, the amount of money for which professional n E {l, 2, ..., N} is willing to sell yn (and
abstain from trading).
Lemma 7.5: The (gross) value of observing the signal y" is
(7.19)
where the variance of the pricing error is given by (7.4),
(7.20) cov(BD' i -R S I y. =y*) = fJ [(1 - i. (N fJ + M B)) r - N fJ i.el, and
emm: See appendix B.
In this way, the properties of Cen are identical to the properties of Cem given in propositions 7.16 - 7.17, and
the expected risk adjusted value of privately acquired information depends on the supply of corporate insiders in
the financial market.
Proposition 7.20: The value of private inf017l'llltion WJIJÆ. to be a unimodal function in the supply of
corporate insiders p:
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(7.22) Sgn(d Cen) = _ Sgn(Jl - Jl),
dJl n
where Jl", among other things, is a function of P = (PN, PM, Pa). If P = (O, O, O) and fl = O, Jl" ~ 00 and
Ce,,(Jl) is a monotonically decreasing function (see (43.6) for a proof).
Figure 7.10 gives an example.
M
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FIGURE 7.10 The value of privately acquired
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I find that Cen·(JJ. = O IPQ = O)= 0.111 > Cen(JJ. -+ 00 I PQ = O)= 0.046 and Cen·(JJ. = O IPQ = l) = 0.091 >
Cen(JJ. -+ 00 IPQ = l) = 0.021. In this way, Cen(JJ.) falls monotonically when PQ = 1 and is unimodal when PQ
= O. For instance, Cen(JJ. = 10 I PQ = O) = 0.043 < Cen(J,1 -+ 00 I PQ = O) = 0.046. This suggests that risk
averse maricet professionals will vote in favor of a law prohibiting insider ttading.
Proposition 7.11: The value of privately acquired in/ormation depends on the trade-off between expected
profit and risk exposure:
(7.23)
fmQf: This follows by differentiating (7.19) with respect to the relevant variables holding other variables
constant Q.E.D.
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The expected risk adjusted profit of market professionals increases with expected profit from trading and decreases
with risk exposure where the risk aversion PN weighs the two effects. If PN = O, risk exposure has no weight,
and if PN ~ 00, the risk exposure is too great and no trade occurs. The effect on expected profit is discussed in
section 4.3. The risk exposure of market professional n depends the risk of trading at a price which does not
reflect the underlying value (i.e., var(x - R S I y*=y*» and size of the position taken in the securities market
(i.e., var(Øn I y*=y*». According to (7.4), the risk tends to decrease when J1. increases, and, according to (7.21),
the position depends m the trading intensity and the precision of the signal. The trading intensity is analyzed in
section 7.4.
If the supply of corporate insiders increases, the risk exposure of the market professionals tends to improve.
This is because of a reduction in the risk of trading at an unfavorable price, and at the same time they respond by
reducing their position in the risky security due to competition. Nevertheless, the risk exposure may increase
for large J1. because then the professional may take larger positions in the security due to improved adverse
selection. Table 73 summarizes.
+ +/(-) +/(-)
TABLE 7.3: Effects OD Cen caused by A J1.
~ epa !'en IilW
JLE [O,~]
JLE Ola,oo)
+
When the supply of corporate insiders increases exogenously, the expected profit from insider trading and the
risk exposure are unimodal, decreases and then increases. Iconclude that market professionals prefer L = B to L
=A and the ban should be effectively enforced.
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7.8 WHERE AND WHEN SHOULD DISCRETIONARY LIQUIDITY TRADERS·
TRADE?
I concluded in section 4.6 that risk neuttal security traders, both informed speculators and uninfonned liquidity
traders, should cluster their trades together with as many liquidity traders as possible, and the uninformed
liquidity traders should also cluster with as many speculators as possible whereas the informed speculators
should avoid trading together with other speculators (see Admati and Pfleiderer (1988b». As observed by
Subrahmanyam (1991), this is not necessarily the case in a corresponding market where the participants are risk
averse.
Liquidity traders
Risk averse liquidity traders who are able to evaluate the securities and periods before they have to trade due to
the realization of the liquidity events should, of course, trade llcI in security k at time t if Cectb <:!: Cedk'f for all
fe [t-, t.. } andk' e [k-, k=],
Figure 7.7 implies that a discretionary liquidity trader should trade with as many insiders as possible (when
PQ= 1, this strategy gives a trading cost of O.139). However, this need not to be an equilibrium. The reason is
that clustering of liquidity trades is increasing the risk. Figure 7.11 illustrates.
-0.22
-0.24
FIGURE 7.11 The trading cost as a function of
The risk the amount of liquidity trading
adjustedprofit -0.14
-0.16
-0.18
We observe that in this example the trading cost of discretionary liquidity traders is minimized when the total
amount of liquidity trading a = ad - 2. This gives each liquidity trader an expected trading cost which equals
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0.134. Complete clustering is not optimal as Ced(a) decreases when a> ad" 2. This is never the case in a
risk neutral market.
Proposition 7.22: The welfare 0/ liquidity traders W1dJ. to be a u.nimodal function in the total amount 0/
liquidity trading:
(8.1) Sgn(ddc;d) = Sgn(ad - a).
where ad. among other things. is a/unction 0/ p = (PD.PN. PM. PQ). If P = (O.O. O. O). ad ~ øoand Ced(a)
increases monotonically with a.
As suggested by Subrahmanyam (1991) and Spiegel and Subrahmanyam (1992). the clustering equilibrium of
Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) does not necessarily exist in a security market with risk averse participants.
Nevertheless. when there are some informed trading. it is often optimal to cluster together with the informed
speculators as is the case in the risk neutral market.
Informed speculators
Figure 7.10 indicates that market professionals prefer to ttade when there are no corporate insiders in the security
market (when PQ = l. this strategy gives a profit of 0.091). However. they prefer trading together with the
liquidity traders as long as it is not too many such traders in the market.
Proposition 7.23: The value of privileged injoT1l'llltionleIJIll tofirst increase and then decrease in the total
amount of liquidity trading:
(8.2) (dCe ) (dCe )Sgn daD = Sgn(aD - a) and Sgn d; = Sgn(am - a).
288
where all and am, among other things, are ftmctions of p = (PH,PM, PQ). If P = (O,O, O), then the value of
privileged information is increasing monotonically in (1.
Figure 7.12 illustrates when I assume that L = A.
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FIGURE 7.12 The value of information as a function
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In this example, Cen and CCm are unimodal functions which suggest that the informed and risk averse
speculators may prefer a reduction in the supply of uninformed traders, This is never the case in a similar risk
neutral market because noise trader risk is not relevanL
7.9 SHORT SUMMARY OF MAJOR CONCLUSIONS
I have shown that insider ttading influences the individual risk adjusted profit of all the demanders of immediacy
(whereas the suppliers of immediacy are assumed to expect no risk: adjusted profit whatever the insiders are
doing). The following conclusions are drawn from the analysis:
• The liquidity traders tend to prefer insider ttading allowed because the presence of several COIpOI'8te
insiders decreases the risk: adjusted ttading cost of ttaders ttading to satisfy their liquidity needs. This is
because insider ttading reduces adverse selection, risk: compensation, and risk: exposure.
• The corporate insiders who are forced out of the market by the stock market regulators tend to prefer
insider ttading allowed. But if some of the insiders believe they are among the insiders who are able to
ttade illegally without being discovered, they prefer insider trading prohibited. This is mainly because
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of the reduction in competition. but also factors such as reduced risk exposure are important in this
picture.
• The market professionals prefer insider trading prohibited because insider trading reveals information
and thereby reduces the possibilities of informed outsiders to make supemonnal profits in the financial
market. Nevertheless. the risk reducing properties of insider ttading are viewed as desirable by outside
professionals.
• Since Ihave assumed price taking behavior in the dealership market, the welfare of market makers is
zero for every supply of corporate insiders. This suggests that the market makers are indifferent to
whether insider trading should be prohibited or not.
Iuse the next chapter to extend the equilibrium in this chapter to a similar stock market economy where the
welfare of market makers depends on the supply of corporate insiders due to imperfect competition in the
dealership market The lack of competition is partly compensated by introducing a new group of traders, the
broker - arbitrageurs. who ttade as the market makers based on information revealed by the net order flow.
Finally. the semi-rationalliquidity ttaders are replaced by fully rational hedgers trading to hedge their initial
position.
APPENDICES
This section contains of the formal proofs. and the last appendix gives the numerical values used in the
example.
Appendix A Proof of lemma 7.1
I draw on the proof of lemma 2.1 given in appendix 2.A and extend it to the case where all the participants are
risk averse.
The portfolio-selection problem of market professional n e {l. 2•••.• N} is given by (2.2). IfPN =O. (2.2)
is identical to (2.2.11). I follow the derivation of the professionals' trading sttategy in appendix 2.A (see
(2.A15) - (2.A29». and obtain the trading sttategy given by (3.1) where the ttading intensity (see (2.A28) for the
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limit when PN =O)
(Al)
fJ = [1 - l((N - I)fJ + MB)]r
(r + e) [2 l + PN var( x - R S lYn. y* = y *)r
I solve for P. taking the variance of the price deviation as a constant. and obtain the trading intensity given by
(3.3). Then I use the price function given by (2.6) where the net order flow is given by (2.A3I) and yield (3.S).
The second order condition (adjust (2.AI7) and differentiate with respect to On> is
(A2) - [2 l + PN var( x - R S lYn. y* = y *)] < O.
If PN ~ Oand A ~ O (with at least one strict inequality). (A3) is satisfied because var(x - R S lYn. y*=y*) is
always non-negative.
The portfolio-selection problem of corporate insider m e {l. 2•...• M} is given (2.3). If PM = O. (2.3) is
identical to (2.2.12). I follow the derivation of the insider's trading strategy in appendix 2.A (see (2.AI) -
(2.AI4». and obtain the trading strategy given by (3.2) where the trading intensity is given by (3.4) or. when
PN = O.by (2.AI4). Then I use (2.6) and (2.A3I). and yield (3.6). The second order condition equals (adjust
(2.A4) and differentiate with respect to L1m)
(A3)
If PM ~ O and A ~ O (with at least one strict inequality). the obtained trading intensity produces a maximum
because the variance is always non-negative.
The risk averse and competitive market makers determine the transaction price according to the equilibrium
condition in the dealership market given by (2.5); see also (2.6) and (2.7). The price function given by (3.7) and
the price sensitivity given by (3.8) follow straightforwardly from (2.S) by the use of the rules for conditional
expectation and conditional variance given normally distributed variables (see. e.g .• Goldberger (1991). pages 7S
- 76). This completes the proof of lemma 7.1.
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Appendix B Proor or lemmas 7.3 • 7.6
I assume an exponential utility function U(T (x - R S» = - exp{ - p T (x - R S)} where p is the risk aversion
coefficient and T (x - R S) is the final wealth obtained by following the trading strategy T E {On, å.m, ua, - Zq}.
Let the vector lP T, (x - R S)] - N(O, V), then (see, e.g., Subrahmanyam (1991), page 439)
(BI)
_{Il + V (°l 01)1l/2}"l,E[-exp(-pi'(x - RS))] =
where I is the identity matrix and V is the varlance-covarlance matrix. The certainty equivalent is defmed by
E[U(T (x - R S»] = U(Ce), or
(B2) I (O 1~l/2I + V 1 O~ exp{-pCe} = 1.
This means that the value of following the trading strategy T is
(B3)
IfT is based on private information, then Ce is the maximum that a trader would be willing to pay to become
privately informed. This value is also given in Admati and Pfleiderer (1987, 1988a) on page 85 in their first
article and on page 99 in their last article.
If the trader is a market maker who has to contribute to market clearing, T = Zq, p= PQ, and the variance-
covariance matrix
(B4)
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I insert this into (B3) and get the risk adjusted value of market making given by (7.1). The covariance and the
variances are given by (72) - (7.4) and follow straightforwardly from the structure of the equilibrium (3.1)-
(3.10).
The liquidity traders trade for reasons outside the model. In this case, T = 1lci, P = PD, and the variance-
covariance mattix
(BS) (
Æ var(Dell y*=y*) PI>cov(Del, i - RS I y*=y*)]
Vel = PI>cov( Del' i - R S I y* = y *) var( i - R S I Y*= y *) .
The covariance and the variances follow easily from the structure of the equilibrium. I insert them into (B3) and
yield (7.7) where var(x - R S I y*=y*) is given by (7.4).
When the trader is a corporate insider who observes a signal y, T = .åm, p = PM, and the variance-covariance
matrix is
(B6)
(
~ var( Å III I y* = y *) At cov( ÅIIl, i - R S I y* = y *)]Vill = _ _ _.
Atcov(AIIl,i - RSIY*=y*) var(i - RSly*=y*)
I substitute this into (B3) and yield the risk adjusted value of inside information given by (7.13). The variances
and the covariance are given by (7.4), (7.14), and (7.15). They follow easily from the structure of the
equilibrium given by (3.1) - (3.10).
The market professionals acquire a private signal Yn which means that in this case T = en, p = PN, and the
variance-covari mattix
(B7) (
~ var(BII I y*= y*) PN cov(BII, i -_R SI Y*= y*)].
VII = PN cov( Bli' i - R S I Y* = y *) var( x - R S I y* = Y*)
I substitute this into (B3) and yield the risk adjusted value of privately acquired information given by (7.19).
The variances and covariance given by (7.4), (720), and (7.21) and follow easily from the structure of the
equilibrium. This completes the proof of lemmas 7.3, 7.4, 7.5 and 7.6.
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Appendix C Example
Table 7.4 gives the numerical values of the exogenous parameters used in the figures to illustrate the
equilibrium.
lå ILE 1.~: Numerical values used in the example
r = 2 PN = 1 M = 10
e = 2 PM = 1 J1 E {l, 2, ..., Ml
TI = 1 ~ E {O,Il N = 2
(J = 1 PI> = 1 D = 10
c:Jci = 0.1 R = 1 Q = 4
In this example all the agents are equal with respect to risk aversion (except in the case where the pricing is risk
neutral).
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CHAPTER 8
HEDGING, ARBITRAGE AND DEALING IN A
SECURITIES MARKET WITH INSIDER TRADING
REGULATIONS
First draft: October 1991,
Cmrent revision: December 1992.
ABSTRACT
This chapter focuses on the welfare effects of insider trading reglllations in a simple exchange marut where the
intermediaries recognize their marut power. TaIu!.lor instance. the Kninformed hedgers whose welfare is shown to
depend on their initial position and the net gain from hedging. The sign and the size ol the gain depend on the
effectiveness ol the hedging strategy and its implementation costs. Insider trading transfers resolKlion olll1lCertainty
from the IKlllre to the present period. and thereby reduces the effectiveness ol hedging strategies via the so called
Birshlei/er effect. This is because insider trading reveals informlllion to the intermediaries. They are then able to set
the transaction price nearer its Il1IderlyingIlI1IlIamenlal.making it hard to hedge the IKlKre valKe ol the secwity by
taking offsetting positions in the secwities marlu!t. On the cost side. there are two effects. Insider trading widens the
eqKilibrillm bid ask spread bectllUl! of increased adverse selection dKe to less hedging. This erodes marlu!t liqKidity. On
the other Mnd. insider trading decreases the trading risk because it brings the transaction price nearer to its Il1Iderlying
lun.dIl1tumtal. The net effect depends on the trade-off between the Bush/ei/er effect. which reduces the effectiveness ol
hedging. and the two cost effects working opposite of each other. I find that the Birshiei/er effect tends to dominate.
and conclKde that hedgers tend to prefer insider trading prohibited and enforced by the stock marut reglllators.
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8.1 INTRODUCTION
The approach in this chapter maws on the securities market model characterized by lemma 7.1. But it makes
two significant extensions so that the new equilibrium, characterized by lemma 8.1, allows me to evaluate the
effects of insider trading regulations on the welfare of outsiders such as broker - arbitrageurs, market makers, and
hedgers.
The first extension is to allow two types of competing intermediaries. Moreover, when these suppliers of
immediacy determine the equilibrium bid ask spread, they recognize their market power. This recognition
crystallizes in an additional component in the bid ask spread, reflecting imperfect competition. In this way, I
extend the imperfect dealership market in Kyle (1984) to the case where there are broker - arbitrageurs competing
with the market makers. Competition reduces the new market power component, and if there is perfect
competition, it vanishes completely. The second extension is based on Spiegel and Subrahmanyam (1992)
who, within a traditional Kyle-type of setting with one type of superiorly informed speculators, replace the
semi-mtionalliquidity traders by fully mtional hedgers whose demand for immediacy is motivated by a desire to
cover their initial positions. However, Spiegel and Subrahmanyam do not recognize the market power of the
price setting intermediaries.
The cost of these extensions is that the viability of the securities market is reduced. This is because the
securities market tends to break down if the intermediaries have "too much" market power and/or the amount of
hedging becomes "too low". Insider trading regulations may, consequently, influence the possibilities of marlcet
existence.
As in the previous chapters, I focus on what happens to the properties of the equilibrium when the supply
of corporate insiders changes exogenously, for instance, because of a change in the law governing 'instder
trading. The main conclusion is that security ttaders, except uninformed liquidity traders with an elastic demand
and corporate insiders forced out of the market, tend to prefer insider trading prohibited by the stock market
regulators. This conclusion is based on the fact that insider trading reduces the effectiveness of uninformed
trading strategies such as hedging, and the securities marlcet therefore tends to dry up, become illiquid, and
volatile. In this way, the stock market regulators should intervene by outlawing the most highly informed
trading.
298
My findings are consistent with LeJand (1992), who in a slightly different setting analyzes whether insider
trading should be prohibited ur not He concludes that
" ...insider trading increases the welfare of insiders - quite naturally, since they are excluded in the other
case. More interestingly, the outsiders' utility (certainty equivalents) falls by more than half." (see his
page877).
The reason for this reduction in the expected welfare of outsiders is that insider trading accelerates the resolution
of uncertainty by shifting uncertainty from future to current prices.
The pJan for this chapter is as follows. The next section presents the altered assumptions relative to the trading
model in the previous chapter, and section three outlines the equilibrium. Sections four to seven discuss the
properties of the equilibrium, and section eight concludes. The formal proofs of the lemmas are found in the
8.2 ASSUMPTIONS
I draw on the trading model characterized by lemma 7.1, but extend it to a corresponding stock: market economy
where the liquidity traders are replaced by rational, wealth maximizing hedgers, and the market makers recognize
their market power, but face competition from brokers and other arbitrageurs with access to the information in
the trading system.
There are two types of individuals, the broker - arbitrageurs and the market makers, who supply immediacy
and thereby represent the continuous presence in the securities market Three types of individuals, the market
professionals, the hedgers, and the corporate insiders, demand immediacy and thereby represent the willingness to
trade rather than wait; see Grossman and Miller (1988), pages 618 - 619 for a general discussion on these
matters. The orders from the various demanders of immediacy may be thought of as market orders whereas the
orders from the various suppliers of immediacy may be thought of as limit orders. A market order is to be
executed at the best price in the trading system while a limit order sets a limit on the price at which it can be
executed; see, for instance, Schwartz (1988), page 17 for a discussion. Hence, immediacy is supplied by limit
orders and consumed by market orders; see Amihud and Mendelson (1991), pages 79 - 81.
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The behavior of market professionals and corporate insiders are discussed in section 7.2. One new
assumption is added though; the informed specuJators have not access to any valuable information in the trading
system. This implies that their demand functions, denoted an and t\m, depend only on their personal
information which is represented by the signals Yn and y correlated with the future value of the security. Thus,
an = an(Yn) and t\m = t\m(Y). This means that the resulting equilibrium is not a rational expectations
equilibrium where traders foresee the ttansaction price and therefore may use its information content to adjust
their demands; see, e.g., Grossman (1981).
The uninformed hedgers are risk averse, and therefore have a desire at time t e {O, I, ..., Tk - 1l,represented
by an exponential utility function with a common risk aversion coefficient PH, to hedge or offset the risk
associated with their initial positions in security k e {1,2, ... , Kl. This means that the decision problem of
hedger h e (l, 2, ... , Hl is to maximize the risk adjusted profit given the knowledge of the hedger's own
position in the security. Thus,
where Wh - N(O, ro) is the initial wealth and Uh is the order or trading strategy. After Dbis decided, the market
order from hedger h is submitted, together with orders from the informed specuJators, to the price setting nuuket
makers. I assume that the hedgers do not have access to the information in the trading system, and they cannot
therefore operate partly as broker - arbitrageurs. This approach is identical to the one in Spiegel and
Subrahmanyam (1992). IfWh =°and Db=Dd- N(O, O'd) where d e {O, 1, ... , Dl, the hedgers become liquidity
traders. In the same way, the randomly trading liquidity traders become hedgers with an endogenous demand if
they already have a random position, and they determine their trading strategies in order to maximize expected
utility.
There are also broker - arbitrageurs present in the securities market. These traders have no initial wealth,
but maximize expected utility by issuing (limit) orders based on the information obtained by observing the order
book. If their utility is exponential with a common risk aversion coefficient PA, the portfolio-selection
problem of arbitrageur a e {l,2, ... , Al is
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(2.2) Max E[Åa (i - RS) l:i, y*=y*] - PA var(Åa (i - RS) l:i, y*=y*),A. 2
where Aa is the limit order (which is a function of the transaction price), S is the transaction price, and z is the
pooled order flow from the informed speculators and the uninformed hedgers. Mter they have decided their
orders, the broker - arbitrageurs submit their orders to the price setting market makers who have the formal
responsibility for market clearing.
The market makers have access to the order book where they observe the demand from the informed
speculators and the uninformed hedgers and the competing supply from the broker - arbitrageurs. Ifnecessary,
they clear the market by supplying securities from their own inventory. In a viable market, the process of
market clearing always produces a transaction price. I assume that the preferences of market makers are
represented by an exponential utility function in which PQ is their common risk aversion coefficient This
implies that the portfolio-selection problem of market maker q E {l, 2, ..., Q} is
(2.3)
subject to the rnarlcet clearing condition
(2.4)
where 8q is the market maker' s position. Their net position has to be the opposite of the net position vis-a-vis
the other ttaders.
Note that z = IOn + Iåm + Iut. is the pooled order flow from the market professionals, the corporate
insiders, and the hedgers. The net order flow is a valuable signal since, for instance, a positive order flow
signals to its observers that the traded security is undervalued. Because the transaction price is produced by
market clearing, it contains the information from the order flow. Remember that the market makers can
distinguish the demand coming from speculators and hedgers from the supply coming from the broker -
arbittageurs. This means that it is enough to condition on z in (2.3). But, of course, the market makers cannot
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distinguish the orders coming from infonned speculators from the orders coming from uninformed hedgers. This
suggests that the intermediaries face an adverse selection or price differentiation problem to the pricing of
securities.
Here the difference between the broker - arbitrageurs and the market makers is somewhat artificial. but the
broker - arbiuageurs have no fonnal responsibility for market clearing whereas the market makers are in many
ways exchange professionals who have a special responsibility to clear the market This means that the market
makers have to clear the market from their own inventory even if they temporarily expect to lose. and they have
a responsibility to maintain a "fair and orderly" market Nevertheless. these functions are not explicitly
modelled. The intermediaries are wealth maximizing individuals as other traders. suggesting that the exchange
itself is not a non-profit organization which is consistent with the view in Miller (1991). pages 128 - 130.
Finally. the broker - arbittageurs may be considered as a different type of market makers having different risk
altitude. Arbittage ttading and traditional market making are essentially alternative technologies for providing
market making services (see Holden (1991».
8.3 EQUILIBRIUM
When it exists. a Nash-equilibrium is (i) a set of ttading sttategies {(0Ub Iimkb Uhitt.Aut. 9qkt); n E {1. 2 •
...• NI. m E {I.2 •...• Ml. h E {I. 2•...• Hl. a E {I. 2•...• Al. q E {I.2 •...• QI. k E {I. 2•...• Kl. t E {O.
1•...• Tk -II I determined by rational agents which maximize expected utility and (ti) a price function Skt
determined by the intermediaries in order to clear the securities market so that the demand equals the supply of
immediacy.
lAmma 8.1: Ifit exists. a linear pooling oforders equilibrium in security k fE {I. 2, ..., K} at the (call)
auction at time t e {O, l, ... , Tk -I} is denoted [(BnJa, .4l11kt, "likt, Aakt, 9qkt): SJrJ. The trading strategies of
marketprofessionals, corporate insiders, hedgers,arbitrageurs,and marketmakers are
(3.1) 80 = fJ (Yo - E(i I y* = y *n,
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(3.2) lim = B(y - E[il y*=y*]),
(3.3)
(3.4) A. = - ",(R S - E[i I y* = y*]), and
(3.5) 9q = -V(RS - E[il y*=y*1),
respectively. The trading intensities are characterized by
(3.6)
p = [(N+ l)r + 2 EP. + PH var(i - RS lYn' y*=y*) (r + e)'
[1 - MBA.]r
(3.7) B = [1 - NP A.] r
(r + 71){(M + 1) A. + PMvar(i - RS I y, y*=y*)}'
(3.8) PH [1 - A. (N P + M B)] rv = _.....;....;.;;...l;....---,~ __ __;'OL..--__,..
2 A. + PH var(i - R S I Uh' y* = y *)'
(3.9)
[mpQ PQ + Qas (mpQ - mpA) '1'] 'I'
'Il = (PA PQ + (PQ A + PA Q) as '1') mpA mpQ , and
(3.10) v =
[mpA PA + A as (mpA - mpQ) '1'] 'I'
(PA PQ + (PQ A + PA Q) as '1') mPA mpQ ,
where 'P is given by (6.1J,
_ re [ 1 - ]2 [ (N - 1)p2 e + ]
(3.11) var(i - RS lYn' y*=y*) = - + A.2 ,
r + e A.{(N - l)fJ + MB} M2B271 + Hy2ti)
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(3.12)
(3.13)
(3.14)
(3.15)
(3.16)
(A - 1) 'If + Qv
mPA = (A _ 2) 'If + QV'
mpQ = (Q - 1) v + A'If and
(Q - 2) v + A 'If'
The transaction price o/ security k at time t is
(3.17)
where the price sensitivity
(3.18)
(3.19)
(3.20)
.t = mp (as + re),
AI'Q + QpAmp = __ ~~:---_~:o..--_.....;;.;;...~~~_~_ and
A (A - 2) 'If + Qv Q (Q - 2) v + A'If '
PQ (A - 1) 'If + Qv + PA (Q - 1) v + A 'If
If L = B, then Il replaces M. .
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fmQf: See appendix A.
This lemma extends lemma 7.1 to a corresponding stock market economy where (i) price setting market makers
compete with broker - arbitrageurs with access to valuable information in the trading system (i.e., the order
book), (ti) the intermediaries do not behave competitively but strategically, and (iii) the semi-rationalliquidity
traders are replaced by fully rational hedgers. In this way, the equilibrium is very general by having many of the
properties of real securities markets. It is straightforward to adjust the equilibrium back to the case where the
liquidity traders replace the hedgers, or to extend it to a corresponding stock market economy with both liquidity
traders and hedgers. This adjusunent would improve the viability of the equilibrium. Further extensions are
possible.
Some special cases
In this subsection, I concentrate on the difference between my model and the ones in Spiegel and Subrahmanyam
(1992).
Corollary 8.1: Suppose there is one marlcet maker or specialist acting competitively (thus, Q = l), A = O,
and M = O, then the linear equilibrium [( 811kt,Amkt, "Ut); SitJ is given by (3.1) - (3.3) and (3.18) where the
trading intensities and the price sensitivity are characterized by
(3.21) f3 = [2 ] ,
[(N + 1) r + 2 el .t + PN e [1 - .t (N -1) Pl r + .t2 [(N -1) p2 e + H y2 m](r + e)
r
(3.22)
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(3.23)
4- [NP+ ~(NP'£+H"'(j))]r
- Np2 (Nr + e) + H v2 m
fmQf: The trading intensities follow from (3.6) and (3.8), and the price sensitivity follows from (7.2.7) which
is the corresponding price sensitivity in a perfectly competitive dealership market Nevertheless, assuming
competitive behavior when there is only a single specialist is odd. According to (3.10), the trading intensity of
the market maker is u= 1/ A. Q.E.D.
This corol1aIy equals the most general equilibrium inSpiegel and Subrahmanyam (1992) given in their appendix
B, pages 327 - 328. The equilibrium has no closed form solution as is the case for lemma 8.1. To obtain close
form solution, we have to assume that both the superiorly informed speculators and the price setting market
makers are risk. neuual.
Corollary 8.2: Suppose the Q price setting market makers act competitively, A = O, PN = O, PM= O,PQ =
O,and
(3.24)
4 [N (T + e) + M (r + ,,) a2]
PåHm>
(r + 2 e)2
then there exists a unique, linear equilibrium [(Slikt, .dmkt, "Jakt); SJal given by (3.1), (3.2), (33), and (3.18).
The trading intensities are
(3.25)
(3.26) ~ HmB=av ,and
N (r + e) + M (r + ,,) a2
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(3.27) v = { ] } ,
2 ( 2 2) (H - 1)[N(r + e) + M(r + 77) a2 r
PH (r + 2 e) + r Ne + M a 77 +
H
{
~N (r + e) + M (r + 77)a2 }[Nr + (M + 1)(r + 77)aJ PH(r + 2e) - 2 Hm
where a is given by (2.3.6). The price sensitivity is
(3.28) l= r IN(r+e)+M(r+77)a
2
v[Nr + (M + l)(r + 77) a] ~ Hm .
Finally, Il replaces M if L = B.
fmQf: The trading intensities follow from (3.6), (3.7), and (3.8) and the price sensitivity Å = as which,
according to (3.18), is the price sensitivity in a securities market in which the market makers actually act
competitively (Q -+ 00). The condition on existence follows from the second order conditions which imply that
Å> O. One way of satisfying this is to assume that v c- O; see Spiegel and Subrahmanyam (1992), page 327.
Q.E.D.
This corollary extends lemma 2.1 to the case where the semi-rationalliquidity traders are replaced by rational,
wealth maximizing hedgers. Moreover, it also extends the stock market equilibrium given by proposition 1 in
Spiegel and Subrahmanyam (1992) to the case where the superiorly informed traders trade on the basis of
different-quality information. Thus, ifM = O,then corollary 8.2 equals their proposition 1 given on their page
313.
More on the existence or the equilibrium
Unlike the stock market equilibrium given by lemma 7.1, the equilibrium given by lemma 8.1 above may not
exisL
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Proposition 8.1: Suppose v »Oand Å > O, then there exists a unique, linear equilibrium given by lemma
8.1. Otherwise, the equilibrium may break down.
I:Em: As indicated by (3.27), the trading intensity of the hedgers may become negative if, for instance, they are
few in number. This means that the price sensitivity becomes a negative number which is not consistent with
the second order conditions of the speculators' maximization problems. However, Amay become negative even
when v e- O. This happens according to (3.18) when
(3.29) A (A - 2) '" + Qv Q (Q - 2) v + A '"PQ (A - 1) '" + Qv + PA (Q _ 1) v + A", < O.
For instance, if A = O and Q S; 2, then A S; Obecause mp S; O. Finally, if v » O and A > O, the proof of the
uniqueness follows along the same lines as the proof of the uniqueness of lemma 7.1; see proposition 7.1.
Q.E.D.
The non-existence of the equilibrium happens in two cases: First, if the supply of immediacy is small, the
intennediacy have "too much" market power as in Kyle (1984, 1989), and the market breaks down. Thus, there
is no equilibrium unless there are enough broker - arbitrageurs and/or market makers to generate a sufficiently
competitive trading environmenL Secondly, if the presence of uninformed hedgers is small, infooned ttaders are
not able to hide in the pool of traders and, as in Spiegel and Subrahmanyam (1992), the market breaks down. In
other words, a market collapse occurs when the uninfonned hedgers refuse to trade with the informed speculators
because the infonnational motive for trade outweighs their hedging motive. For such a result in a walrasian
framework; see Bhattacharya and Spiegel (1991).
Insider trading and market breakdowns
As suggested by inequalities (3.27) and (3.29), the probability of market breakdowns is influenced by the
number of corporate insiders "allowed" to operate in the securities market. The possibilities of market collapses
therefore have implications for insider trading regulations.
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Proposition 8.2: Suppose the securities market is characterized by corollary 8.2 and
(3.30) r+TIJ.I.> --,
TI
then the probability of a viable equilibrium increases with the supply of corporate insiders in an otherwise
randomly given set of parameters. Nevertheless. if J.I.= Oand then increases to M < (T + TI)I TI. the probability
of a market breakdown increases.
IE:af: Given the assumption, the condition for a viable equilibrium is given by (3.24). We see that insider
trading affects the right hand side of the inequality. It is straightforward to show that Sgn(d RHS I d M) =
Sgn(r + (1 - M) 11)where RHS means the right hand side, and condition (3.30) follows immediately. This
means that the right hand side is a unimodal function which increases for small Jl and decreases for larger u,
Q.E.D.
The desirable competition effects caused by extensive insider trading increases the viability of the market
equilibrium. On the other hand, increased trading by the market professionals always increases the probability
of a market breakdown. The reason is the differences in information structures between professionals and
insiders; see section 2.2.
This result gives in some respects a more complicated picture of market breakdowns and informed trading
than the ones given previously by Glosten and Milgrom (1985), Glosten (1989), Bhattacharya and Spiegel
(1991), and Spiegel and Subrahmanyam (1992). They find that the market breaks down if there are "too much"
informed trading. In my model, there may be infmitely many informed traders, and the securities market
equilibrium may still exists. But since infinitely many corporate insiders reveal their information through
trading, the amount of insider trading is limited (cf. (2.2.11». This is the reason that securities markets may
hold open even if there are infinitely many corporate insiders operating on information obtained from internal
sources.
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8.4 TRADING INTENSITIES
This section analyzes how the demand and supply of immediacy depend on the number of corporate insiders
trading in the financial market and thereby on the exogenously determined insider trading regulations. The
market is said to be immediate if an incoming order is executed immediately without any search for traders to
take the opposite position. In this model, the motives for trading are information, risk sharing, and market
power in the broker - dealership market.
Demanders of immediacy
The demanders are the informed speculators and the uninformed hedgers, but they have different motives for
trading. The market professionals and the corporate insiders trade stocks based on privileged information
whereas the hedgers trade to cover their initial position. Nevertheless, their trading intensities have several
properties in common.
Proposition 8.3: Suppose the stock market equilibrium is given by (3.1) - (3.20), then
(4.1) ~P < 0, _-:-~a:-B __ --:-
a var( i -R S, y., Y* = y *) a var( i -R S, y, y* = y *)
ap aB ava.a < 0, a.a < 0, and a.a < o.
av
fmQf: This is obtained by differentiating the trading intensities given by (3.6), (3.7), and (3.8) with respect to
the relevant variables, holding other variables constant Q.E.D.
Other things equal, the demanders of immediacy decrease their trading intensities when the trading risk (that is,
the risk of trading at a price different from its underlying value) or the price sensitivity (and thereby the
equilibrium bid ask spread) are increasing. There are also differences in the trading response between hedgers and
speculators.
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Proposition 8.4: Suppose the stock market equilibrium is given by (3.1) - (3.20), then
(4.2) () f3 < O ()B O __ .1 () V O()PN ' ()/JM < ,UT," ()Pu > .
fmQf: This is obtained by differentiating (3.6), (3.7), and (3.8) with respect to the respective risk aversion
coefficients, holding other variables constanL Q.E.D.
ff their risk aversion increases, the trading intensities of infonned speculators decrease while the trading intensity
of uninfonned hedgers increases. The hedgers, of course, want to increase the hedge of their initial position if
they become more concerned about random fluctuations in the future value of the security. This is their motive
for trading.
Proposition 8.5: The trading intensities of the demanders of immediacy WJd. to be reduced in the supply of
corporate insiders:
(4.3) d f3 < O, d B < O, and d v < O.
dJl dJl dJl
Figure 8.1 gives the trading intensities of the demanders of immediacy as functions of u, using the numerical
values given in table 8.3 (see appendix B).
Trading
intensity
FIGURE 8.1 The trading intensities of the demanders
O. 36 or immediacy
0.3
0.26
0.2
0.1.6 *> M
0.1.
0.06
The number of illegally
2. 'I. 6. 8. 1.0. trading insiders
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ff the supply of corporate insiders decreases because of tightened enforcement of the ban against insider trading,
the trading intensities of the market professionals, the remaining corporate insiders, and the hedgers increase
monotonically. In the example, we observe that v·(JJ. = O) = 0.355 > v(JJ. = 10) = 0.072 > v(JJ. ~ 00) = 0.068,
B·(JJ.= O) = 0.192 > B(JJ.= 10) = 0.0182 > B(JJ. ~ 00)= O, and p.(JJ. = O) = 0.109 > P(JJ.= 10) = 0.033> P(JJ.~
00)=0.022.
We observe that if the corporate insiders grow in number, the uninformed hedgers respond by reducing their
demand. One reason is that insiders reduce the effectiveness of spot hedging due to the leakage of information
through their submission of orders to the price setting intermediaries. Thereby the insiders reduce the
uncertainty associated with holding an uncovered position in security k from t to t+ 1. By doing this before the
hedgers actually have insured their initial position by taking an offsetting position at the forthcoming batch
auction, the insiders actually desttoy some of the risk sharing possibilities. One extreme occurs if the current
price for some reason reveals the future value of the security, because it then would be impossible to use the
batch auction to hedge, and the hedging demand would be zero. On the other hand, insider trading reduces the
risk of spot ttading because the variance of the price deviation, given the hedger's own trade, is reduced from
2.403, when there are no corporate insiders, to 1.209, when there are ten insiders, and converges towards 1.041
when J.L ~ 00. Other things equal, this would, according to (4.1), increase the ttading intensity of the hedgers.
In this way, there is a ttade-off between less hedging due to reduced risk sharing possibilities and increased
hedging due to less risk of ttading at the current spot price. Ifind that the negative effect on the effectiveness of
hedging strategies tends to dominate the positive effect on the risk of taking a spot position to offset the initial
risk. This gives an explanation why the trading intensity of uninformed hedgers is falling in the supply of
corporate insiders.
The effects on the ttading intensities of superiorly informed speculators are much the same as in section
7.4. However, there is a new effect caused by the endogenous reduction in the amount of uninformed ttading.
This effect reduces the informed trading in order not to reveal too much information when facing the price
setting intermediaries.
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Suppliers of immediacy
The supply of immediacy is delivered by the broker - arbitrageurs and the market makers. They are both trading
and competing with information inferred from the order book which displays the net order flow from the
demanders of immediacy. Their motive for trading is the possibility of exploiting their market power and
thereby make a risk adjusted profil
Proposition 8.6: Suppose the stock market equilibrium is given by (3.1) - (3.20), then (for almost all
parameter values)
fmQf: This follows by differentiating (3.9) and (3.10) with respect to the relevant variables, holding other
variables constanl Q.E.D.
Other thing equal, the trading intensity of the broker - arbitrageUlS decreases when their risk aversion, market
power, or their price differentiation problem is reduced. On the other hand, their trading intensity increases when
the market power of professionals or the informativeness of the net order flow is increased. For instance, if the
market power of the broker - arbitrageurs is reduced, they expect to earn less risk adjusted profil Consequently,
they respond by increasing their trading intensity in order to compensate for some of the reduction in expected
profit.
Proposition 8.7: The trading intensities of the suppliers of immediacy WJd. to decrease in the supply of
corporate insiders:
(4.5)
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Figure 8.2 gives an example.
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FIGURE 8.2 The trading intensities of the suppliers
of immediacy
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The limits are v·(J.L = O)= 0.219 > v(J.L = 10) = 0.072 > v(J.L -+ 00) = 0.068 and u·(J.L = O) = 0.141> u(J.L = 10)
= 0.059 > u(J.I. -+ 00) = 0.051. In other words, the trading intensities of the suppliers of immediacy are
monotonically decreasing functions in J.I..This is consistent with what we observed in the previous subsection,
as, when the demand for immediacy falls, the supply of immediacy must fall in order to clear the securities
IfJ.I.increases, the intermediaries are facing a trade-off. They tend to increase their trading intensity because
trading by corporate insiders increase the informativeness of the net order flow, which in turn reduces the risk of
trading. But this effect is dominated by an effect working in the opposite direction caused by the worsening of
their adverse selection problem due to relatively more informed than uninfonned trading. The negative net effect
leads to less enthusiasm for taking the opposite position vis-a-vis the demanders of immediacy. This is
consistent with Leland (1992), who on page 8TI finds that the average demand of competitive hedger -
arbittageurs falls if the law changes from prohibiting to allowing insider trading.
8.5 PRICE SENSITIVITY
The slope of the market clearing line is the intermediaries' response parameter to changes in the market
conditions. If the slope increases, the equilibrium bid ask spread increases which in tum reduces the liquidity of
the market According to (3.18), the price sensitivity and thereby the equilibrium bid ask spread is split into
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three components:
(5.1) Bid ask spread = market power (adverse selection + risk compensation).
This relation means that the equilibrium bid ask spread, denoted s = S(A), equals the market power component
multiplied by the sum of the adverse selection and the risk compensation components (see also (3.3.2». This
division of the spread is consistent with the discussion, e.g., in Schwartz (1988), pages 419 - 420.
Proposition 8.8: Suppose the stock market equilibrium is given by (3.1) - (3.20), then
(5.2) a.t > o ...!!.. > o, and a.t > o.aas ' amp arc
fmQf: This follows directly by differentiating (3.18) with respect 10 the relevant variables, holding other
variables constant Q.E.D
Other things equal, the price sensitivity and thereby the equilibrium bid ask spread are widened if the market
power, the adverse selection, or the risk compensation of the price setting intermediaries increases. Notice that
mp > 1 and reflects the competition in the broker - dealership market The two other components are also
present in (7.3.8).
Proposition 8.9: Suppose the stock market equilibrium is given by (3.1) - (3.20), then
(5.3) Lim .t(A, Q) = as.
A-+-U1II, ..
Q-+-
fmgf: This follows directly from (3.18). Q.E.D.
This means that competition in the broker - dealership market tends 10narrow the bid ask spread so that it only
reflects adverse selection, and the pricing therefore tends 10be risk neutral and the market power evaporates.
315
Proposition 8.10: The price sensitivity and thereby the equilibrium bid ask spread l&.IJIi. to increase with the
supply of corporate insiders:
(5.4) dÅ.> O and ds> O.
dJ.l dJ.l
Figure 8.3 illustrates.
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I find that AijJ.= O)= 0.999 < AijJ. = 10) = 2.633 < A·ijJ.-+ 00) = 3.585. Thus, the price sensitivity and thereby
the equilibrium bid ask spread are increasing monotonically with the number of corporate insiders. This is
consistent with the findings in Leland (1992), who on page 870 finds that the average price is increasing when
insider trading is permitted. Here the equilibrium bid ask spread is increasing which leads to a higher transaction
price; see also King and ROell (1988), page 168.
If the supply of corporate insiders increases, e.g., because of less enforcement from the stock market
regulators, the net effect on the price sensitivity is detennined by a trade-off between adverse selection. risk
compensation. and market power. Figure 8.4 illustrates.
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I find that as(JJ. = O) = 0.311 < as(JJ. = 10) = 1.807 < as·(JJ. ~ 00) = 2.606, rc·(JJ. = O) = 0.466 > rc(JJ. = 10) =
0.275 > rc(JJ. ~ 00) = 0.239, and mp·(JJ. = O) = 1.285 > mp(JJ. = 10) = 1.264 > mp(JJ. ~ 00) = 1.260. The
adverse selection increases monotonically with Jl whereas the risk compensation and the market power decrease
monotonically. Notice that the price sensitivity can be found from the figure by the use of (3.18). For
instance, A.(JJ.= 10) = 1.264 (1.807 + 0.275) = 2.633.
There are two important effects which affect the adverse selection component in the price sensitivity. These
effects are called the competition and the hedger effect First, for a given amount of hedging, the competition
effect (through the sub-effect previously called the ''presence-of-insider'' effect) increases the adverse selection
component when Jl increases from zero to Jl' ... 1 (where Jl' is dermed by d as(JJ.') Id Jl = O in a corresponding
market without hedging). If Jl increases to u", where u" is a constant satisfying Jl' < u." < M, the
competition effect ("lack-of-coordinationj decreases the adverse selection component Secondly, the trading
intensity of the hedgers falls when Jl increases. A decrease in the demand from uninformed traders tends to
increase adverse selection because of the relative increase in informed traders. But there is also an opposite effect
because informed speculators act strategically, and reduce their trading in order not to reveal too much
information to the intermediaries. Nevertheless, the net effect increases the adverse selection because the
competition effect tends to dominate the hedger effect This is not necessarily the case if the corporate insiders
observe diverse information; see Subrahmanyam and Spiegel (1992), pages 315 - 316. In this case, the net
effect depends on the risk aversion of the uninformed hedgers which influences the change in the size of the
uninfonned orders. I find that when they are working in opposite directions, the hedger effect tends to dominate
the competition effect This also holds when the uninformed hedgers' risk aversion is large. Hence, the adverse
selection tends to increase with J.1.
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The risk compensation component in the equilibrium price sensitivity decreases with the number of
corporate insiders because an expansion in J.I. brings the transaction price closer to its fundamental. This implies
that it is less risky to take the opposite position vis-a-vis the demanders of immediacy. Consequently, the
intermediaries need not to quote as high a bid ask spread as is the case when there are fewer insiders, e.g.,
because L = B. When A = O or Q = O, the market power component in the equilibrium price sensitivity is a
constant independent of J.I.. This is also almost the case when there are two types of intermediaries. I find,
however, that the market power decreases slightlyas the intennediaries meet the order flow from less powerful
demanders ofimm~.
8.6 MARKET EFFICIENCY
According to (3.18) and (3.20), the price sensitivity is closely related to the price infonnativeness. This
relationship is caused by the component reflecting the risk compensation of the intermediaries; see section 7.5
for further comments.
Lemma 8.2: The price informativeness is
(6.1)
fmgf: The market efficiency is measured by (All), and (6.1) follows straightforwardly from the structure of the
equilibrium. Q.ED.
Because the informed speculators are risk averse, the market efficiency depends on the amount of hedging. The
reason is that speculators scale up their trades less than the increase in hedging; see Spiegel and Subrahmanyam
(1992), who on page 318 analyze the case where hedging does not influence the informativeness of the
transaction price.
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Proposition 8.11: Suppose the stock market equilibrium is given by (3.1) - (3.20), then
(6.2) : 'Pr o'P > o o 'Pu < o, op 'o B > O o'P > O o'P > O o'P'oN ' oM 'oT/
o'P < O __ .I o'P O
oH ' UfIU o fl) > .
< O o'P < O o'P O'oe 'ov < ,
£mm: This follows by differentiating (6.1) with respect to the relevant variables, holding other variables
constant. Q.E.D.
We see that the price informativeness increases with the amount of informed trading, but decreases with the
amount of uninfonned hedging.
Proposition 8.12: The price informativeness ~ to increase with the supply of corporate insiders and the
precision of inside inj017fl/ltion:
(6.3) d 'P > O and d 'P < o.
dJl dT/
Figure 8.5 gives 'P as a function of u,
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The limits are 'P{J1= O)= 0.536 < 'P{J1= 10) = 0.908 < 'P.{J1 ~ 00) = 1.048 where • indicates the maximum. I
conclude that as long as the supply of market professionals is fixed or inelastic, the informativeness is improved
by insider trading. Another indicator of market efficiency, the price volatility is also increasing when Jl
319
increases due to a less enforcement of L = B.
8.7 WELFARE
This section analyzes the effects caused by an exogenous change in the number of corporate insiders on the
welfare of all agents present in the economy characterized by lemma 8.1. As in Admati and Pfleiderer (1988),
the welfare is measured by the expected risk adjusted profit which equals the expected profit minus an appropriate
risk premium.
Suppliers of immediacy
The market makers and the broker - arbitrageUl'S recognize their market power, and expect accordingly to make a
risk adjusted profn, As a result, the privilege to observe the order flow and set the transaction price becomes
quite valuable. I show that the value of these privileges depends on the insider trading regulations, and because
there often are close links between the exchange and the regulatory agency, the exchange becomes a powerful
demander of regulation. The view that exchanges are profit maximizing organizations is consistent with the
discussion in Miller (1991), pages 128 - 130.
Lem"", 8.3: The value of market moking is
(7.1)Ceq = _1_10g{[ (9- 1 _+ R S-I _* *)]2 - P~ var(åq I y* = y *) var(i - R SI y* = y *)},
2 PQ PQcov q' x - y = y
where
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v( - - - - ) " [(N P +) {l(NP + MB)} " {N p2 E + M2 B2 TJ l](7.4)00 Sq, x - RS I y*=y* = VI\. r + l\. __2 •
MB -1 +Hv-m
In the same way, the individual value of observing the order book without any formal responsibility of market
clearing is
(7.5) ce, = _1_10g{[ (_ 1_+ _ _ )]2 _ pl var(A. I y* = y *) var(i _ R S I y* = y *)},
2PA PA cov A., x - RS I y*=y*
where
fmgf: The values given by (7.1) and (7.5) follow from (7.B3), and the variances andcovariances given by (7.2)
- (7.4) and (7.6) - (7.7) follow easily from the structure of the securities markel equilibrium given by lemma
8.1. Q.E.D.
The value of observing the net order flow depends on the trade-off between expected profil and risk exposure
where the risk aversion decide the weight of these two effects. For instance, if the supplier of immediacy is
relatively risk averse, the deduction because of trading risk becomes more importanL Otherwise, il is sufficient
to analyze the effect on expected profiL
Proposition 8J3: The value of observing the order flow ~ to be a monotonically decreasing function in
the supply of corporate insiders:
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(7.8) dCeq < O and dCe. < O.
dJl dJl
Figure 8.6 illustrates.
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In this example, Ce-.(JJ. = O) = 0.130 > Ce.(JJ. = 10) = 0.036 >Ce.(JJ. -+ -) = 0.024 and ee.q(J.I. = O) = 0.072 >
Ceq(JJ.= 10) = 0.026 > Ceq(JJ. -+ -) = 0.019. Ce.(JJ.) > Ceq(JJ.)because the broker - arbitrageurs areasswned to
be fewer and less risk averse than the market makers. This means the broker - arbitrageurs have more use for the
information content in the order flow from the demanders of immediacy because they respond barder to the
information.
If the supply of corporate insiders increases, the effect on the expected profit depends on the sub-effects on
the equilibriwn bid ask spread and the expected trading volwne. The first sub-effect is positive because insider
trading reduces hedging, and lowers the adverse selection problem faced by the suppliers of immediacy. This
forces the intermediaries to increase the price sensitivity and thereby the bid ask spread. The second sub-effect is
negative because insider trading erodes market liquidity by reducing the trading from both the demander and
suppliers of immediacy. In this way, the sub-effect on the equilibriwn bid ask spread is positive, but the sub-
effect on the expected trading volwne is negative, because it reduces the expected welfare of the suppliers of
immediacy.
If the supply of corporate insiders increases, the effect on risk exposure depends on their risk aversion and
their ttading risk. The risk aversion is independent of insider ttading, whereas the trading risk depends on insider
trading via its influence through the expected trading volwne and the variability of the pricing error. Insider
trading reduces the variability of the pricing error because information leaks out to the suppliers of immediacy
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via the net order flow, and they are therefore able to reduce the difference between the market price and its
underlying fundamental. In this way, the effect on both the expected trading volume and the expected trading
risk are positive because the risk premium is reduced, leading to higher expected welfare for the suppliers of
immediacy.
Table 8.1 summarizes the effects.
lADLE 8.l: Effects on welfare caused by A ....
• ep re1- -11- -I
lw .Y..2.l ~
JL=O -+ JLSM + -/+ +
The net effect on the welfare of the suppliers of immediacy tends to be negative because insider trading reduces
the expected trading volume and thereby the expected profil But there are positive effects working through the
bid ask spread and the ttading risk.
The outsiders in Leland (1992) are as my arbitrageurs using the transaction price as their sole source of
information. Although, his outsiders differ from my arbitrageurs since they have an initial wealth. The final
conclusion is identical. The welfare of arbitrageurs increases if the law changes from allowing to prohibiting
insider trading.
The demand for regulatory actions against insider trading may have many supporters in real world securities
markets, but a condition for success is that powerful groups such as exchange members (market makers and
brokers) are among the demanders to lobby the restrictions through the regulatory bureaucracy. Having
exchange members on the team is an advantage because there often are close links between the national exchange
and the regulatory agency. In this way, the stock market exchange often has a great impact on the national
securities market law, at least in smaller countries.
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Hedgers
The uninformed hedgers demand immediacy because they have a need to share the risk of holding the initial
wealth from time t to time t+ 1. and a better allocation of risk improves their welfare. As we shall see. hedgers
have much in common with liquidity traders. Nonetheless. the hedgers are fully rational while the liquidity
traders are nOL
Lemma 8.4: The value of hedging the initial wealth of hedger h E {l. 2•...•Hl when the hedgers realize that
they have a random endowment is
(7.9) ce, = _1_IOg{[ (_ 1_+ S-I _* *)]2 - ~ var(iih I y* = y *) var(x - R SI y* = y *)}.
2 PH PH COV Uh' X - R Y = Y
where the variance of the pricing error is given by (7.2).
(7.10) var(iih I y* = y *) = v2 OJ. and
(7.11) cov(iih• X - RS I y*=y*) = - A. v2 OJ.
However. the expected utility when hedger h knows Wit is
(7.13)
_ _ [{ 1 + }]2 {N 2 e + M
2
B
2
}(7.14)var(I-v)x+vRSIWh.y*=y*)= r l-v 1( R ) +A.2v2 P 11.
/I,. NI-' + M B + (H - 1) v2 OJ
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fmQf: The value of hedging given by (7.9) follows from (7.B3), and the variance and the covariance given by
(7.10) and (7.11) follow easily from the structure of the equilibrium. Then I insert (3.3) into (2.1), and yield the
value of holding and hedging the initial position given by (7.12). The expectation and the variance given by
(7.13) and (7.14) respectively follow straightforwardly from the structure of the equilibrium given by (3.1) -
(3.20). Q.E.D.
The expected risk adjusted profit equals the expected profit minus an appropriate risk premium which reflects the
risk of both holding and hedging the initial position. But the pure value of hedging given by (7.9) does not
recognize the effects on the initial wealth, and the hedgers may therefore be considered as "liquidity traders" with
an elastic demand. In this case, it is not optimal to hedge because Cet. < O for all v > O. This may seem
strange, but it is caused by the fact that the trader does not know the risk caused by the initial position.
However, if the hedgers know their initial wealth Wh, hedging is optimal, and hedging is therefore a part of the
equilibrium. If v = O, then, according to (7.12),
(7.15)
and by choosing v > O, the hedgers obviously improve their expected utility. In fact there exist parameter
values for which v e- 1, suggesting, as also pointed out by Spiegel and Subrahmanyam (1992), pages 317 -
318, that the hedgers may"over-hedge".
Proposition 8.14: The welfare of uninformed "liquidity traders" with till elastic demand of immediacy lmIJ.s.
to improve with the supply 0/ illegally trading insiders, whereas the welfare 0/ uninformed hedgers le.J:I.ds. to
deteriorate:
(7.16)
Figure 8.7 gives an example.
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I find that ~(JJ. = O) = -0.405 < C~(JJ. = 10) = -0.038 < Ce-h(JJ. -+ 00) = -0.020 and eo- h(JJ.= O) = -0.522 >
eUh(JJ.= 10) = -0.713 > eUh(JJ.-+ 00) = -0.797 where eDb = (BUh - Wh B[x Iy*=y*]) IWh2 depends on M (and
thereby on J.I.) in the same way as BUh.
In this example, the welfare of "liquidity traders" improves with J.I. and the welfare of hedgers worsen. If v =
O, ellh = -l for all J.I.which clearly illustrates that the hedger really has a rationale for trading because ellh (JJ.)> -l
for all J.I. ~ 10. This is not the case with liquidity traders who are assumed to trade randomly (that is for
exogenous reasons).
First, if we ignore the effects on the initial wealth of the hedgers, then, according to (7.9), the value of
hedging depends on the expected trading cost and the risk exposure. According to (7.11), the expected trading
cost depends on the bid ask spread and the position given by (7.10). Ihave found that insider trading increases
the bid ask spread (see (5.4», but decreases the positions of the hedgers (see (4.3». Therefore the net effect on
the expected profit is a trade-off between these two effects.
The risk exposure of the hedger depends on risk aversion and the risk of trading where the risk depends on
the position taken and the variance ofpricing error. I find that insider trading reduces both position (see (4.3»
and the variance of the price deviation given by (1.2). In this way, insider trading improves the risk exposure of
"liquidity traders". This means that the effects of insider trading on expected trading profit and risk exposure tend
to be positive, and so is the effect on the expected risk adjusted profiL The reason is that the net effect depends
on its two sub-effects which are weighted by the risk aversion. For instance, if the hedgers are relatively risk
averse, they pay much attention to the risk exposure, and they do not feel that insider trading is a problem
because it reduces the trading risk.
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Secondly, if the hedgers recognize their initial wealth, they also have to take into account the effect caused
by insider trading on the possibilities of covering their position. We have seen that insider trading increases
market efficiency (see (6.3» and thereby decreases the riskiness of the future price, but increases simultaneously
the volatility of the market price which, of course, measures the riskiness of the current transaction price. This
transmission of risk from the future to the present period reduces the effectiveness of hedging sttategies because
there is reduced possibilities to hedge the future risk and a greater need to hedge the risk of trading together with
corporate insiders creating variability in the transaction price. It is difftcult to hedge against market created risks
such as price volatility. The transmission effect tends to dominate the effects recognized by corresponding
"liquidity traders".
Table 8.2 gives a summary the major effects affecting the welfare of both "liquidity traders" and real
hedgers.
TABLE 8.2: Effect on welfare caused by å J.I.
• ep re wre1- -11- -I
ltu rn ~
J.I. = O -+ J.l.SM
• "Liquidity traders" +/+ + +
• Hedgeø +/+ +
The net effect on expected profit tends to be positive whereas the net effect on risk exposure is either positive or
negative depending on the risk exposure of the initial wealth. In this way, the hedgers tends to prefer insider
ttading prohibited.
My fInding is consistent with the finding in Spiegel and Subrahmanyam (1992), pages 320 - 321 (see,
especially, their proposition 5). The outsiders in Leland (1992) have an initial wealth as my hedgers. This
suggests that some of their demand is motivated by hedging, and this is used by Leland to explain why the
welfare of outsiders increases when the law changes from allowing to prohibiting insider trading. He says that
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the distribution of risk is less desirable with insider trading (see his page 878). An early resolution of
uncertainty may not always benefit market participants because it may destroy the possibilities of risk sharing;
see Hirshleifer (1971).
Informed speculators
The corporate insiders and the market professionals expect to earn a risk adjusted profit on their superior
information.
LemmtJ 8.5: The value of insider trading is
(7.17) 1 {[ 1 + ]2 2 [ var(åm I y*=y*) ·l}Cem = --log - - - PM •
2 PM PM COV(åm• i - R S I y* = y *) var( i - R S I y* = y *)
where the variance o/the pricing error is given by (7.2).
(7.18) var(åm I y*=y*) = B2 [F + TI).and
(7.19) cov(åm.i - RSly*=y*) = B[(1 - l(Np + MB))r - MB1,,].
The gross value o/ acqWring private information is
(7.20) 1 {[ 1+ ]2 [ var(8a I y* = y *) ·l}Cea=--log - - -~ •
2PN PNCOv(Oa.i - RSly*=y*) var(i - RSly*=y*)
(7.21) var(8a I y* = y *) = p2 (r + e). and
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(7.22) cov(OD,i - RSly*=y*) = fJ [{l - ).,(NfJ + MB))r - NfJ).,e].
1Egf: The values given by (7.17) and (7.20) follow from (7.B3), and the variances and the covariances given
by (7.18), (7.19), (7.21), and (7.22) follow straightforwardly from the structure of the equilibrium (3.1) - (3.20).
Q.E.D.
The value of superior infonnation depends on the ttade-off between expected profit and risk exposure where risk
aversion detennines the strength of the risk exposure. The Hirshleifer effect does not affect the welfare of the
superiorly infonned speculators because they are assumed to have no initial position (thus, Wn = Wm = O for all
n E {l, 2, ... , N} and m E (l, 2, ... , Mn.
Proposition 8.15: The value of superior information ~ to decrease when the number of corporate
insiders increases:
(7.23) dCeD < O and dCem < O.
d J.L d J.L
Figure 8.8 illustrates.
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In this example, Ce-m{jJ. = O) = 0.172 > Cem{jJ. = 10) = 0.003 > Cem{jJ. -+ 00) = Oand Ce-n{jJ. = O) = 0.066 >
Cen{jJ. = 10) = 0.008 > cen{jJ. -+ 00) = 0.004. This means that ifL changes exogenously from A to B where J.1
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< M = 10, the value of superior infonnation is reduced. We observe that if Jl < 4.768, the value of inside
information is greater than the value of privately acquired infonnation before acquisition costs. Otherwise,
Cem(Jl) < Cen(Jl)·
If the supply of corporate insiders increases, there are two additional effects relative to the ones identified in
section 7.7 and summarized in tables 7.2 - 7.3. First, there is a reduction in the amount of uninfonned trading
because hedging is elastic, and, secondly, the bid ask spread is higher due to the market power of the
intennediaries (and the eroding of market liquidity). These new effects influence both the expected profit and the
risk exposure. The next table summarizes the major effects.
+
+
TABLE 8.3: Effects on welfare caused by AJl
•
JI. = O~JI. SM:
• Insiders
• Professionals
ep re
Superiorly infonned speculatoIS lose welfare because the equilibrium bid ask spread increases and because they
have less volume to hide behind. This means that even if the speculators are market professionals, the expected
profit decreases monotonically. On the other hand, the effect on risk exposure is positive since insider trading
reveals information and brings market prices nearer to their underlying fundamentals. In addition, the
speculators' positions are reduced because ofreduced hedging. However, the positive effect on risk exposure
tends to be dominated by the negative effect on expected profiL
8.8 SHORT SUMMARY OF MAJOR CONCLUSIONS
Insider trading is analyzed in an environment with uninfonned hedgers, two types of infonned speculators, and
market makers, I conclude that insider trading is not desirable because it reduces the amount of uninfonned
trading and thereby makers everybody (except elastic "liquidity ttadersj worse off. The stock market regulators
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should prohibit insider trading and enforce the law. This conclusion is strengthen if incentive effects are
recognized; see chapters 5 - 6.
APPENDICES
This section is used to prove lemma 8.1 and to give the numerical values which are used to illustrate the
equilibrium.
Appendix A Prool ol lemma 8.1
The equilibrium price of security k E {l. 2 ..... Kl at auction te (O.l ..... Tk - 1l is determined by the market
clearing condition:
(Al)
Market clearing means that the demand of immediacy equals the supply of immediacy. I assume that the trading
strategies of the suppliers of immediacy. who are the broker - arbitrageurs and the market makers. are linear in
the market price. Thus.
(A2) A. = - ",(RS - E[i I y*=y*1). and
(A3) 9q = - V(RS - E[i I y*=y*1).
respectively. I insert (A2) and (A3) into (AI). and yield the equilibrium price
(A4) S = .!.. (E[i I y*=y*] + .tz).
R
where z is the market orders from the demanders of immediacy. which in this case are the informed speculators
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and the uninfonned hedgers. and the price sensitivity
(A5) .t = l
IfQ = O. then (A5) equals (2.7.5). In this way. the market depth is provided by both arbitrageurs and market
makers.
The risk adjusted profit of arbittageur a e (1.2 ..... Al is represented by the object function in their
portfolio-selection problem given by (2.2). I insert the linear ttading sttategy given by (A2). Then the
portfolio-selection problem of the broker - arbittageur equals
(A6)Max _ 'Il. ( RS - ) (E[i li. y*=y*]) _ PA 'Il: ( RS - )2 var(i I Z. y*=y*).
". E[ily*=y*] -RS 2 E[ily*=y*]
The next step is to insert the price function given by (A4) and simultaneously take into account that from the
arbitrageur's perspective the price sensitivity is
(A7) .t = l
(A - l) 'Il + 'Il. + Qv'
In this way. the arbitrageur recognizes that he affects the market depth through his supply intensity Va. After
some sttaightforward simplifications. I yield
(A8) Max _ 'Il. z2 {COv(i.i)
". (A - l) 'Il + 'Il. + Qv var(i)
l [l PA (- I-)J}- -- varxz(A - l) 'Il + 'Il. +Q v 2 'Il. .
The first Older condition gives the ttading intensity
(A9) 'I' {l }"'= . ----Qvas.PA + Aas'l' mPA
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where mpA is given by (3.14),
(AlO)
cov(i, z I y* = y*)
as = (_ _ )' andvarzly*=y*
(All)
1
'1'= -~---~
var(i I z, y*=y*)"
The second order condition secures that the intensity determined by the first order condition is optimal, i.e., a
maximum.
(A12) as _ ( 1 )2 [(2 A-l) 'I' + 2 Q v + PA [(A _ 3) 'I' + Q v1] < O.A 'I' + Q v (A - 1) 'I' + Qv 2 'I'
This suggests that 'If ~ O.
In the same way, market maker q e (l,2, ..., Q) determines his optimal supply intensity by solving his
portfolio-selection problem parallel to (A6). The first order condition is
(A13) 'I' {l }v= ---A'I'as,
PQ + Qas'l' mpQ
where mPQ is given by (3.15). The second order condition is
(A14) as _ ( 1 )2 [(2 Q - 1)v + 2 A 'I' + PQ [(Q _ 3) v + A l] < O.
A 'I' + Qv (Q - 1) v + A 'I' 2 'I' 'I'
This suggests that u~O.
I insert (A13) into (A9) and yield (3.9) after some straightforward calculations. Then I insert (3.9) into
(A13) and yield (3.10). Finally, I insert (3.9) and (3.10) into (AS), and get the equilibrium price sensitivity
given by (3.18) where as is given by (AIO),
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(AlS)
(AI6)
I substitute (3.14) and (3.15) into (AlS). and yield (3.19). Then I inset (6.1) into (AI6). and yield (3.12).
Finally. (3.16) follows from the structure of the securities market equilibrium in the same way as in earlier
chapters.
The portfolio-selection problem of hedger h E {l. 2•...• H} is given by (2.1). I use the price function
given by (A4) and get this equivalent formulation of the hedger's problem.
The first order condition gives the trading strategy given by (3.3) in which the trading intensity of the hedger
equals
(AI8)
v = Pø [var(i Iy*=y*) - Åcov(i. z Iy*=y*)]
2 Å + Pø [var(i I y* = y*) + Å2 var(z IUh' Y* = y *) - 2 Å cov(i. z IY* = y *)r
The trading intensity given by (3.8) follows directly. Finally. the second order condition follows from (AI?).
andequals
(AI9)
IfPH :=!: O and A. :=!: O (with at least one strict inequality). the second order condition is satisfied because the
variance is always non-negative.
The portfolio-selection problems of the market professionals and the corporate insiders are given by (?.2.2)
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and (7.2.3) where the first order conditions are given by (7.3.1) and (7.3.2). These trading strategies are identical
10 the ones given by (3.1) and (3.2). The trading intensities are given by (7.3.3) and (7.3.4) which are identical
10 (3.6) and (3.7). The second order conditions for a maximum are given by (7.A2) and (7.A3). Finally, the
variances given by (3.11) - (3.13) follow straightforwardly from the structure of the equilibrium. This
completes the proof of lemma 8.1.
Appendix B Exam pie
The following numerical values are used when drawing figures 8.1 - 8.8, illustrating the properties of the
equilibrium:
TABLE a,3: Numerical values
r = 2 R = 1 M = 10
e = 2 PM = 1 J1 E {O, 1, •••, M}
11 = 1 Pli = 1 N = 2
m = 1 PH = 1 H = 10
PA = 1 A = 2
PQ = 2 Q = 4
Note that the necessary ''noise" from the hedgers is secured by increasing the size of theit (limit) orders relative
10 the market order size of liquidity traders used in the previous chapter. Inthis example the difference between
broker - arbitrageurs and market makers is that the broker - arbitrageurs are fewer but the market makers are more
risk averse.
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SYMBOL GLOSSARY
OF PART IV
(see also the symbol glossary of part IT)
a 300 k',k·,k" 287
as 262,304 K,Kt 258
A 300 A. 260,261,304
P 261,303 Aa 301,303
13* 264 m 258
B 261,303 304mp
B* 264
mpA,mpQ 304
Ce 292
1.1' ,1.1" 317
ee.,Ced'C~,
J.Id, J.Ii!, J1~, J.I.n 268,272,278,285
Cern,ce, ,Ceq 275,277,281,284,
M 258
320,321,324,328
n 257
d 259
v 303
D 259
N 257
Åm 258,260,303
q 259
ep, ePm, epn 283,286,323 On 258,261,302
fO,gO 264 Q 259
h 300
~ 301,303
H 300
re 262,304
264
re, rtd, rem, ren 279,283,286,323
k 258
P 268,288,292
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PA,Po,PH,
PN,PN,PQ 258,259,300
PO',PO" 277,278
Gd,Øm,Gn 287,288
S 315
S 259,260,261,304
t 258
t', t-, t·· 287
T, Tk 258
T 292
lld,Uh 259,300,303
U 303
U(),U,U' 258
V 292
Vd, v-:v; Vq 292,293
wre 327
m 300
Wh, Wm, v, 300,329
x 260
Y 258
Yn 257
'If 303
'I' 273,318
z 259,301
Zq 259
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CHAPTER 9
SUMMARY OF MAJOR CONCLUSIONS
First draft: September 1992,
Current version: January 1993.
ABSTRACT
This cluJpter gives a short overview of the major conclllSions in cluJpters2 - 8. It is done by giving advice on how the
stock marlr.etregulators, the varioIlS types of outsiders, and the corporate insiders should adjllSt to insider trading or its
regulation.
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9.1 INTRODUCTION
This dissertation focuses on insider trading regulations by analyzing rather formal financial market models in
which the corporate insiders may differ in supply due to changes in the regulation of insider trading or its
enforcement by the regulators. In chapter 2 - 8. the primary interest was what happens to the properties of the
presented fmancial market equilibria. particularly the welfare of the various participants. The ensuing sections
summarize by giving some advice to the fmancial market regulators. the various types of outsiders. and the
corporate insiders based on the identified effects in my models.
9.2 ADVICE TO REGULATORS
If.for some reason. the fmancial market regulators want to protect small. uninformed investors. they should be
aware that insider trading affects both production and exchange. This is because trading on inside infonnation
tends to decrease the adverse selection. the trading risk. the risk sharing possibilities. and the stability of the
underlying fundamental. The two first effects are positive. whereas the two last are negative. Thus. the net
effect may be negative or positive. depending on the market premises which. of course. may differ from
exchange to exchange.
For instance. if a major part of the uninformed trading is motivated by hedging. the hedgers prefer insider
trading prohibited because it decreases the possibility to share the risk associated with their initial positions. On
the other hand, if a major part of the uninformed trading comes from unsophisticated traders whose trading often
are motivated by liquidity events. these traders may prefer insider trading allowed because of the increased
competition among the superiorly informed traders. This means that if the regulators want to protect small.
uninfonned investors. they have to find out what are the motives for trading. Regulations in financial markets
should. of course. be based on a clear understanding of their effects combined with empirical analyses exploring
the premises of the market If the financial market regulators find it optimal to prohibit insider trading. they
have to enforce the law and. consequently. take into account the cost of enforcement Then the regulatory
choices might be between allowing insider trading or prohibiting it by the support of an inadequate enforcement
policy.
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The problem with an inadequate enforcement is that the insiders are able to trade illegally either directly or
indirectly by tippees. Obviously, this makes the choice of regulatory regime more difficult because the
competition is reduced, giving the illegally trading insiders more market power. They respond by reducing their
trading which at the same time gives them better camouflage and higher risk: adjusted returns. My study also
indicates that if the welfare of small, unsophisticated traders is the primary concern of regulators, prohibiting
insider trading should in many cases be supported by adequate enforcement or else be allowed. This in turn
suggests that the financial market regulators must implement operational rules (e.g., trading restrictions before
announcements of major events) in order to eliminate illegal trading. Other considerations such as the
managers' legal right to trade in their own stock based on ''public" information must perhaps step aside some
time before these events.
9.3 ADVICE TO OUTSIDERS
There are many types of outsiders such as liquidity traders, hedgers. market professionals, market makers. and
broker - arbitrageurs. Normally. the market professionals would be better informed than the market makers and
the broker - arbitrageurs. The hedgers and the liquidity traders, on the other hand. have only access to the history
of the securities market, and are therefore less informed than the intermediaries and the superiorly informed
speculators.
Liquidity traders
If a liquidity event occurs, the trader who is affected should trade in riskless assets such as bonds or in stock
index futures where security-specific information is diversified away. Nevertheless. ifthese liquidity traders have
to sell stocks they already own. they should choose to sell at a time where the informed trading is expected to
have small impact on the trading cost; for instance. just after the company has published information. Other
strategies are also possible. but difficult in practice. because the discretionary liquidity traders then need much
information about market conditions.
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Hedgers
If the corporate insiders are allowed to trade, the effectiveness of hedging strategies by taking offsetting positions
in the spot market tends to be reduced because of reduced and even destroyed risk sharing opportunities. This
means that hedgers operating on an exchange characterized by insider trading should think somewhat differently
about hedging, because it becomes more important to always hold diversified portfolios. As we know,
diversification eliminates the security-specific risk leaving the hedgers only with non-diversifiable risk which
have to be borne by someone. If the hedgers always see to it that they hold diversified portfolios, they are only
hort by informed traders who have access to information about the systematic component in the return of their
portfolio.
Market proressionals
Securities analysts and other quasi-insiders should concentrate their effort on securities where there is minimal
competition from real insiders. In this way, their supply will be elastic in the number of corporate insiders
which may also improve the terms of trade for uninformed such as hedgers and liquidity traders. If the
professionals are concerned about the risk of trading, insider trading would hort them less. This is because
informed trading brings the prices closer to their fundamentals.
Market makers and broker • arbitrageurs
Dealing in securities characterized by insider trading is disadvantageous unless the dealer holds a low inventory
or is concerned about the risk of trading. This means that the exchange members usually are demanders of
regulation, and because there often is a close relation between the exchange and the control authorities, these
demandels are often heard.
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9.4 ADVICE TO INSIDERS
We have seen that corporate insiders and their tippees outside the firm may trade illegally by hiding behind
outsiders in the net flow of orders. But as long as the law is enforced, there is a positive probability that the
insiders are identified and punished according to the law. Of course, illegal trading is not recommended.
Nevertheless, traders possessing inside information may easily develop trading strategies which is bard to pursue
by the control authorities. For instance, if the insiders exploit the fact that information is correlated, the risk of
detection is small. If one of company A' s insiders receives infonnation revealing that A is undervalued, a
profitable strategy might be for the insider's tippee to buy stocks in company B which is in the same industry.
Corporate insiders can also take advantage of their information by not trading. If, for instance, the insiders
observe good news, they can either buy stock or postpone previously planned sales until after the news is
revealed in the market price.
9.5 FUTURE RESEARCH
I have shown that the effects of insider trading may depend on the parameters of the model, leading to different
conclusion for different sets of parameters. This suggests that future research should be more empirical in the
sense that insider trading should be analyzed separatelyon every exchange. Perhaps the law should be adjusted
to take into account potential differences in market characteristics such as the elasticity of the liquidity demand.
Theoretical research should continue to focus on insider trading in market designs close to the ones actually
observed. This in order to improve our understanding of the basic underlying effects caused by insider trading
and its regulation.
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